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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This PhD dissertation investigates the links between foreign direct investment (FDI), pollution 
and environmental policies in an interdependent world. To tackle the issue of spatial 
dependence, I propose to apply new spatial estimators.   
 
The thesis consists of four papers. The first chapter, entitled Spatial Dynamic Panel and System 
GMM: a Monte-Carlo Investigation, investigates the finite sample properties of estimators for 
spatial dynamic panel models in the presence of several endogenous variables. I show that in 
order to account for the endogeneity of several covariates and get unbiased estimates, you 
should apply the system generalized moments method (GMM) estimator instead of traditional 
spatial dynamic estimators. From a practical point of view, system GMM is computationally less 
demanding and easier to adapt to unbalanced panel data.  
 
In the second paper, Pollution Havens: a Spatial Vector Autoregression Approach (VAR), I 
investigate the mutual relationship between FDI, pollution and trade openness for 141 countries 
during the nineties. After applying second generation panel unit root tests, I estimate a 
trivariate spatial VAR model where a shock occurring in a given country can potentially affect 
the economic conditions in the neighboring countries. Based on generalized empirical likelihood 
estimations, the results highlight a reverse causality between FDI and pollution emission, 
suggesting the existence of a potential endogenous pollution haven effect to low income 
countries in particular. In addition, spatial spillovers play a key role in the linkage between FDI, 
trade openness and SO2 emission and highlight the strategic nature of these variables. 
Multilateral and regional cooperation between developed, emerging and developing countries 
should be extended to capitalize on these spillovers, address potential issues and seize new 
opportunities.  
 
In line with the previous study, in the third paper, entitled Complex FDI and Environmental 
Regulation: the Role of Spatial Dependence, I investigate if differences in environmental 
regulations influenced OECD’s FDI allocation during 1981-2000 taking into account “third-
country” effects in a multi-country setting. The findings, based on system GMM estimates of a 
spatial dynamic gravity model, confirm the existence of a negative relationship between FDI and 
environmental stringency, once I correct for endogeneity and spatial dependence. In addition, 
the evidence of positive “third-country” effects for FDI suggests the prevalence of highly 
complex vertically integrated FDI from OECD countries to developing economies. Multinationals 
tend to allocate each part of the production process in different countries to ensure cost 
minimization. Emerging and developing countries, which might be tempted to use 
environmental regulation as an instrument to attract FDI, will only attract the most polluting 
part of the production process. This is not the best way to ensure sustainable economic growth, 
at least on the long run.  
 
 
 
     
 
 
In the last chapter called Unequal Diffusion of Eco-labels: a Spatial Econometric Approach, I 
analyze the decision to introduce an eco-labelling scheme through a heteroskedastic Bayesian 
spatial probit. This framework allows the government’s decision to introduce an eco-label 
program to be influenced by the decision of the neighboring countries. I propose to estimate 
this model by implementing a new algorithm with higher mixing and converge. Based on a 
sample, including 141 developing and developed economies, I show that the probability for a 
country to introduce an eco-labelling scheme depends on the eco-label programs adopted by 
countries which are spatially close or sharing a strong trade intensity relationship with each 
other. These results explain why developing countries, which are standards takers, have 
naturally been put at a disadvantage in terms of eco-labelling adoption. Therefore, eco-label 
programs should be as transparent as possible and rely on standard harmonization and mutual 
recognition to remove any potential technical trade barriers and encourage the participation of 
developing countries. 
 
 
Keywords:  Spatial Econometrics; Generalized Moments Methods; Empirical Likelihood; 
Bayesian Econometrics; Dynamic Panel Model; Monte-Carlo Simulations.  
  
International Trade; Environmental Policy; Complex Foreign Direct Investment; Pollution 
Haven; Eco-label.   
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is an attempt to better understand the role of spatial dependence in the 
determination of the linkages between foreign direct investments (FDI), pollution emissions and 
environmental policies at the world wide level.  
 
Motivation 
The so-called globalization process has been at the center of several heated debates between 
environmental and trade communities. The impact of globalization on the environment both 
within and across countries is a controversial debate among economists and policymakers. 
Climate Change has further put the attention to energy efficiency and environmental damages. 
Thus, it is important to understand the mechanisms through which the economy is affecting and 
affected by environmental degradation.  
 
Emerging and developing countries are likely to face the highest share of the damage costs of 
environmental impacts in terms of potential agricultural productivity losses, limited water 
access, poverty and forced migration. While developing economies should engage in green 
growth strategies through the use of energy efficient technologies and renewable alternative 
energies, they cannot be expected to make these changes right away without impeding 
productivity and growth. Therefore, an understanding of the spatial and temporal dynamic 
linkages between foreign direct investment, trade, pollution emissions and environmental 
policies is necessary to be able to lay down the foundations for a sustainable economic path in 
an interdependent world. 
 
Conceptually, the presence of spatial interdependence necessitates a specific modelling and 
econometric treatment, which can be accommodated through the inclusion of an endogenous 
spatial autoregressive term, called spatial lag. Yet, most empirical studies fail to explicitly 
account for the fact that some policy and investment decisions depend on the behavior of other 
governments and firms, while pollution emissions (air/water) are characterized by spillovers to 
geographically close countries. If spatial interdependence does matter, but is not accounted for, 
empirical findings might be biased and invalid. Therefore it is particularly important to 
overcome the lack of robustness by mitigating the variables omission bias. 
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Contributions 
Beyond the environmental/trade perspective, each empirical essay proposes a new estimator to 
be applied in a spatial framework. Despite an increasing diffusion of spatial estimators in the 
past 10 years, a major limitation in spatial econometrics is the lack of available estimators in 
standard statistical and econometric software packages (e.g. Stata, Eviews, ...). In particular, I 
show the flexibility of the system GMM estimator and generalized empirical likelihood in order 
to address the endogeneity of the time as well as spatial dependence and other covariates. In a 
cross-section setting, I extend the "joint updating" Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithm to a 
spatial dependent probit model. This new method displays higher mixing and relies on smaller 
draws to obtain a stationary chain making it relatively more time efficient. I compiled and 
implemented most of the new estimators in MATLAB. Although time consuming, the 
construction of all these routines were a true learning process. They remain available upon 
request. 
 
Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis is composed of three parts. The first one is purely econometric and 
investigates the finite sample properties of spatial dynamic estimators and system GMM in a 
spatial dynamic panel framework. The second part includes two essays that analyze the 
pollution haven effect through a spatial Vector Autoregression specification and a bilateral 
spatial dynamic panel model. Finally, in the third part, I investigate the adoption of eco-labelling 
schemes in an international trade setting through a Bayesian spatial autoregressive probit 
model. 
 
The starting point of this thesis is the investigation of the finite sample properties of several 
estimators for spatial dynamic panel models in the presence of several endogenous variables. 
So far, none of the available estimators in spatial econometrics allows to consider spatial 
dynamic models with endogenous variables, beside the time and spatial autoregressive 
variables. I propose to apply system GMM, since it can correct for the endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent variable, the spatial lag as well as other potentially endogenous variables using 
internal and/or external instruments. The results demonstrate that system GMM can be as 
efficient as standard spatial dynamic estimators (Elhorst, 2005; Yu et al., 2008). In addition, the 
need to account for additional sources of endogeneity leads to favor system GMM. On a 
practical ground, unlike spatial dynamic estimators which are computationally cumbersome, 
system GMM is easy to handle and readily available in most econometric softwares.  
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The second chapter, “Pollution Havens: a Spatial Vector Autoregression Approach”, starts by 
recognizing that empirical studies designed to test the pollution haven effect have so far shown 
little and conflicting evidence. One of the crucial problems inherent in existing studies is that, to 
date, no specific causality analysis of the mutual relationship between FDI, environmental policy 
and capital/trade openness has been conducted. The most popular approaches consist of either 
assuming environmental regulation as a function of FDI/trade or vice-versa. Only recently, some 
authors showed the theoretical and empirical importance of endogenizing environmental 
stringency with respect to FDI/Trade. The second essay disentangles which relationship(s) is 
(are) more prevalent by estimating a trivariate spatial panel vector autoregression where an 
economic shock occurring in a given country can potentially affect the economic conditions in 
the neighbouring countries. Explicitly accounting for spatial dependence and spillovers is 
particularly important for two interrelated reasons. First, environmental policies, FDI allocation 
as well as trade openness have been shown to be spatially correlated. Second, taking into 
account spatial dependence and spillovers can potentially mitigate the variable omissions bias. 
This is the first time that the temporal and spatial dynamics through which these three variables 
interact are carefully analyzed at the world-wide level. From a methodological perspective, this 
study presents several innovative features. First, the generalized empirical likelihood (GEL) 
estimator based on the system GMM's moments conditions is applied to a spatial VAR model. 
Second, because ignoring the possibility of non-stationary parameters can lead to unreliable 
inference, second generation panel unit root tests, that explicitly account for heterogeneity and 
cross-section dependence, are implemented. Last but not least, the role of spatial spillovers is 
highlighted through spatial complements to panel Granger causality and impulse-response 
functions. Based on 124 countries during the nineties (1993-2000), the results highlight a 
reverse causality between FDI and environmental policy (proxied by SO2/GDP emission), 
confirming the existence of both a pollution haven and a pollution halo effect, for low income 
countries in particular. In addition, spatial spillovers play a key role in the linkages between FDI, 
trade openness and SO₂ emissions and highlight the strategic nature of these variables. Overall, 
these findings suggest that the analysis of the linkages between FDI and the environment should 
explicitly account for the potential endogeneity and spatial nature of the variables in order to 
reduce variable omissions. 
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Based on the results provided by the first two chapters, the third essay, entitled “Complex FDI 
and Environmental Regulation”, reconsiders the analysis of the pollution haven effect by 
accounting for the spatial and endogenous nature of environmental regulation with respect to 
the allocation of FDI. Until recently, most multinational enterprises' (MNE) motivations 
illustrated in the literature relied on a two-country framework, where FDI between home 
country i and host country j was only affected by both countries' characteristics. However, new 
types of FDI have emerged in the last twenty years. Multinationals can allocate FDI in a host 
country but can also engage in trade or FDI in a third country. These more complex integrated 
FDI are embedded in a multilateral decision-making process, which means that FDI decisions 
across various host countries are not spatially independent. Other elements may also lead to 
interdependent FDI decisions across host countries, including imperfect capital markets and 
agglomeration externalities (spillovers) which limit the necessary funds a multinational company 
has to commit abroad. The distinction between types of FDI is also important in the analysis of 
the pollution haven effect, because these four forms of FDI respond differently to the host and 
neighboring countries' environmental stringency. In particular, highly integrated vertical FDI is 
expected to be more sensitive to environmental stringency. On the other hand, horizontal FDI 
should not be very sensitive to environmental regulation. Thus, the reason the evidence of 
pollution haven effect is weak (almost inexistent) at the cross-country level could be related to 
the fact that the most prevalent type of FDI is horizontal, not that the pollution haven effect 
does not exist. This paper employs a spatial dynamic panel model to estimate the effects of 
environmental regulations on the allocation of FDI flows among countries taking into account 
spatial dependence in FDI decision. I examine bilateral FDI flows using an extended OECD 
investment database which covers a great number of host countries and a long sample period 
(1981-2000). The findings are largely plausible across specifications and confirm the existence of 
a pollution haven effect, once I correct for endogeneity and spatial dependence. It is further 
corroborated by the evidence of prevalence of complex vertical integrated FDI from developed 
to developing countries. 
 
The last chapter takes a departure from the pollution haven literature to analyze why some 
governments have adopted multi-sectors (manufactured products) type I eco-label programs 
and others did not. It also looks at the presence of strategic interactions among partners in their 
decision to adopt an eco-labelling scheme. Due to increasing competition in domestic and 
export markets, a country's decision to introduce an eco-label program might be influenced by 
the behaviour of its neighbouring countries. A government might consider introducing an eco-
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labelling scheme in order to restrict market access to foreign products or to boost its exports 
earnings. Whatever the case, its decision will depend on how many and which countries have or 
are expected to adopt an eco-labelling program. Such interdependence may help explain the 
very unequal diffusion of eco-label programs among countries. While most industrialized 
countries have adopted an eco-labelling scheme, African and Latin American countries have yet 
to decide to implement this type of market-based initiative. This asymmetry has led to trade 
tensions, as eco-labels are criticized for potentially imposing the environmental concerns of 
(high income) importing countries on the production methods of (low income) trading partners. 
This is particularly problematic for developing countries depending heavily on exports to sustain 
their growth. So far, in spite of these important concerns, most of the literature on eco-labels 
and its international trade linkages has taken a conceptual or descriptive approach due to a lack 
of data. As prior studies have not controlled for the spatial dependence in the eco-label 
decision, their results may also be biased or inconsistent. To tackle the issue of cross-sectional 
interdependence, I estimate a Bayesian spatial autoregressive probit model by developing a 
new Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo algorithm. The empirical evidence confirms the role of the 
economy's stage of development and innovation capacity in the government's decision to 
introduce an eco-label. Moreover, results highlight the strategic nature of the eco-labelling 
decision. In particular, the probability for a country to introduce an eco-labelling scheme 
depends on the eco-label programs adopted by countries which are spatially close or sharing a 
strong trade intensity relationship with each other. These results explain why developing 
countries, which are standards takers, have been naturally put at a disadvantage in terms of 
eco-labelling adoption. 
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Chapter 1  
Spatial Dynamic Panel Model and System GMM: 
A Monte Carlo Investigation1 
1 Introduction 
Although dynamic panel models have drawn a lot of attention in the last decade, the 
econometric analysis of spatial and dynamic panel models is scarce. So far, none of the available 
estimators allows to consider a dynamic spatial lag panel model with one or more endogenous 
variables as explanatory variables, besides the time and spatial lag. Despite this econometric 
gap, there is an increasing number of empirical studies interested in analyzing the time and 
spatial patterns of the data in a unified framework. 
 
The spatial dynamic model finds its justification in two main arguments. First, from a theoretical 
point of view, the spatial lag variable can be viewed as the empirical representation of the 
reaction function of the theoretical model (e.g. Nash game), while the autoregressive variable 
captures the dynamic mechanism of the underlying process2. Second, from an econometric 
viewpoint, the inclusion of a spatial and time lag can potentially reduce variables omission, 
which are spatially and/or temporally correlated. Despite the inclusion of both variables, 
additional endogeneity in the right hand side might still persist. This endogeneity is usually 
associated with additional variables omission, measurement error or the existence of a 
simultaneous relationship between the dependent and some explanatory variables. 
 
Empirically, there are numerous examples where the presence of a dynamic process, spatial 
dependence and endogeneity might occur. For instance, the empirical test of the New Economic 
Geography model faces not only spatial and dynamic dependence, but also endogeneity. In the 
so-called wage equation, the nominal wage rate of the monopolistically competitive sector 
usually displays high persistency over time and can be determined strategically with respect to 
the remaining regions or industries. Moreover, the main explanatory variable of the equation, 
the "market potential" variable, is likely to be endogenous, since the level of income and the 
price index of each region are partially determined by the wage rate. Recently, empirical work 
                                                     
1
 Written in collaboration with Madina Kukenova, PhD Candidate, University of Lausanne. 
2
 The spatial autoregressive term is also referred as endogenous interaction effects in social economics or as interdependence 
process in political science. 
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on FDI based on the Capital-Knowledge model is set in a spatial dynamic framework to account 
for the complementary and/or substitutive nature of FDI (e.g. horizontal, vertical and complex 
FDI). Additional FDI determinants might also be endogenous, especially in small countries whose 
FDI are a large source of income. 
 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and additional endogenous variables in a spatial 
lag model invalidate the use of traditional spatial maximum likelihood estimators. In fact, 
applying standard spatial likelihood estimators in this framework yields inconsistent and biased 
estimates, because they only account for one or two source(s) of endogeneity, namely the 
spatial and the time lag. To overcome the absence of a proper spatial estimator, several 
empirical studies (Kukenova and Monteiro, 2009; Madariaga and Poncet, 2007) apply the 
system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, developed by Arellano and 
Bover(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)3. The main reason behind the use of system GMM to 
estimate a spatial dynamic panel model is its ability to correct for the endogeneity introduced 
by the spatial lag variable and other potentially endogenous regressors. In addition, system 
GMM is robust to some econometrics issues such as measurement error and weak instruments. 
It can also control for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the disturbance error. 
Moreover its implementation is computationally tractable as it avoids the inversion of high 
dimension spatial weights matrix W and the computation of its eigenvalues. 
 
Going beyond this intuitive motivation, this paper addresses several issues through an extensive 
Monte Carlo study. First, I show that system GMM estimates consistently the spatial lag 
parameter. Second, I investigate how the presence of additional endogenous variables influence 
the performance of system GMM. Third, I compare the relative performance of recently 
available spatial dynamic estimators with respect to system GMM in the presence of an 
additional endogenous variable. In particular, I compare the performance of spatial MLE (SMLE), 
Spatial Dynamic MLE (SDMLE) (Elhorst, 2005) and Spatial Dynamic QMLE (SDQMLE) (Yu et al, 
2008). To our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the consequences of an additional 
endogenous explanatory variable in a spatial dynamic framework and compare the finite sample 
properties of the current available spatial dynamic estimators in a thorough analysis. Overall, 
system GMM displays good finite sample properties. Despite the fact that system GMM displays 
higher dispersion in the parameter estimation, it is less biased. As the 
                                                     
3
 System GMM is also known as SYS-GMM or extended GMM (Binder, 2005). 
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sample size increases, system GMM outperforms any spatial estimators considered in this study. 
These findings suggest that it might be appropriate to apply system GMM when the spatial 
dynamic panel model includes several endogenous variables and the sample size ( N  or T ) is 
relatively large. The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
dynamic spatial lag model and reviews the available methods to estimate it, including system  
GMM. The Monte Carlo investigation is described and performed in section 3. Section 4 checks 
the robustness of the main results. Section 5 brings the paper to a conclusion. 
 
2 Spatial Dynamic Panel Model 
The increasing popularity of spatial models in empirical studies is intimately linked to the recent 
progress in spatial econometrics theory. The basic spatial model was suggested by Cliff and Ord 
(1981), but it did not receive important theoretical extensions until the middle of the 1990s. 
Anselin (2001, 2006), Elhorst (2003) and Lee and Yu (2009) provide thorough surveys of the 
different spatial models and suggest econometric strategies to estimate them. 
 
2.1 Dynamic Spatial Lag Model 
A general spatial dynamic panel model, also known as a spatial dynamic autoregressive model 
with spatial autoregressive error (SARAR(1,1)), can be described as follows:  
 
 
ttttttt XZYWYY    11  
TtvW tttt ,...,1  ,2    
(1)  
 
where tY  is a 1N  vector, tW1  and tW2  are NN  row-standardized spatial weight matrices 
which are non-stochastic and exogenous to the model,   is the vector of individual effects, tZ  
is a pN  matrix of p  exogenous explanatory variables ( 0p ) and tX  is a qN  matrix of q  
endogenous and predetermined explanatory variables with respect to tY   0q . Finally, tv  is 
assumed to be distributed as  ,0 . By adding some restrictions to the parameters, two 
popular spatial model specifications can be derived from this general spatial model, namely the 
dynamic spatial lag model ( 0 ) and the dynamic spatial error model  0 4. 
                                                     
4 The analysis of the spatial error panel model and the spatial lag with spatial error model is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
further details, see Elhorst (2005), Kapoor et al. (2007), as well as Lee and Yu (2009). Recently, Jacobs et al. (2009) estimate a 
spatial dynamic model with a spatial error term using system GMM. They show that the impact of ignoring the spatial error 
term is marginal. This confirms that the presence of spatial dependence in the error term does not alter the consistence of the 
remaining parameters. 
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The spatial lag model accounts directly for relationships between dependent variables that are 
believed to be related in some spatial way. Somewhat analogous to a lagged dependent variable 
in time series analysis, the estimated spatial lag coefficient characterizes the contemporaneous 
correlation between one cross-section and other geographically-proximate cross-sections. The 
following equation gives the basic spatial dynamic panel specification: 
 
 ttttttt vXZYWYY    1  (2)  
 
Model (2) is also known as the "time-space simultaneous" model according to Anselin (1988, 
2001) typology5. The spatial autoregressive coefficient (  ) associated with ttYW  represents the 
effect of the weighted average of the neighborhood, i.e.     jtijtNjitt YdwYW t   ...1 ,  ijt dw  
being the weight between location i and j. The spatial lag term allows to determine if the 
dependent variable tY  is (positively/negatively) affected by the tY  from other close locations 
weighted by a given criterion (usually distance or contiguity). In other words, the spatial lag 
coefficient captures the impact of tY  from neighborhood locations. Let min  and max  be the 
smallest and highest characteristic root of the spatial matrix W , then this spatial effect is 
assumed to lie between min1   and max1  . Most of the spatial econometrics literature 
constrains the spatial lag to lie between -1 and +1. However, this might be restrictive, because if 
the spatial matrix is row-normalized, then the highest characteristic root is equal to unity (i.e. 
1max  ), but the smallest eigenvalue can be bigger than -1, which would lead the lower bound 
to be smaller than -1. 
 
Given that expression (2) is a combination of a time and spatial autoregressive models, I need to 
ensure that the resulting process is stationary. This is particularly important for the spatial 
estimators, since Binder et al. (2005) showed that system GMM does not break down in the 
presence of a unit root. Note that the stationarity restrictions in this type of model are stronger 
than the individual restrictions imposed on the coefficients of a spatial or dynamic model. The 
process is covariance stationary if   11    tN WI  , or, equivalently, if
6 
 
0if 1
0if 1
min
max




 
 
                                                     
5
 Besides the "time-space simulatenous" model, Anselin distinguishes three other spatial lag panel models: the "pure space 
recursive" model which only includes a lagged spatial lag coefficient; the "time-space recursive" specification which considers 
a lagged dependent variable as well as a lagged spatial lag (Korniotis, 2007); and the "time-space dynamic" model, which 
includes a time lag, a spatial lag and a lagged spatial lag (Yu et al., 2008). 
6
 According to Kelejian and Prucha (1999), one necessary stationary condition in space is that rows and columns sums of the 
spatial weight matrix are uniformly bounded in absolute values (as n ). 
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From an econometric viewpoint, equation (2) faces simultaneity and endogeneity problems, 
which in turn means that OLS estimation will be biased and inconsistent (Anselin, 1988). To see 
this point more formally, note that the reduced form of equation (2) is given by the following 
expression: 
 
   tttttNt vXZYWIY  
  1
1  
 
Each element of tY  is a linear combination of all of the error terms. Moreover, as pointed out by 
Anselin (2003), assuming 1  and each element of tW  is smaller than one imply that 
  1 tN WI   can be reformulated as a Leontief expansion   ....
221 

tttN WWIWI   
Accordingly, the spatial lag model features two types of global spillovers effects: a multiplier 
effect for the predictor variables as well as a diffusion effect for the error process. Since the 
spatial lag term ttYW  is correlated with the disturbances, even if tv  are independently and 
identically distributed, it must be treated as endogenous and a proper estimation method must 
account for this endogeneity.  
 
Despite the fact that dynamic panel models have been the object of recent important 
developments (Phillips and Moon, 2000), econometric analysis of spatial dynamic panel models 
is almost inexistent. In fact, the spatial dynamic panel model without additional endogenous 
variables was first formulated by Anselin in 1988. Yet there was no available estimator until the 
mid 2000's. Currently, there is only a limited number of available estimators that deal with 
spatial and time dependence in a panel setting. Table 1 summarizes the different estimators 
proposed in the literature. 
 
In the absence of spatial dependence, there are three main types of estimators available to 
estimate a dynamic panel model. The first type of estimators consists of estimating an 
unconditional likelihood function (Hsiao et al., 2002). The second type of procedure corrects the 
bias associated with the least square dummy variables (LSDV) estimator (Bun and Carree, 2005). 
The last type, which is the most popular, relies on GMM estimators, like difference GMM 
(Arellano and Bond, 1992), system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995), Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
or continuously updated GMM (Hansen et al., 1996). 
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Table 1: Spatial Dynamic Estimators Survey 
  
Model Estimation Methods Endogenous 
 tttt ZYY   1   GMM (Arellano et al. 1991, 1995; Blundell et al., 1998; Hansen et al., 1996)  1tY   
 MLE/Minimum Distance (Hsiao, Pesaran & Tahmiscioglu, 2002)  
 CLSDV (Kiviet, 1995; Hahn and Kuersteiner, 2002; Bun and Carree, 2005)  
   
 ttttt XZYY   1   GMM (Arellano et al., 1991, 1995; Blundell et al., 1998; Hansen et al., 1996)  ;1tY  tX   
   
 tttttt XZWYYY    11   LSDV-IV (Korniotis, 2010)  ;1tY  tX   
   
 tttt ZWYY     Spatial-MLE / Spatial 2SLS (Anselin, 1988, 2001; Elhorst, 2003)  tWY   
 Minimum Distance (Azomahou, 2008)  
   
 ttttt XZWYY     Spatial 2SLS (Dall'erba and Le Gallo, 2007)  ;tWY  tX   
   
 ttttt ZWYYY   1   Spatial Dynamic MLE (Elhorst, 2003, 2005, 2008)  ;tWY  1tY   
 Spatial Dynamic QMLE (Yu, de Jong and Lee, 2007, 2008; Lee and Yu 2007)  
 C2SLSDV (Beenstock and Felsenstein, 2007)  
 Spatial MLE-GMM / Spatial MLE-Spatial Dynamic MLE (Elhorst, 2008)  
   
 tttttt XZWYYY   1   System-GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998)  ;tWY  ;1tY  tX   
   
  
     
-13- 
Assuming all explanatory variables are exogenous beside the spatial autoregressive term, the 
spatial lag panel model without any time dynamic is usually estimated using spatial maximum 
likelihood (Elhorst, 2003) or spatial two-stage least squares methods (S2SLS) (Anselin, 1988, 
2001). The ML approach consists of estimating the spatial coefficient by maximizing the non-
linear reduced form of the spatial lag model. The spatial 2SLS uses the exogenous variables and 
their spatially weighted averages ( tZ , tt ZW  ) as instruments
7. In a Monte Carlo study, Franzese 
and Hays (2007) show that S2SLS is less biased than SMLE but suffers from poor efficiency in 
small samples. When the number of cross-sections is larger than the period sample, Anselin 
(1988) suggests to estimate the model using MLE, 2SLS or 3SLS in a spatial seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) framework. More recently, Azomahou (2008) proposes to estimate a spatial 
panel autoregressive model with random effects applying a two-step minimum distance 
estimator. In the presence of endogenous variables but no lagged dependent variable, Dall'erba 
and Le Gallo (2007) suggest applying spatial 2SLS with lower orders of the spatially weighted 
sum of the exogenous variables as instrument for the spatial autoregressive term and the 
endogenous variables. 
 
In a dynamic context, the estimation of spatial lag panel models is usually based on a ML 
function. Elhorst (2003, 2005) proposes to estimate the unconditional loglikelihood function of 
the reduced form of the model in first-difference. While the absence of explanatory variables 
besides the time and spatial lags leads to an exact likelihood function, this is no longer the case 
when additional regressors are included. Moreover, when the sample size T  is relatively small 
the initial observations contribute greatly to the overall likelihood. That is why the pre-sample 
values of the explanatory variables and likelihood function are approximated using the Bhargava 
and Sargan approximation or the Nerlove and Balestra approximation. More recently, Yu et al. 
(2008) provide a theoretical analysis on the asymptotic properties of the quasi-maximum 
likelihood (Spatial Dynamic QML), which relies on the maximization of the concentrated 
likelihood function of the demeaned model. They show that the limit distribution is not 
centered around zero and propose a bias-corrected estimator8. Beside the fact that Yu et al. 
(2008) do not assume normality, the main difference with Elhorst's ML estimator lies in the 
asymptotic structure. Elhorst considers fixed T  and large N   N , while Yu et al. assume 
                                                     
7
 In a cross-section setting, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) suggest also additional instruments (Wt
2
Zt, Wt
3
Wt, …). Lee (2003) shows 
that the estimator proposed by Kelejian and Prucha is not an asymptotically optimal estimator and suggests a three-steps 
procedure with an alternative instrument for the spatial autoregressive coefficient in the last step: Wt(Zt - ~ Wt)
-1
Zt 
~ , where 
~  and ~  are estimates obtained using the S2SLS proposed by Kelejian and Prucha, 1998. 
8
 In two other related working papers, Lee and Yu (2007) and Yu et al.(2007) investigate the presence of non-stationarity and 
time fixed effects, respectively, in a spatial dynamic panel framework. 
     
-14- 
large N  and T    TN  ; . Consequently, the way the individual effects are taken out 
differs. Elhorst considers first-difference variables, while Yu et al. demean the variables. 
Assuming large T  avoids the problem associated with initial values and the use of 
approximation procedures. Finally, Yu et al's approach allows to recover the estimated 
individual effects, which is not the case with the estimator proposed by Elhorst. In a recent 
paper, Elhorst (2008) analyzes the finite sample performance of three estimators for a spatial 
dynamic panel model with one exogenous variable: Spatial MLE (referred as CLSDV by Elhorst), 
Spatial Dynamic MLE and difference GMM. He finds that Spatial Dynamic MLE has the better 
overall performance in terms of bias reduction and root mean squared errors (RMSE), although 
the Spatial MLE presents the smallest bias for the spatial autoregressive coefficient. Based on 
these results, Elhorst proposes two mixed estimators, where the spatial lag dependent variable 
is based on the spatial ML estimator and the remaining parameters are estimated using either 
difference GMM or Spatial Dynamic ML conditional on the spatial ML's estimate of the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient. The mixed Spatial MLE/Spatial Dynamic MLE estimator shows 
superior performance in terms of bias reduction and RMSE in comparison with mixed Spatial 
MLE/difference GMM. However, the latter can be justified on a practical ground if the number 
of cross-sections in the panel is large, since the time needed to compute Spatial MLE/Spatial 
Dynamic MLE can be substantial. In a spatial vector autoregression (spVAR) setting, Beenstock 
and Felsenstein (2007) suggest a spatial 2SLS procedure where the bias of the lagged dependent 
variable is corrected using Hsiao (1986)'s asymptotic bias expression. 
 
If one is willing to consider some explanatory variables as potentially endogenous in a dynamic 
spatial panel setting, then no spatial estimator is currently available. In many empirical 
applications, endogeneity can arise from measurement errors, variables omission or the 
presence of simultaneous relationship(s) between the dependent and the covariate(s). The main 
drawback of applying SMLE, SDMLE or SDQMLE is that, while the spatial autoregressive 
coefficient is considered endogenous, no instrumental treatment is applied to other potential 
endogenous variables. This leads to biased estimates, which would invalidate empirical results. 
To address this issue, I propose system-GMM. 
 
2.2 System GMM 
Empirical papers dealing with a spatial dynamic panel model with several endogenous variables 
usually apply system GMM (see for example Kukenova and Monteiro, 2008; Madriaga and 
Poncet, 2007). Back in 1978, Haining proposed to instrument a first order spatial autoregressive 
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model using lagged dependent variables. Since it does not use efficiently all the available 
information, this method is not efficient in a cross-section setting (Anselin, 1988). This is no 
longer the case in a panel framework. In line with Haining's suggestion, GMM instruments the 
spatial lag using lagged values of the dependent, spatial autoregressive and exogenous 
variables9. For simplicity, equation (2) is reformulated for a given cross-section i  ( Ni ,..,1 ) at 
time t  ( Tt ,..,1 ): 
   itiititittitit vXZYWYY    1  (3)  
 
According to Arellano and Bond (1991), the first step in difference GMM consists of eliminating 
the individual effects ( i ) correlated with the covariates and the lagged dependent variable, by 
rewriting equation (3) in first difference for individual i  at time t : 
 
   itititittitit vXZYWYY    1  (4)  
 
Even if the fixed effects (within) estimator cancels the individual fixed effects, the lagged 
endogenous variable ( 1 itY ) is still correlated with the idiosyncratic error terms ( itv ). Nickell 
(1981) as well as Anderson and Hsiao (1981) show that the within estimator is only consistent 
for large T . Given that this condition is usually not satisfied in practice, the estimation using 
first-difference remains also biased and inconsistent. To overcome this issue, Arellano and Bond 
(1991) propose the following moment conditions associated with equation (4): 
 
   12and,...,3 for  ;0,  tTtvYE itti   (5)  
 
If the strict exogeneity assumption of the covariates ( itZ ) has not been verified, the estimation 
based only on these moment conditions (5) is insufficient. The explanatory variables constitute 
valid instruments to improve the estimator's efficiency only when the strict exogeneity 
assumption is satisfied: 
 
   TTtvZE iti   1and,...,3 for  ;0  (6)  
 
However, the GMM estimator based on the moment conditions (5) and (6) can still be 
inconsistent when 2  and in presence of reverse causality, i.e.   0ititvZE . In order to 
overcome this problem, one can assume that the covariates are weakly exogenous for  t  , 
which means that the moment conditions (6) can be rewritten as: 
 
                                                     
9
 Badinger et al. (2004) recommend to apply system GMM, once the data has been spatially filtered. This approach can be 
considered only when spatial dependence is viewed as a nuisance parameter. 
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   11and,...,3 for  ;0,  tTtvZE itti   (7)  
 
For the different endogenous variables, including the spatial lag, the valid moment conditions 
are 
   12and...3 for  ;0,  tTtvXE itti   (8)  
    12and...3 for  ;0  tTtvYWE ititt   (9)  
 
In small samples, the GMM estimator based on these moment conditions can still yield biased 
coefficients. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the imprecision of this estimator increases 
when the individual effects are important and the variables are persistent over time making the 
lagged levels of the endogenous variables weak instruments. To overcome those problems, the 
authors propose system GMM, which estimate simultaneously equation (3) and equation (4). 
The additional moment conditions for system GMM are based on the model specified in level: 
 
   TtvYE itti ,...,3 for  ;01,    (10)  
   TtvZE itit ,...,2 for  ;0   (11)  
   TtvXE itit ,...,3 for  ;01    (12)  
    TtvYWE ititt ,...,3 for  ;011    (13)  
 
The consistency of the system GMM estimator relies on the validity of these moment 
conditions, which depends on the assumption of absence of serial correlation of the level 
residuals and the exogeneity of the explanatory variables. Therefore, it is necessary to apply 
specification tests to ensure that these assumptions hold. Arellano and Bond suggest two 
specification tests in order to verify the consistency of the GMM estimator. First, the overall 
validity of the moment conditions is checked by the Sargan/Hansen test. Second, the Arellano-
Bond test examines the serial correlation property of the level residuals. 
 
More generally, one should keep in mind that the estimation of the spatial autoregressive 
coefficient via system GMM, although "potentially" consistent, is usually not the most efficient 
one. Efficiency relies on the "proper" choice of instruments, which is not an easy task to 
implement. Another issue lies in the fact that the instrument count grows as the sample size T  
rises. A large number of instruments can overfit endogenous variables (i.e. fail to correct for 
endogeneity) and leads to inaccurate estimation of the optimal weight matrix, downward 
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biased two-step standard errors and wrong inference in the Hansen test of instruments validity. 
Okui (2009) demonstrates that the bias of system GMM does not result from the total number 
of instruments, but from the number of instruments for each equation. As pointed out by 
Roodman (2009), it is advisable to restrict the number of instruments by defining a maximum 
number of lags and/or by collapsing the instruments10. Collapsing means combining instruments 
through addition into subsets. For instance, if the instruments are collapsed, the moment 
conditions (5) become: 
   12 for  ;0,  tvYE itti   (14)  
 
These modified moment conditions still impose the orthogonality of tiY ,  and itv , but rather 
to hold for each t  and  , it is only valid for each  . Roodman (2009) shows that collapsed 
instruments lead to less biased estimates, although the associated standard errors tend to 
increase. GMM results in this paper are based on collapsed instruments11. This allows us to use 
the same number of instruments independently of the sample size. 
 
3 A Monte-Carlo Study 
In this section, I investigate the finite sample properties of several estimators including Spatial 
MLE, Spatial Dynamic MLE and Spatial Dynamic QMLE, LSDV, difference GMM and system GMM 
in the presence of an endogenous variable in a spatial dynamic panel data context using Monte-
Carlo simulations12. Following Blundell et al. (2000), the data generating process (DGP) is 
defined as follows: 
   itiititittiit vXZWYYY    1,  (15)  
 ittiit uZZ  1,  (16)  
 itititiit evXX    1,  (17)  
 
with  2,0  Ni  ;   2,0 vit Nv  ;   2,0 uit Nu   2,0; eit Ne   . 
 
 
                                                     
10
 This approach has been adopted in several empirical papers, including Beck and Levine (2004). 
11
 See Appendix 6.1 for further details on extended GMM and Appendix 6.2 for spatial ML estimators. 
12
 All simulations are performed using Matlab R2008b. The estimation of a spatial dynamic panel model with system-GMM can 
also be done in Stata (with the xtabond2 command), Gauss (with the DPD98 routine) or Eviews (with gmm() and @dyn 
commands). 
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Note that the variable itX  is predetermined and not endogenous per se. Yet, GMM estimators 
correct for the presence of predetermined and endogenous variables through the same type of 
moment conditions. In order to avoid results being influenced by initial observations, the 
covariates 0iY , 0iZ  and 0iX  are set to 0  for all i  and each variable is generated  T100  times 
according to their respective DGP. The first 100 observations are then discarded. Note that the 
dependent variable is generated according to the reduced form of equation (15): 
 
     itiitittiiit vXZYWY    1,11  (18)  
 
Following Kapoor et al. (2007) and Kelejian and Prucha (1999), I consider four different types of 
spatial weight matrix. In each case, the matrix is row-standardized so that elements in each row 
sums to one. The matrices considered are characterized by different degree of sparseness. More 
precisely, the first three "theoretical" spatial matrices rely on a perfect "idealized" circular 
world, referred as Rook type of order 1, 3 and 5, so that each location is related to the 
one/three/five locations immediately before and after it and each nonzero elements are equal 
to  5.0  / 3.0  / 1.0  , respectively13. In addition, as a robustness check, I consider real distance 
data between capitals among 224 countries14. In order to avoid giving some positive weight to 
very remote countries, I consider the negative exponential weighting scheme. This is done by 
dividing the distance between locations J and K by the minimum distance within the region r  
(where location j  lies within region r ):    jrkjkj MINddw ,,, /exp   if kj  . 
 
The Monte Carlo experiments rely on the following designs: 
 
 40,30,20,10,5T ;  70 ;50 ;30 ;20N ;  7.0 ;5.0 ;4.0 ;2.0 ;  7.0 ;5.0 ;3.0 ;1.0 ; 
08.0 ;05.0 ;05.0 ;05.0 ;6.0 ;25.0 ;45.0 ;5.0 ;65.0 ;1 2222   evu  
 
In order to ensure stationarity, I consider the designs that satisfy the restrictions max1    
if 0 . The values of the spatial lag are restricted to be positive, as most empirical studies 
highlight a positive spatial autoregressive parameter. This stationarity restriction reduces the 
total number of designs to 200. For each of these designs, I performed 1000 trials with the same 
initial conditions and spatial weight matrix. 
                                                     
13
 For example, the rook-type matrix of order 1, also known as "one ahead, one behind" is such that its i
th
 row, Ni 1 , has 
nonzero elements in positions 1i  and 1i . Since the matrix is defined in a circular world, the nonzero elements in rows 1 
and N are in positions )1,( ),,1( and ),1( ,)2,1( NNNN  , respectively. The other two matrices are defined in a similar way. Note 
that these matrices have the property of remaining symmetric even after the row-standardization, which reduces significantly 
the computation time of Spatial Dynamic MLE and Spatial Dynamic QMLE. 
14
 The data is taken from CEPII database. 
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As a measure of consistency, I consider the root mean square error which is defined as the 
square root of the sum of the variance and the squared bias of the estimator. As suggested by 
Kelejian and Prucha (1999), I also consider the approximated RMSE, which converges to the 
standard RMSE under a normal distribution. Approximated RMSE is given by  222 35.1/IQb  , 
where b  is the difference between the true value of the coefficient and the median of the 
estimated coefficients, and IQ  is the difference between the 75% and 25% quantile. This 
definition has the advantage of being more robust to outliers that may be generated by the 
Monte-Carlo simulations. 
 
Based on the Rook type of order 1 spatial weight matrix, the Monte Carlo investigation 
highlights several important facts15. First, the results in terms of bias and efficiency depend on 
the values assigned to the spatial and time lag parameters. Second, the computation time is 
always larger with any spatial ML estimators than with system GMM. Since the results based on 
RMSE and approximated RMSE are qualitatively similar, I only present the results associated 
with standard RMSE. The Monte Carlo analysis is presented in two parts. First, I check if GMM 
are appropriate estimators in a spatial dynamic panel framework. Second, I compare the 
relative performance of system GMM with respect to the spatial estimators. 
 
3.1 System GMM vs. Difference GMM 
In this section, I study the finite sample properties of difference and system GMM. For 
illustrative purpose, I compare the performance of GMM estimators with respect to LSDV 
estimator. In order to have the same number of instruments independently of the sample size, I 
consider two-step GMM based on a collapsed instruments structure16. To avoid imprecise 
estimate of the optimal weight matrix (when NT  ), I also restrict the lags to two and three. In 
other words, each endogenous variables (i.e. 1tY , ,tWY  tX ) is instrumented with their 2nd and 
3rd lags values and the exogenous variable tX .  
 
In order to assess the global consistency and efficiency of GMM estimators: the bias and RMSE 
results are averaged over the whole range of parameters. As Figure 1 and 2 indicate, system and 
difference GMM outperform the fixed effect estimator in terms of bias and efficiency. In fact, 
                                                     
15
 The full results are given in Appendix 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. 
16
 Different types of instruments structure have been considered (no lag limit, no collapse option, ...) as well as different initial 
weight of the moment conditions matrix used in the first-step estimation. All results are available upon request. 
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the LSDV estimator has a negative bias which does not decrease with the size of the panel, 
invalidating the use of LSDV in this type of model. Consequently, spatial dynamic panel models 
should definitively not be estimated with LSDV. The differences in terms of performance 
between difference and system GMM are relatively marginal. Hayakawa (2007) shows that 
difference and level GMM estimators can be more biased than system GMM, because the bias 
of system GMM is the sum of two elements. The first one is the weighted sum of the bias 
associated with difference and level GMM, while the second one originates from using the level 
and difference estimators jointly. Since the bias of difference and level GMM evolve in opposite 
directions, the first component of the bias of system GMM will tend to be small due to a partial 
cancelling out effect. In addition, the weight of the first element plays also a role in the 
difference of the magnitude of the biases. The latter could explain why both GMM estimators 
perform almost equivalently. However, as depicted in Figure 2, system GMM displays smaller 
RMSE in small samples, that is why, I decide to focus on system GMM. 
 
 
Figure 1: LSDV vs. GMM Bias 
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Figure 2: LSDV vs. GMM RMSE 
 
 
3.2 System GMM vs. Spatial Estimators 
In this section, I compare the performance of system GMM with respect to spatial ML 
estimators by considering the average bias and RMSE for the different values of the 
autoregressive and spatial autoregressive coefficient17. For each parameter, Figure 3 plots the 
averaged bias of the respective estimators over a range of the cross-sectional dimension, N . 
The upper panels of Figure 3 display the average bias associated with the autoregressive and 
spatial autoregressive variables respectively, while the lower panels present the average bias for 
the endogenous and exogenous variables. Although the bias associated with the spatial 
estimators seems to be independent of the cross-section dimension, it does decrease as the 
time dimension increases. This corroborates Yu et al.'s findings, who show that spatial dynamic 
QMLE remains slightly biased as the number of cross-section increases (see Table 2 and 3 in Yu 
et al., 2008). Unlike spatial maximum likelihood estimators, system GMM's bias decreases as N  
and/or T  increase. 
 
                                                     
17
 Note that the spatial estimators rely on a numerical optimization algorithm which can lead to a non-convergent solution. 
When convergence is not obtained, the trial is dropped from the analysis. See Appendix 6.2 for further details about the 
implementation of the spatial estimators. 
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According to the plot on the top left of Figure 3, all estimators tend to underestimate the 
autoregressive parameter (e.g. positive bias) with system GMM exhibiting the smallest bias. The 
opposite happens for the spatial autoregressive parameter. Note that the spatial estimators 
tend to dominate system GMM in relatively small sample. This is not surprising since spatial 
estimators explicitly account for the spatial structure of the data by estimating the reduced 
form of the model. However, as the time dimension increases, system GMM tends to 
outperform the spatial estimators. Even though all estimators overestimate the exogenous 
variable, system GMM display smaller bias. Most importantly, the plot on the bottom left of 
Figure 3 shows how important it is to correct for endogeneity18. In fact, if not corrected, the bias 
associated with the endogenous variable can represent more than 40% of the true value of the 
parameter. Moreover, the magnitude of the bias of the endogenous covariate does not seem to 
depend on the sample dimension (N and T). This finding suggests that estimating a spatial 
dynamic panel model with endogenous variables using traditional spatial estimators would not 
be advisable. Besides system GMM, spatial dynamic QMLE displays the lowest bias for all 
coefficients. 
 
Figure 4 depicts the performance of the estimators in terms of RMSE. The results are slightly 
different from the ones obtained for the bias. Despite the fact that spatial ML estimators yield 
larger bias, in general, they tend to render less disperse estimates than system GMM. This is 
confirmed by Figure 5, which plots the histogram distribution for each estimated parameter 
based on 1000 trials for  N = 70 and T = 20. However, as the panel size increases, the 
performance of GMM converges to the level of RMSE of the spatial ML estimators. 
 
While the spatial estimators reach their steady-state level of RMSE in relatively small samples 
(making the slope of RMSE and bias almost flat), the RMSE of system GMM decreases as the 
sample size increases (the slope of RMSE and bias being more steeper). Interestingly, for 
moderate size samples, the estimation of the time lag and exogenous variables with system 
GMM yields a lower RMSE than any spatial ML estimators. This result might seems to be 
paradoxical with the accepted notion that ML is more efficient than GMM, but it is not. Actually, 
this finding is an extension of Das et al.'s (2003) conclusion to the panel framework. The main 
reason for this seemingly contradictory result is that the spatial ML approach requires the 
estimation of more parameters than does system GMM.  All  spatial  ML  estimators  involve the 
                                                     
18
 I run simulations using different values for the correlation parameter () of the endogenous variable and the error term of the 
dependent variable (vit). Results remain qualitatively similar. The main difference is that depending on the sign of the 
parameter of the endogenous variable will be overestimated ( > 0) or underestimated ( < 0). 
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Figure 3: System GMM vs. Spatial Estimators Bias 
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Figure 4: System GMM vs. Spatial Estimators RMSE 
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Figure 5: Parameters’ Histograms (N = 70 and T = 20) 
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estimation of the additional parameter 2 . Moreover, Elhorst's approach implies the 
estimation of the parameters for initial condition, while Yu et al's method is explicitly designed 
for large N  and T . Therefore, the classical arguments relating to relative efficiency do not 
apply here. 
 
As I already mentioned it in the bias analysis, the estimation of the endogenous covariate with 
system GMM yields the lowest RMSE. The slope of the RMSE line in Figure 4 is almost null for 
the QMLE and MLE, which suggests that increasing the sample dimension cannot decrease the 
RMSE associated with the endogenous variable. In other words, the use of spatial ML estimators 
is not recommended in the presence of endogenous or predetermined variables. Among the 
spatial estimators, SDQMLE is again the best one in terms of the RMSE criterion. Note that the 
estimation of the spatial lag parameter by simple spatial MLE yields a similar RMSE than any 
other spatial estimators. That is why Elhorst (2008) suggests estimating separately the spatial 
lag with SMLE and the remaining parameters with either SDMLE or difference GMM. 
 
4 Robustness Check 
Before investigating the sensitivity of our main results, I summarize the results in terms of RMSE 
response functions. This allows us to highlight potential issues that need to be addressed in the 
robustness checks. Specifically, I investigate four departures from the baseline model. First, I 
check if the results are sensitive to the choice of the spatial matrix W . Additionally, I analyze 
what happens when the spatial weight scheme is miss-specified. Second, I drop the assumption 
of Gaussian process for the error terms and individual effects. Third, I check the impact of 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms on the performance of the estimators. Last, I investigate 
the consequence of dealing with spatially dependent endogenous and exogenous variables19. 
 
4.1 RMSE response function 
As previously commented, the relationship between the performance of the estimators and the 
model parameters is not easily determined. That is why, I report the results in terms of response 
functions. Using the RMSE for each estimator and parameters of the entire set of designs, the 
following equation is estimated by OLS: 
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19
 To conserve space, I do not display the results tables, but they remain available upon request. 
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where iRMSE  is the RMSE of a given parameter obtained using a given estimator in the i-th 
design. iW  corresponds to the value attributed to the construction of the spatial weight matrix 
and is a measure of the degree of sparseness of matrix W  (e.g.  5,3,1iW ). Note that the 
dependent variable is expressed in logarithm in order to rule out negative predicted RMSE. 
Therefore, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not straightforward (i.e. a negative 
coefficient implies a small (close to zero) effect). 
 
The RMSE response function estimation results are displayed in Table 2. As suggested by 2R , the 
fit of the response functions to the data is relatively good. The comments made in the previous 
section are confirmed by the estimation results. As expected, the main factor that contributes 
to the efficiency of system GMM is the panel size ( N  and T ). This is not the case for the spatial 
estimators, because the rate of efficiency is only marginally affected by the panel size. This was 
already confirmed by Figures 3 and 4, where the slope of the spatial estimators' RMSE were 
relatively flat. The effects of the autoregressive and spatial autoregressive parameters on the 
RMSE are clearly non-linear. While the individual effects of the parameters are negative and 
significant, the interaction term enters the RMSE regression positively and significantly in almost 
all cases. In other words, it is the combination of the time and spatial lag coefficients which 
affects the efficiency of the estimators rather than each parameter taken individually. Another 
important finding relates to the specification of the spatial weight matrix W . The performances 
of the spatial estimators are definitively more sensitive to the spatial weight matrix than system 
GMM estimator. The spatial lag parameter is the only parameter where performance of GMM 
seems to be affected by the spatial matrix W . This finding suggests that spatial estimators are 
more sensitive to the specification of the spatial weight matrix than GMM. I address this 
question in the following sub-section. 
 
4.2 Role of the Spatial Weight Matrix 
In order to check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of spatial matrix, I re-estimate the 
model with data generated according to a theoretical Rook type of order 3 and 5 spatial weight 
matrix as well as a negative exponential matrix based on real data distance for 224 countries. As 
in the baseline case, I perform 1000 simulations for each design with respect to each type of 
spatial matrix. 
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Table 2: RMSE Response Functions 
 Time Lag  :  Spatial Lag  : Endogenous  : Exogenous  : 
 SYS-GMM SDMLE SDQMLE SYS-GMM SDMLE SDQMLE SYS-GMM SDMLE SDQMLE SYS-GMM SDMLE SDQMLE 
iW/1  0.0251 -0.308*** -0.295*** -0.909*** -0.819*** -0.770*** -0.0352 -0.0138 -0.0146 -0.0396 -0.284*** -0.295*** 
 (-0.057) (-0.064) (-0.061) (-0.081) (-0.093) (-0.092) (-0.049) (-0.018) (-0.018) (-0.063) (-0.072) (-0.072) 
i  
-0.229** -3.520*** -3.821*** -2.887*** -1.858*** -1.800*** -1.002*** -0.195*** -0.187*** 0.0625 -1.822*** -1.907*** 
 (-0.105) (-0.122) (-0.115) (-0.143) (-0.15) (-0.151) (-0.087) (-0.032) (-0.032) (-0.109) (-0.12) (-0.121) 
i  -0.736*** -3.072*** -3.131*** -2.615*** -2.156*** -2.012*** -0.500*** -0.157*** -0.159*** -0.441*** -1.911*** -1.899*** 
 (-0.116) (-0.159) (-0.153) (-0.187) (-0.205) (-0.207) (-0.1) (-0.038) (-0.039) (-0.14) (-0.147) (-0.148) 
ii   1.437*** 4.837*** 5.041*** 0.0916 5.945*** 5.876*** 0.348 0.146 0.152 0.786* 2.471*** 2.380*** 
 (-0.384) (-0.436) (-0.406) (-0.556) (-0.646) (-0.66) (-0.317) (-0.121) (-0.123) (-0.433) (-0.461) (-0.461) 
ii NW /  0.706** 0.0427 -0.0181 1.454*** 1.991*** 2.055*** 0.393 0.0724 0.0782 0.582 -0.155 -0.182 
 (-0.357) (-0.384) (-0.374) (-0.483) (-0.484) (-0.495) (-0.299) (-0.107) (-0.11) (-0.414) (-0.369) (-0.363) 
ii TW /  -0.297* 0.0969 0.147 0.517** 1.366*** 1.310*** -0.0852 0.0107 0.0049 -0.322* -0.211 -0.206 
 (-0.166) (-0.188) (-0.177) (-0.24) (-0.294) (-0.297) (-0.137) (-0.048) (-0.049) (-0.186) (-0.201) (-0.195) 
iN/1  13.40*** -11.79*** -13.13*** 13.28*** 4.830*** 3.885** 16.85*** -16.87*** -17.16*** 15.56*** -1.461 -1.483 
 (-1.317) (-1.482) (-1.41) (-1.731) (-1.657) (-1.691) (-1.079) (-0.38) (-0.391) (-1.402) (-1.46) (-1.444) 
iT/1  13.22*** -3.730*** -4.408*** 12.70*** 1.976** 3.291*** 11.04*** -7.673*** -7.513*** 9.222*** -3.755*** -3.329*** 
 (-0.613) (-0.723) (-0.669) (-0.865) (-0.92) (-0.939) (-0.52) (-0.166) (-0.173) (-0.647) (-0.723) (-0.711) 
Constant -3.409*** 0.202*** 0.302*** -0.637*** -3.258*** -3.345*** -1.191*** 2.476*** 2.474*** -2.762*** -1.206*** -1.228*** 
 (-0.057) (-0.072) (-0.068) (-0.084) (-0.09) (-0.091) (-0.049) (-0.02) (-0.019) (-0.065) (-0.072) (-0.072) 
R
2 0.824 0.824 0.856 0.893 0.797 0.791 0.85 0.962 0.961 0.698 0.612 0.618 
Notes: The standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
.
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The results seem to be qualitatively similar to what I obtained in the benchmark scenario. 
System GMM outperforms the spatial estimators according to the unbiasness criterion. The only 
exception is the spatial lag parameter which is better estimated by spatial ML estimators in 
relatively small samples. As before, all estimators tend to underestimate the autoregressive 
parameter and overestimate the spatial autoregressive parameter. The coefficients of the 
endogenous and exogenous variable tend to be overestimated by spatial ML estimators. In 
addition, the bias of the endogenous and exogenous variables does not seem to decrease with 
an increase in the sample size ( N  and/or T ). As highlighted by the response function analysis, 
the bias of the spatial estimators increases with the number of non-zeros elements in the spatial 
weight matrix. This is not the case for system GMM, whose performance is not affected by the 
degree of sparseness of the matrix W . Nevertheless, the spatial estimators' sensitivity to the 
type of spatial weight matrix tends to disappear as the panel dimension increases. 
 
Most of the spatial econometrics literature presumes that the spatial weight matrix is known 
and well specified. However, in practice, one has to define the spatial weight matrix. This is 
usually done based on some underlying theory. But since there is no theoretical guidance on the 
choice of the matrix W , the latter can be misspecified. In order to study the consequences of 
the misspecification of the spatial weight matrix, I consider the data based on a Rook type of 
order 3 matrix, but estimating the model applying instead Rook type of order 1 or 5 spatial 
weight matrices. In the first case, I assume the spatial dependence to be more local than it 
actually is, while in the second scenario I presume the opposite. 
 
The results depend on the type of misspecification. In the case of over-spatial dependence, the 
results are similar to what I obtained in the benchmark case, although the parameters' bias 
tends to be higher. In particular, assuming more global spatial dependence introduces 
additional noise, which affects the performance of system GMM. As found earlier, the 
autoregressive variable tends to be underestimated while the spatial autoregressive variable, 
endogenous and exogenous variables tend to be overestimated. Moreover, the estimation of 
the autoregressive and endogenous variables by the spatial estimators are dominated by system 
GMM according to the unbiasness criterion. 
 
In the case of under-spatial dependence, the results for all estimators are severely affected. The 
bias for the spatial autoregressive parameter changes from negative to positive. In fact, limiting 
spatial dependence to the close neighborhood tends to underestimate the spatial effect. The 
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main explanation for this finding lies probably in the fact that spatial methods estimate the 
reduced form of the model, which means that the entire set of parameters, beside the spatial 
lag, are affected by the miss-specification (see equation (18)). As noted previously, simple SMLE 
seems to estimate the spatial lag as accurate as SDMLE and SDQMLE (Elhorst, 2008).  
 
From an applied econometric point of view, these results suggest that spatial dynamic panel 
models should not be estimated using only one type of spatial weight matrix. In fact, different 
types of spatial weight matrices (contiguity, geographical distance, economic distance) should 
be applied to check the robustness and consistency of the results. 
 
4.3 Non-Gaussian Distribution 
Most spatial estimators rely on the assumption of normality of the individual effects and error 
term. In empirical application, the data does not necessarily follow a normal distribution. That is 
why I investigate the consequences of dropping the Gaussian assumption through three 
modifications: student distribution and chi-square distribution for the error term as well as a 
non-normal distribution for the individual fixed effects.  
 
First, when the error are generated according to a Student distribution with five degrees of 
freedom (  5tvit  ), characterized by heavier tails than the normal distribution, the results 
remain qualitatively similar. System GMM tends to outperform spatial ML estimators although 
the rate of convergence seems to be slower. Among the spatial estimators, SDQMLE continues 
to be more robust. This corroborates Lee's (2004) finding who demonstrates that QMLE can be 
consistent when the disturbances are independently and identically distributed without 
normality. 
 
Second, the performance of system GMM deteriorates when the shocks are generated 
according to a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom  )1( 2itv . The bias reduction 
associated with an increase in the panel dimension tends to be smaller than in the benchmark 
case. Spatial ML estimators tend to outperform system GMM according to the unbiasness 
criterion for the exogenous and spatial autoregressive parameters. However, the estimation of 
the lagged dependent and endogenous variables with system GMM continues to dominate the 
spatial ML estimators. 
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Last, following Binder et al. (2005), I also investigate the way the individual effects are 
generated, since the performance of system GMM depends on the ratio of the individual effect 
variance with respect to the variance of the error term (Hayakawa, 2006). Note that in the 
benchmark setting, the ratio 22 / v   is different from 1 (=1.6), which already favors the spatial 
estimators against system GMM. Going one step further, the individual specific effects are no 
longer normally distributed but generated as follows: 
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The parameter   measures the degree of cross-section to the time-series variations. Two 
values are considered 1  and 5 . 
 
As expected, spatial estimators are not affected by the way the individual specific effects are 
generated. This result is in line with Binder et al.'s (2005) findings. The performance of system 
GMM deteriorates slightly, but continues to display better results for the endogenous variable 
than any other spatial estimators. 
 
4.4 Heteroskedastic Errors 
Theoretically, maximum likelihood allows for heteroskedasticity in the error term. However, the 
practical application of such estimator is difficult and complex, which dissuades researchers to 
directly account for heterogeneity. This is also the case for spatial dynamic maximum likelihood 
estimators, which do not accommodate easily for heteroskedasticity. That is why I investigate 
the impact of three different types of heteroskedasticity on the performance of the estimators. 
First, cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in the variance of the disturbance term is defined as 
follows:  122  
2   iit vv . Second, time-series heteroskedasticity in the variance is specified as 
a function of time:  ttit vv
2
 
2   . Third, both cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity, 
which are common in empirical applications, is considered by combining the first two processes. 
In these three specifications I make sure that the average variance is equal to one (Bun and 
Carree, 2006):  
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Overall, the performance of all estimators deteriorates in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
The absolute bias as well as the RMSE of the parameters increase in comparison with the 
baseline scenario. In addition, the convergence slows down for all estimators. This should not 
come as a surprise, since heteroskedasticity increases volatility in the data. According to the bias 
criterion, system GMM continues to dominate any spatial estimators for most variables. But 
spatial estimators still show superior performance when estimating the spatial lag parameter. 
However, the pattern of the bias associated with system GMM indicates that for higher time 
and cross-section dimensions system GMM will ultimately catch with the spatial estimators. The 
results associated with RMSE seem to be qualitatively similar to the main results. Once again, 
system GMM dominates the spatial estimators for the estimation of the lagged dependent and 
endogenous variables. For the exogenous and spatial lag, the rate of convergence is slower but 
shows a similar pattern as the benchmark results. 
 
4.5 Additional Spatial Dependence 
Finally, I modify the data generating process to account for spatial dependence in the 
exogenous and endogenous variables. Each one follows a spatial moving average process (with 
5.0 XZ  ): 
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The performance of the spatial estimators and GMM remains relatively robust to the presence 
of spatial dependence. Unlike the main results, the spatial ML estimators tend to underestimate 
the spatial lag parameter, while overestimating the effect of endogenous and exogenous 
variables. The spatial estimators seem to allocate higher spatial dependence to the endogenous 
and exogenous variables at the expense of the spatial autoregressive variable. System GMM is 
still less biased and more efficient than the spatial estimators for all but the spatial lag variable. 
The estimation of the spatial lag with system GMM leads to a negative bias, which means that 
system GMM continues to overestimate the effect of the spatial autoregressive term. In 
relatively small samples, the spatial estimators continue to dominate system GMM for the 
spatial lag variable. However, as sample size increases, system GMM reaches the same level of 
RMSE than the spatial estimators. Note that the bias of the exogenous variable for system GMM 
tends to be higher compared to the baseline case. Despite the fact that RMSE tends to be higher 
for all the estimators in small samples, the relative performance of system GMM remains 
qualitatively unchanged.  
 
     
-33- 
The performance of system GMM improves, when the spatially weighted sum of the exogenous 
variable ( tZW  ) is included as an additional instrument as suggested by Kelejian and Prucha 
(1998). Note that this is only true when there is spatial dependence in the exogenous and 
endogenous variables. In fact, in the benchmark Monte Carlo setting, where 0 XZ  , the 
inclusion of tZW   as instruments does not improve significantly the performance of system 
GMM. From a practical viewpoint, this finding suggests to include the spatially weighted 
average of the exogenous variables in the set of instruments ( tZW  , tZW 
2 ,...), once the 
presence of spatial dependence is verified (with a Moran's I or Geary's C test for instance). 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper I investigate the finite samples behavior of system GMM in a spatial dynamic panel 
framework in the presence of an additional endogenous variable. Our Monte Carlo analysis 
demonstrates that while the simultaneity bias of the spatial lag remains relatively low, the bias 
of the endogenous variable is large if it is not corrected. 
 
The need to account for additional sources of endogeneity leads to favour system GMM. In fact, 
system GMM emerges clearly dominant by an unbiasedness criterion for most variables. In 
addition, system GMM can even be as efficient as spatial maximum likelihood estimators in 
moderate and large samples. Moreover, from a purely practical point of view, system GMM is 
less cumbersome than any spatial estimators. It avoids the inversion of large spatial weight 
matrices. It is also easier to implement and its computation time is lower than any spatial 
dynamic estimators. Furthermore, the efficiency of system GMM could be improved through 
iterated GMM or continuously updated GMM. 
 
However, the use of spatial dynamic estimators (SDMLE or SDQMLE) would still be advisable 
under some conditions. When the sample size (N and T) is relatively small, potential additional 
endogeneity can be ignored or the interpretation and measurement of the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient has important policy relevance (e.g. tax reaction function study), the 
spatial dynamic panel model should be estimated with SDMLE or SDQMLE. Recently, a lot of 
attention has been drawn to the impact of heterogenous and cross-section error on the bias in 
dynamic panel estimation with fixed effects. A possible extension of this study would be to 
consider weak cross-section dependence by allowing the error term to be spatially dependent. 
This could be done by extending the spatial HAC framework proposed by Kelejian and Prucha 
(2007) or Driscoll and Kray's (1998) approach to system GMM.  
     
-34- 
6 Appendices 
6.1 GMM Estimators 
This appendix section presents the procedure associated with the different GMM estimators 
considered in this study. Let Y , 1Y , WY , U  be TN   column vectors, Z  is a pTN   exogenous 
matrix and X  is a qTN   endogenous matrix. Note that the data is first sorted by time T  and 
then by cross-section N . Thus,   TYYYY  ...; ; ; 21  , where tY  

Nttt YYY  ...; ; ; 21 . The same 
structure is applied to the remaining vectors and matrices. 
 
As mentioned previously, the time lag  1, tiY , spatial lag   itWY  and endogenous variable  itX  
are treated as endogenous covariates, while the exogenous variable  itZ  is considered as 
strictly exogenous. Each endogenous variable is instrumented by the strictly exogenous variable 
and the second and third lags of each endogenous variable. In order to restrict the number of 
instruments, the instruments matrix is constructed by collapsing them20. 
 
6.1.1 Difference GMM 
The difference GMM estimator, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), consists of estimating 
the model expressed in first-difference. More specifically, the estimation steps are: 
1) Construct the "collapsed" instruments matrix for each cross-section i: 
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2) Construct the weighting matrix: 
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 Numerous instruments can lead to two types of small-sample issues. The first problem leads to overfitting endogenous 
variables, i.e. failure to remove endogeneity. The second problem concerns imprecise estimation of the optimal weighting 
matrix in the two-step procedure. This affects the computation of two-step standard errors and the validity of Hansen's weak 
instruments (see Roodman, 2009). 
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3) Carry out the one-step estimation given by 
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 The associated variance are computed as follows: 
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 The robust one-step variance is given by: 
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 The two-step estimates are given by: 
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 The associated two-step variance is computed as: 
  122ˆ

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D
XZ QAQV  
 
 
6.1.2 System GMM 
The system GMM estimator, proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), consists of combining the moment conditions from the model in first-difference with the 
moment conditions from the model in levels. These are the estimation steps: 
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1) Construct the "collapsed" instruments matrix for each cross-section i: 
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2) Construct the weighting matrix: 
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3) Carry out the one-step estimation given by: 
  ZYXZXZXZ QAQQAQ 
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4) The associated variance are computed as follows: 
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5) The robust one-step variance is given by: 
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6) The two-step estimates are given by: 
  ZYXZXZXZ QAQQAQ 
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7) The associated two-step variance is computed as: 
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6.2 Spatial Estimators 
This appendix section presents the procedure associated with the different spatial estimators. 
For further details, the reader is referred to Anselin (1988), Elhorst (2003, 2005, 2008) and Yu et 
al. (2008). Let Y , 1Y , WY , U  be TN   column vectors, Z  is a  pTN   exogenous matrix and 
X  is a qTN   endogenous matrix. Note that the data is first sorted by time T  and then by 
cross-section N . Thus,   TYYYY  ...; ; ; 21 , where tY  

Nttt YYY  ...; ; ; 21 . The same structure is 
applied to the remaining vectors and matrices. As initial values for the parameters, the 
estimates obtained by system GMM can be used. 
 
6.2.1 Spatial MLE 
The classical spatial maximum likelihood estimator relies on the concentrated likelihood in the 
spatial lag parameter, which is conditional upon the others' coefficient values. Operationally, 
"standard" spatial maximum estimation can be achieved in five steps: 
1) Demean all variables, denoted by ~. 
 
2) Carry out the following OLS regressions: 
  001  ~;~;~~ UbXZYY    
  LL UbXZYYW    ~;~;~~ 1  
 
3) Compute the associated residuals 0Uˆ  and LUˆ . 
 
4) Given 0Uˆ  and LUˆ , find   that maximizes the following concentrated likelihood: 
     





 LLN UUUU
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WIT
NTNT
L ˆˆˆˆln
2
lnln
2
2ln
2
ln 00
2  . 
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5) Given the estimate ˆ , the remaining coefficient estimates are computed as follows: 
Lbb 



ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
0 





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
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
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NT
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1
ˆ
00
2  

  
 
As mentioned in Elhorst (2008), this spatial MLE is inconsistent, because of the presence of the 
lag dependent variable. 
 
 
6.2.2 Spatial Dynamic MLE 
The unconditional MLE, proposed by Elhorst (2005, 2008), involves a two-steps iterative 
procedure once the data has been first-differenced. Note that the initial observations are 
approximated using Bhargava and Sargan approach (1983). Estimation should proceed 
according to the following steps: 
1) Take the first-difference of all variables. 
 
2) Define some initial values for the parameters ,    and  , where 22 /   and 
2
  is the 
variance associated with the approximation of the initial observations. 
 
3) The two-steps iterative procedure begins here with the computation of the coefficients i  
associated with the initial observations' approximation as well as the parameters of the 
exogenous and endogenous covariates, and the variance :2   
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   ;1 WIS N   
 
The parameter m, which represents the number of periods since the process started, should be 
defined in advance. It must be such that the eigenvalues of the matrix S  lie inside the unit 
circle, because otherwise the matrix   1mS  would become infinite and yield a corner solution. 
Instead of defining m in advance, Elhorst (2008) proposes to include a third step procedure to 
estimate it. Besides increasing the computation time, this additional step improves marginally 
the results. 
 
4) Given the set of parameters obtained in step 3, maximize the unconditional likelihood 
function as follows: 
  UHUHWIT
NTNT
L VVN ˆˆ
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2
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,,ln 1
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
   
w.r.t. max1    and min1     
 
5) Repeat step 3, with the estimates obtained in step 4 and so on, until convergence is met. 
 
 
Note that to reduce the computation time the Jacobian term, WIN ln , in the loglikelihood 
function is approximated by   i
N
i   1ln1  , where i  is the eigenvalue of matrix W . The 
inverse of matrix VH  is also estimated using summation operations instead of matrix calculus. 
 
 
6.2.3 Spatial Dynamic QMLE 
The QMLE, presented by Yu et al. (2008), requires first the maximization of the concentrated 
likelihood and then a bias correction. Note that the original model proposed by the authors 
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includes a lagged spatial lag and corresponds to a "time-space dynamic" model (based on 
Anselin taxonomy (1988, 2001)). The estimation process involves the following steps: 
1) Demean all variables, denoted by ~. 
 
2) Maximize the following concentrated likelihood function in order to estimate 
2ˆ  and  ˆ  ,ˆ  ,ˆ  ,ˆ  : 
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3) The bias-corrected estimator is then given by: 
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where 1ˆ   can be approximated by the empirical Hessian matrix of the concentrated log 
likelihood function (an analytical expression for the matrix   can also be found in Yu et al.) 
and the column matrix b is given by: 
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4) Finally, the individual effects are recovered as follows: 
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6.3 Monte Carlo Results: Bias 
 
Time lag variable  : Bias 
T N     SMLE SDMLE SDQMLE LSDV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
10 20 0.2 0.1 0.1076 0.0860 0.0807 0.0935 0.0588 0.0272 
10 20 0.5 0.3 0.0784 0.0633 0.0518 0.0618 0.0472 0.0244 
10 20 0.7 0.1 0.0722 0.0562 0.0402 0.0455 0.0762 -0.0561 
20 20 0.2 0.1 0.0913 0.0804 0.0784 0.0413 0.0166 0.0180 
20 20 0.5 0.3 0.0585 0.0514 0.0467 0.0614 0.0226 0.0115 
20 20 0.7 0.1 0.0478 0.0407 0.0352 0.0211 0.0200 -0.0052 
30 20 0.2 0.1 0.0857 0.0783 0.0770 -0.0591 0.0122 0.0141 
30 20 0.5 0.3 0.0531 0.0483 0.0455 0.0608 0.0141 0.0099 
30 20 0.7 0.1 0.0404 0.0362 0.0328 -0.0134 0.0102 -0.0008 
40 20 0.2 0.1 0.0819 0.0763 0.0756 0.0803 0.0082 0.0096 
40 20 0.5 0.3 0.0500 0.0463 0.0443 -0.0666 0.0081 0.0046 
40 20 0.7 0.1 0.0374 0.0343 0.0327 -0.0064 0.0082 0.0004 
10 30 0.2 0.1 0.1081 0.0851 0.0821 0.1066 0.0298 0.0284 
10 30 0.5 0.3 0.0780 0.0571 0.0506 -0.0066 0.0437 0.0013 
10 30 0.7 0.1 0.0716 0.0459 0.0388 0.0651 0.0485 -0.0042 
20 30 0.2 0.1 0.0917 0.0807 0.0785 0.0921 0.0122 0.0143 
20 30 0.5 0.3 0.0588 0.0514 0.0464 0.0689 0.0148 0.0038 
20 30 0.7 0.1 0.0471 0.0404 0.0344 0.0068 0.0119 -0.0082 
30 30 0.2 0.1 0.0850 0.0775 0.0763 -0.0514 0.0100 0.0071 
30 30 0.5 0.3 0.0525 0.0477 0.0447 0.0345 0.0090 0.0028 
30 30 0.7 0.1 0.0398 0.0355 0.0327 -0.0119 0.0081 -0.0059 
40 30 0.2 0.1 0.0828 0.0773 0.0762 0.0651 0.0057 0.0059 
40 30 0.5 0.3 0.0486 0.0452 0.0432 0.0262 0.0047 0.0044 
40 30 0.7 0.1 0.0366 0.0335 0.0320 0.0119 0.0047 -0.0042 
10 50 0.2 0.1 0.1070 0.0825 0.0808 0.1064 0.0203 0.0177 
10 50 0.5 0.3 0.0795 0.0547 0.0524 0.0601 0.0326 0.0004 
10 50 0.7 0.1 0.0706 0.0437 0.0385 0.0589 0.0228 -0.0163 
20 50 0.2 0.1 0.0897 0.0786 0.0768 0.0849 0.0091 0.0095 
20 50 0.5 0.3 0.0580 0.0492 0.0461 0.0693 0.0087 0.0036 
20 50 0.7 0.1 0.0473 0.0377 0.0344 0.0457 0.0090 -0.0106 
30 50 0.2 0.1 0.0853 0.0780 0.0767 0.0488 0.0048 0.0051 
30 50 0.5 0.3 0.0530 0.0483 0.0453 0.0361 0.0060 0.0007 
30 50 0.7 0.1 0.0401 0.0358 0.0327 0.0194 0.0052 -0.0042 
40 50 0.2 0.1 0.0818 0.0763 0.0755 0.0588 0.0032 0.0051 
40 50 0.5 0.3 0.0499 0.0464 0.0443 0.0596 0.0040 0.0006 
40 50 0.7 0.1 0.0369 0.0337 0.0323 -0.0440 0.0044 -0.0051 
10 70 0.2 0.1 0.1064 0.0812 0.0802 0.0975 0.0149 0.0136 
10 70 0.5 0.3 0.0787 0.0538 0.0515 0.0907 0.0200 0.0048 
10 70 0.7 0.1 0.0692 0.0429 0.0375 0.0363 0.0193 -0.0129 
20 70 0.2 0.1 0.0907 0.0789 0.0776 0.0910 0.0063 0.0077 
20 70 0.5 0.3 0.0583 0.0473 0.0464 0.0628 0.0076 0.0003 
20 70 0.7 0.1 0.0468 0.0350 0.0338 0.0352 0.0077 -0.0094 
30 70 0.2 0.1 0.0847 0.0773 0.0761 0.0714 0.0034 0.0038 
30 70 0.5 0.3 0.0516 0.0461 0.0440 0.0247 0.0036 0.0000 
30 70 0.7 0.1 0.0392 0.0336 0.0314 0.0212 0.0041 -0.0025 
40 70 0.2 0.1 0.0825 0.0770 0.0760 0.0612 0.0013 0.0020 
40 70 0.5 0.3 0.0492 0.0456 0.0434 0.0597 0.0026 0.0019 
40 70 0.7 0.1 0.0366 0.0335 0.0309 0.0322 0.0016 -0.0034 
Notes: The DGP are generated according to the expressions (15)-(18) based on a Rook-type spatial weight matrix of order 1 
with ;1  ;65.0  ;5.0  ;45.0  ;25.0 6.0 ; );08.0,0(Ni   );05.0,0(Nvit   
).05.0,0();05.0,0( NeNu itit    
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Spatial lag variable  : Bias 
T N     SMLE SDMLE SDQMLE LSDV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
10 20 0.2 0.1 -0.0013 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0825 -0.0148 -0.0326 
10 20 0.5 0.3 -0.0151 -0.0116 -0.0104 -0.0883 -0.0216 -0.0140 
10 20 0.7 0.1 -0.0081 -0.0085 -0.0073 -0.0812 -0.0253 -0.0005 
20 20 0.2 0.1 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0048 -0.0460 -0.0127 0.0020 
20 20 0.5 0.3 -0.0152 -0.0130 -0.0124 -0.0482 -0.0125 -0.0164 
20 20 0.7 0.1 -0.0073 -0.0066 -0.0065 -0.0665 -0.0036 -0.0009 
30 20 0.2 0.1 -0.0045 -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.1479 0.0000 -0.0084 
30 20 0.5 0.3 -0.0174 -0.0158 -0.0153 -0.0248 -0.0066 -0.0092 
30 20 0.7 0.1 -0.0072 -0.0066 -0.0070 0.0752 -0.0035 0.0063 
40 20 0.2 0.1 -0.0046 -0.0041 -0.0043 -0.0222 -0.0014 -0.0046 
40 20 0.5 0.3 -0.0161 -0.0151 -0.0147 -0.0150 0.0003 -0.0024 
40 20 0.7 0.1 -0.0070 -0.0062 -0.0070 -0.0163 -0.0015 -0.0021 
10 30 0.2 0.1 -0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0176 -0.0111 -0.0078 
10 30 0.5 0.3 -0.0150 -0.0113 -0.0120 -0.0462 -0.0139 -0.0039 
10 30 0.7 0.1 -0.0074 -0.0053 -0.0077 -0.0067 -0.0008 -0.0016 
20 30 0.2 0.1 -0.0039 -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0286 -0.0075 -0.0037 
20 30 0.5 0.3 -0.0170 -0.0146 -0.0140 -0.0518 -0.0013 -0.0051 
20 30 0.7 0.1 -0.0077 -0.0067 -0.0069 0.0040 -0.0014 -0.0056 
30 30 0.2 0.1 -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0041 0.0948 -0.0056 -0.0016 
30 30 0.5 0.3 -0.0173 -0.0158 -0.0153 0.0060 0.0017 -0.0029 
30 30 0.7 0.1 -0.0068 -0.0059 -0.0060 0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0026 
40 30 0.2 0.1 -0.0037 -0.0034 -0.0033 0.0070 0.0032 -0.0026 
40 30 0.5 0.3 -0.0160 -0.0151 -0.0147 -0.0202 -0.0046 -0.0056 
40 30 0.7 0.1 -0.0081 -0.0076 -0.0078 0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0010 
10 50 0.2 0.1 -0.0034 -0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0267 -0.0077 -0.0051 
10 50 0.5 0.3 -0.0144 -0.0089 -0.0101 -0.1200 -0.0052 -0.0219 
10 50 0.7 0.1 -0.0063 -0.0040 -0.0061 -0.0286 -0.0005 -0.0069 
20 50 0.2 0.1 -0.0032 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0195 -0.0008 0.0011 
20 50 0.5 0.3 -0.0172 -0.0144 -0.0143 -0.0499 0.0001 -0.0035 
20 50 0.7 0.1 -0.0079 -0.0060 -0.0068 -0.0219 -0.0005 -0.0027 
30 50 0.2 0.1 -0.0039 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0522 0.0007 -0.0006 
30 50 0.5 0.3 -0.0174 -0.0158 -0.0155 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0035 
30 50 0.7 0.1 -0.0074 -0.0066 -0.0066 0.0060 -0.0037 -0.0023 
40 50 0.2 0.1 -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0448 0.0037 0.0043 
40 50 0.5 0.3 -0.0173 -0.0161 -0.0158 -0.0518 -0.0018 -0.0037 
40 50 0.7 0.1 -0.0075 -0.0068 -0.0072 -0.0200 -0.0027 -0.0034 
10 70 0.2 0.1 -0.0041 -0.0024 -0.0031 -0.0287 -0.0043 -0.0032 
10 70 0.5 0.3 -0.0159 -0.0104 -0.0111 -0.0550 -0.0075 -0.0154 
10 70 0.7 0.1 -0.0064 -0.0038 -0.0056 0.0101 0.0027 -0.0039 
20 70 0.2 0.1 -0.0044 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0230 -0.0033 -0.0029 
20 70 0.5 0.3 -0.0176 -0.0134 -0.0144 -0.0443 -0.0006 -0.0037 
20 70 0.7 0.1 -0.0077 -0.0058 -0.0068 -0.0081 -0.0017 -0.0034 
30 70 0.2 0.1 -0.0045 -0.0040 -0.0041 -0.0114 0.0011 -0.0010 
30 70 0.5 0.3 -0.0165 -0.0145 -0.0144 -0.0140 -0.0008 -0.0025 
30 70 0.7 0.1 -0.0074 -0.0063 -0.0067 0.0131 0.0004 0.0003 
40 70 0.2 0.1 -0.0043 -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0302 -0.0019 -0.0026 
40 70 0.5 0.3 -0.0171 -0.0163 -0.0158 -0.0557 -0.0003 -0.0022 
40 70 0.7 0.1 -0.0078 -0.0072 -0.0073 -0.0091 0.0002 -0.0004  
Notes: The DGP are generated according to the expressions (15)-(18) based on a Rook-type spatial weight matrix of order 1 
with ;1  ;65.0  ;5.0  ;45.0  ;25.0 6.0 ; );08.0,0(Ni   );05.0,0(Nvit   
).05.0,0();05.0,0( NeNu itit    
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Endogenous variable  : Bias 
T N     SMLE SDMLE SDQMLE LSDV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
10 20 0.2 0.1 -0.4125 -0.4065 -0.4050 -0.4107 -0.1361 -0.1614 
10 20 0.5 0.3 -0.3994 -0.3958 -0.3932 -0.4003 -0.1305 -0.1308 
10 20 0.7 0.1 -0.3942 -0.3931 -0.3905 -0.4014 -0.1193 -0.0894 
20 20 0.2 0.1 -0.3987 -0.3950 -0.3941 -0.4117 -0.0589 -0.0822 
20 20 0.5 0.3 -0.3845 -0.3826 -0.3808 -0.3863 -0.0617 -0.0695 
20 20 0.7 0.1 -0.3817 -0.3793 -0.3776 -0.3870 -0.0404 -0.0389 
30 20 0.2 0.1 -0.3932 -0.3905 -0.3898 -0.4266 -0.0366 -0.0472 
30 20 0.5 0.3 -0.3786 -0.3766 -0.3758 -0.3838 -0.0384 -0.0388 
30 20 0.7 0.1 -0.3779 -0.3761 -0.3741 -0.3989 -0.0451 -0.0341 
40 20 0.2 0.1 -0.3907 -0.3885 -0.3882 -0.3906 -0.0334 -0.0455 
40 20 0.5 0.3 -0.3790 -0.3775 -0.3766 -0.4267 -0.0213 -0.0332 
40 20 0.7 0.1 -0.3733 -0.3714 -0.3701 -0.3862 -0.0208 -0.0252 
10 30 0.2 0.1 -0.4192 -0.4138 -0.4131 -0.4192 -0.0764 -0.1107 
10 30 0.5 0.3 -0.3975 -0.3943 -0.3924 -0.4378 -0.0808 -0.0781 
10 30 0.7 0.1 -0.3947 -0.3902 -0.3909 -0.3982 -0.0877 -0.0805 
20 30 0.2 0.1 -0.3980 -0.3941 -0.3936 -0.3970 -0.0341 -0.0552 
20 30 0.5 0.3 -0.3861 -0.3837 -0.3820 -0.3838 -0.0448 -0.0475 
20 30 0.7 0.1 -0.3806 -0.3787 -0.3771 -0.3946 -0.0390 -0.0323 
30 30 0.2 0.1 -0.3925 -0.3901 -0.3893 -0.4420 -0.0180 -0.0327 
30 30 0.5 0.3 -0.3802 -0.3785 -0.3776 -0.3999 -0.0270 -0.0256 
30 30 0.7 0.1 -0.3780 -0.3764 -0.3749 -0.3952 -0.0248 -0.0189 
40 30 0.2 0.1 -0.3918 -0.3896 -0.3892 -0.3983 -0.0221 -0.0325 
40 30 0.5 0.3 -0.3771 -0.3757 -0.3748 -0.3924 -0.0193 -0.0272 
40 30 0.7 0.1 -0.3759 -0.3748 -0.3730 -0.3859 -0.0143 -0.0168 
10 50 0.2 0.1 -0.4095 -0.4031 -0.4026 -0.4076 -0.0540 -0.0762 
10 50 0.5 0.3 -0.3980 -0.3939 -0.3927 -0.3930 -0.0598 -0.0483 
10 50 0.7 0.1 -0.3945 -0.3906 -0.3898 -0.3978 -0.0490 -0.0444 
20 50 0.2 0.1 -0.3990 -0.3951 -0.3945 -0.3999 -0.0247 -0.0440 
20 50 0.5 0.3 -0.3856 -0.3828 -0.3816 -0.3838 -0.0277 -0.0333 
20 50 0.7 0.1 -0.3811 -0.3784 -0.3773 -0.3814 -0.0210 -0.0119 
30 50 0.2 0.1 -0.3946 -0.3918 -0.3914 -0.4024 -0.0133 -0.0228 
30 50 0.5 0.3 -0.3805 -0.3789 -0.3777 -0.3984 -0.0148 -0.0142 
30 50 0.7 0.1 -0.3762 -0.3744 -0.3729 -0.3833 -0.0127 -0.0123 
40 50 0.2 0.1 -0.3918 -0.3895 -0.3891 -0.3964 -0.0155 -0.0257 
40 50 0.5 0.3 -0.3778 -0.3764 -0.3757 -0.3773 -0.0137 -0.0134 
40 50 0.7 0.1 -0.3753 -0.3741 -0.3726 -0.3992 -0.0093 -0.0056 
10 70 0.2 0.1 -0.4105 -0.4037 -0.4032 -0.4130 -0.0448 -0.0558 
10 70 0.5 0.3 -0.4009 -0.3955 -0.3952 -0.3969 -0.0471 -0.0408 
10 70 0.7 0.1 -0.3918 -0.3877 -0.3871 -0.4046 -0.0400 -0.0271 
20 70 0.2 0.1 -0.3982 -0.3941 -0.3937 -0.3975 -0.0174 -0.0300 
20 70 0.5 0.3 -0.3862 -0.3829 -0.3823 -0.3886 -0.0224 -0.0155 
20 70 0.7 0.1 -0.3809 -0.3773 -0.3769 -0.3850 -0.0223 -0.0184 
30 70 0.2 0.1 -0.3940 -0.3911 -0.3907 -0.3985 -0.0152 -0.0228 
30 70 0.5 0.3 -0.3804 -0.3784 -0.3775 -0.3998 -0.0122 -0.0141 
30 70 0.7 0.1 -0.3773 -0.3752 -0.3744 -0.3844 -0.0056 -0.0049 
40 70 0.2 0.1 -0.3903 -0.3882 -0.3878 -0.3960 -0.0023 -0.0110 
40 70 0.5 0.3 -0.3768 -0.3754 -0.3747 -0.3751 -0.0067 -0.0083 
40 70 0.7 0.1 -0.3745 -0.3734 -0.3722 -0.3766 -0.0086 -0.0062  
Notes: The DGP are generated according to the expressions (15)-(18) based on a Rook-type spatial weight matrix of order 1 
with ;1  ;65.0  ;5.0  ;45.0  ;25.0 6.0 ; );08.0,0(Ni   );05.0,0(Nvit   
).05.0,0();05.0,0( NeNu itit    
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Exogenous variable  : Bias 
T N     SMLE SDMLE SDQMLE LSDV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
10 20 0.2 0.1 -0.0487 -0.0387 -0.0358 -0.0365 0.0098 -0.0062 
10 20 0.5 0.3 -0.0329 -0.0258 -0.0219 -0.0103 0.0088 -0.0013 
10 20 0.7 0.1 -0.0234 -0.0189 -0.0129 -0.0118 0.0318 0.0517 
20 20 0.2 0.1 -0.0581 -0.0512 -0.0499 -0.0218 -0.0029 -0.0145 
20 20 0.5 0.3 -0.0390 -0.0344 -0.0307 -0.0308 0.0017 -0.0053 
20 20 0.7 0.1 -0.0316 -0.0260 -0.0222 -0.0073 0.0096 0.0163 
30 20 0.2 0.1 -0.0572 -0.0522 -0.0514 0.0466 0.0001 -0.0098 
30 20 0.5 0.3 -0.0403 -0.0362 -0.0340 -0.0434 0.0007 -0.0068 
30 20 0.7 0.1 -0.0342 -0.0298 -0.0278 0.0025 0.0008 0.0091 
40 20 0.2 0.1 -0.0553 -0.0513 -0.0507 -0.0527 -0.0017 -0.0032 
40 20 0.5 0.3 -0.0381 -0.0355 -0.0338 0.0631 0.0017 -0.0017 
40 20 0.7 0.1 -0.0330 -0.0298 -0.0278 0.0089 -0.0028 0.0052 
10 30 0.2 0.1 -0.0572 -0.0457 -0.0437 -0.0560 -0.0046 -0.0185 
10 30 0.5 0.3 -0.0311 -0.0225 -0.0200 0.0162 0.0072 0.0097 
10 30 0.7 0.1 -0.0263 -0.0164 -0.0149 -0.0252 0.0142 0.0132 
20 30 0.2 0.1 -0.0553 -0.0489 -0.0477 -0.0546 -0.0022 -0.0069 
20 30 0.5 0.3 -0.0344 -0.0298 -0.0264 -0.0326 0.0014 0.0053 
20 30 0.7 0.1 -0.0326 -0.0275 -0.0231 -0.0040 0.0062 0.0129 
30 30 0.2 0.1 -0.0554 -0.0504 -0.0496 0.0309 -0.0006 -0.0074 
30 30 0.5 0.3 -0.0373 -0.0338 -0.0319 -0.0284 0.0009 0.0034 
30 30 0.7 0.1 -0.0340 -0.0297 -0.0274 0.0084 0.0010 0.0090 
40 30 0.2 0.1 -0.0574 -0.0536 -0.0529 -0.0463 -0.0036 -0.0077 
40 30 0.5 0.3 -0.0393 -0.0364 -0.0347 -0.0177 -0.0009 -0.0030 
40 30 0.7 0.1 -0.0349 -0.0320 -0.0291 -0.0118 0.0002 0.0044 
10 50 0.2 0.1 -0.0512 -0.0389 -0.0382 -0.0500 0.0017 -0.0049 
10 50 0.5 0.3 -0.0353 -0.0255 -0.0238 -0.0043 0.0050 0.0131 
10 50 0.7 0.1 -0.0262 -0.0174 -0.0156 -0.0204 0.0040 0.0148 
20 50 0.2 0.1 -0.0557 -0.0486 -0.0476 -0.0523 -0.0018 -0.0075 
20 50 0.5 0.3 -0.0384 -0.0330 -0.0303 -0.0381 -0.0004 -0.0027 
20 50 0.7 0.1 -0.0323 -0.0256 -0.0232 -0.0309 0.0034 0.0130 
30 50 0.2 0.1 -0.0556 -0.0507 -0.0498 -0.0287 -0.0003 -0.0038 
30 50 0.5 0.3 -0.0390 -0.0355 -0.0332 -0.0293 -0.0004 0.0029 
30 50 0.7 0.1 -0.0331 -0.0293 -0.0265 -0.0173 -0.0009 0.0082 
40 50 0.2 0.1 -0.0558 -0.0520 -0.0513 -0.0372 0.0002 -0.0029 
40 50 0.5 0.3 -0.0395 -0.0368 -0.0350 -0.0366 -0.0018 0.0019 
40 50 0.7 0.1 -0.0334 -0.0307 -0.0280 0.0445 -0.0012 0.0069 
10 70 0.2 0.1 -0.0512 -0.0391 -0.0386 -0.0457 0.0018 -0.0024 
10 70 0.5 0.3 -0.0328 -0.0228 -0.0210 -0.0303 0.0027 0.0059 
10 70 0.7 0.1 -0.0240 -0.0148 -0.0123 -0.0119 0.0056 0.0172 
20 70 0.2 0.1 -0.0552 -0.0478 -0.0472 -0.0544 0.0001 -0.0059 
20 70 0.5 0.3 -0.0374 -0.0301 -0.0294 -0.0335 -0.0015 0.0049 
20 70 0.7 0.1 -0.0330 -0.0251 -0.0241 -0.0259 0.0022 0.0100 
30 70 0.2 0.1 -0.0561 -0.0514 -0.0507 -0.0467 -0.0007 -0.0018 
30 70 0.5 0.3 -0.0381 -0.0341 -0.0325 -0.0164 0.0006 0.0008 
30 70 0.7 0.1 -0.0332 -0.0284 -0.0266 -0.0198 -0.0002 0.0065 
40 70 0.2 0.1 -0.0567 -0.0528 -0.0522 -0.0400 -0.0013 -0.0048 
40 70 0.5 0.3 -0.0395 -0.0368 -0.0349 -0.0363 -0.0025 0.0001 
40 70 0.7 0.1 -0.0334 -0.0305 -0.0281 -0.0293 0.0003 0.0055  
Notes: The DGP are generated according to the expressions (15)-(18) based on a Rook-type spatial weight matrix of order 1 
with ;1  ;65.0  ;5.0  ;45.0  ;25.0 6.0 ; );08.0,0(Ni   );05.0,0(Nvit   
).05.0,0();05.0,0( NeNu itit    
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6.4 Monte Carlo Results: RMSE 
 
Time lag variable  : RMSE 
T N     SMLE SDMLE SDQMLE LSDV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
10 20 0.2 0.1 0.0135 0.0092 0.0085 0.0108 0.0235 0.0177 
10 20 0.5 0.3 0.0074 0.0051 0.0038 0.0050 0.0207 0.0125 
10 20 0.7 0.1 0.0062 0.0040 0.0026 0.0033 0.1781 0.0173 
20 20 0.2 0.1 0.0089 0.0070 0.0067 0.0025 0.0048 0.0063 
20 20 0.5 0.3 0.0039 0.0031 0.0026 0.0043 0.0059 0.0063 
20 20 0.7 0.1 0.0026 0.0020 0.0016 0.0009 0.0085 0.0051 
30 20 0.2 0.1 0.0078 0.0065 0.0063 0.0040 0.0026 0.0039 
30 20 0.5 0.3 0.0031 0.0026 0.0023 0.0040 0.0027 0.0036 
30 20 0.7 0.1 0.0018 0.0015 0.0013 0.0004 0.0032 0.0033 
40 20 0.2 0.1 0.0071 0.0062 0.0061 0.0068 0.0020 0.0030 
40 20 0.5 0.3 0.0027 0.0023 0.0022 0.0046 0.0020 0.0030 
40 20 0.7 0.1 0.0015 0.0013 0.0012 0.0002 0.0016 0.0022 
10 30 0.2 0.1 0.0126 0.0082 0.0077 0.0122 0.0094 0.0096 
10 30 0.5 0.3 0.0069 0.0039 0.0033 0.0009 0.0183 0.0126 
10 30 0.7 0.1 0.0057 0.0026 0.0021 0.0049 0.0282 0.0087 
20 30 0.2 0.1 0.0088 0.0069 0.0066 0.0088 0.0033 0.0047 
20 30 0.5 0.3 0.0037 0.0029 0.0024 0.0051 0.0032 0.0042 
20 30 0.7 0.1 0.0024 0.0018 0.0014 0.0003 0.0056 0.0043 
30 30 0.2 0.1 0.0075 0.0063 0.0061 0.0030 0.0017 0.0024 
30 30 0.5 0.3 0.0030 0.0025 0.0022 0.0014 0.0018 0.0027 
30 30 0.7 0.1 0.0017 0.0014 0.0012 0.0003 0.0018 0.0023 
40 30 0.2 0.1 0.0070 0.0062 0.0060 0.0046 0.0012 0.0018 
40 30 0.5 0.3 0.0025 0.0022 0.0020 0.0008 0.0011 0.0017 
40 30 0.7 0.1 0.0015 0.0012 0.0012 0.0002 0.0014 0.0019 
10 50 0.2 0.1 0.0121 0.0074 0.0071 0.0120 0.0046 0.0054 
10 50 0.5 0.3 0.0066 0.0032 0.0031 0.0041 0.0119 0.0074 
10 50 0.7 0.1 0.0053 0.0023 0.0019 0.0039 0.0119 0.0058 
20 50 0.2 0.1 0.0083 0.0064 0.0062 0.0075 0.0018 0.0025 
20 50 0.5 0.3 0.0035 0.0026 0.0023 0.0050 0.0020 0.0025 
20 50 0.7 0.1 0.0023 0.0015 0.0013 0.0022 0.0028 0.0027 
30 50 0.2 0.1 0.0074 0.0062 0.0060 0.0026 0.0011 0.0017 
30 50 0.5 0.3 0.0029 0.0024 0.0021 0.0014 0.0011 0.0016 
30 50 0.7 0.1 0.0017 0.0014 0.0011 0.0005 0.0011 0.0014 
40 50 0.2 0.1 0.0069 0.0060 0.0059 0.0036 0.0007 0.0012 
40 50 0.5 0.3 0.0026 0.0022 0.0020 0.0036 0.0007 0.0010 
40 50 0.7 0.1 0.0014 0.0012 0.0011 0.0020 0.0007 0.0011 
10 70 0.2 0.1 0.0116 0.0068 0.0067 0.0100 0.0031 0.0038 
10 70 0.5 0.3 0.0064 0.0031 0.0029 0.0084 0.0060 0.0052 
10 70 0.7 0.1 0.0051 0.0021 0.0017 0.0017 0.0094 0.0057 
20 70 0.2 0.1 0.0084 0.0064 0.0062 0.0084 0.0011 0.0018 
20 70 0.5 0.3 0.0035 0.0023 0.0023 0.0041 0.0014 0.0020 
20 70 0.7 0.1 0.0023 0.0013 0.0012 0.0014 0.0019 0.0024 
30 70 0.2 0.1 0.0073 0.0061 0.0059 0.0052 0.0006 0.0009 
30 70 0.5 0.3 0.0027 0.0022 0.0020 0.0007 0.0007 0.0011 
30 70 0.7 0.1 0.0016 0.0012 0.0011 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 
40 70 0.2 0.1 0.0069 0.0060 0.0059 0.0038 0.0005 0.0009 
40 70 0.5 0.3 0.0025 0.0022 0.0020 0.0037 0.0005 0.0008 
40 70 0.7 0.1 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0011 0.0005 0.0008  
Notes: The DGP are generated according to the expressions (15)-(18) based on a Rook-type spatial weight matrix of order 1 
with ;1  ;65.0  ;5.0  ;45.0  ;25.0 6.0 ; );08.0,0(Ni   );05.0,0(Nvit   
).05.0,0();05.0,0( NeNu itit    
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Spatial lag variable  : RMSE 
T N     SMLE SDMLE SDQMLE LSDV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
10 20 0.2 0.1 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0078 0.0979 0.0324 
10 20 0.5 0.3 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0093 0.0333 0.0153 
10 20 0.7 0.1 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0078 0.2125 0.0129 
20 20 0.2 0.1 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0041 0.0320 0.0219 
20 20 0.5 0.3 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0031 0.0100 0.0058 
20 20 0.7 0.1 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0052 0.0331 0.0043 
30 20 0.2 0.1 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0231 0.0111 0.0105 
30 20 0.5 0.3 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 0.0046 0.0039 
30 20 0.7 0.1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0061 0.0054 0.0038 
40 20 0.2 0.1 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0012 0.0075 0.0080 
40 20 0.5 0.3 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0010 0.0020 0.0020 
40 20 0.7 0.1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0022 0.0014 
10 30 0.2 0.1 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0026 0.0393 0.0304 
10 30 0.5 0.3 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0045 0.0252 0.0099 
10 30 0.7 0.1 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012 0.0307 0.0090 
20 30 0.2 0.1 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0016 0.0122 0.0101 
20 30 0.5 0.3 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0030 0.0082 0.0046 
20 30 0.7 0.1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 0.0108 0.0027 
30 30 0.2 0.1 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0103 0.0061 0.0050 
30 30 0.5 0.3 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0029 0.0018 
30 30 0.7 0.1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0027 0.0016 
40 30 0.2 0.1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0059 0.0049 
40 30 0.5 0.3 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0016 0.0012 
40 30 0.7 0.1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0033 0.0016 
10 50 0.2 0.1 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 0.0021 0.0140 0.0101 
10 50 0.5 0.3 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006 0.0143 0.0771 0.0083 
10 50 0.7 0.1 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0014 0.0174 0.0046 
20 50 0.2 0.1 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0008 0.0094 0.0057 
20 50 0.5 0.3 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0025 0.0032 0.0025 
20 50 0.7 0.1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 0.0058 0.0016 
30 50 0.2 0.1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0035 0.0042 0.0044 
30 50 0.5 0.3 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0019 0.0016 
30 50 0.7 0.1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0016 0.0011 
40 50 0.2 0.1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0024 0.0030 0.0029 
40 50 0.5 0.3 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0029 0.0012 0.0010 
40 50 0.7 0.1 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.0012 0.0006 
10 70 0.2 0.1 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0016 0.0143 0.0142 
10 70 0.5 0.3 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0032 0.0199 0.0048 
10 70 0.7 0.1 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0008 0.0121 0.0025 
20 70 0.2 0.1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 0.0050 0.0050 
20 70 0.5 0.3 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0024 0.0024 0.0015 
20 70 0.7 0.1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0032 0.0018 
30 70 0.2 0.1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0026 0.0026 
30 70 0.5 0.3 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0012 0.0010 
30 70 0.7 0.1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 0.0006 
40 70 0.2 0.1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0010 0.0020 0.0020 
40 70 0.5 0.3 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0033 0.0007 0.0005 
40 70 0.7 0.1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 0.0005  
Notes: The DGP are generated according to the expressions (15)-(18) based on a Rook-type spatial weight matrix of order 1 
with ;1  ;65.0  ;5.0  ;45.0  ;25.0 6.0 ; );08.0,0(Ni   );05.0,0(Nvit   
).05.0,0();05.0,0( NeNu itit    
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Endogenous variable  : RMSE 
T N     SMLE SDMLE SDQMLE LSDV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
10 20 0.2 0.1 0.1733 0.1686 0.1676 0.1723 0.1073 0.1195 
10 20 0.5 0.3 0.1634 0.1611 0.1593 0.1649 0.0892 0.0810 
10 20 0.7 0.1 0.1603 0.1581 0.1572 0.1650 0.1134 0.0668 
20 20 0.2 0.1 0.1615 0.1584 0.1579 0.1735 0.0424 0.0476 
20 20 0.5 0.3 0.1499 0.1481 0.1470 0.1512 0.0329 0.0364 
20 20 0.7 0.1 0.1477 0.1457 0.1448 0.1518 0.0288 0.0292 
30 20 0.2 0.1 0.1549 0.1527 0.1524 0.1843 0.0248 0.0305 
30 20 0.5 0.3 0.1446 0.1432 0.1425 0.1484 0.0227 0.0244 
30 20 0.7 0.1 0.1431 0.1403 0.1408 0.1603 0.0173 0.0188 
40 20 0.2 0.1 0.1529 0.1512 0.1509 0.1528 0.0184 0.0231 
40 20 0.5 0.3 0.1441 0.1430 0.1425 0.1825 0.0142 0.0177 
40 20 0.7 0.1 0.1408 0.1383 0.1387 0.1508 0.0122 0.0139 
10 30 0.2 0.1 0.1754 0.1702 0.1696 0.1748 0.0634 0.0655 
10 30 0.5 0.3 0.1608 0.1561 0.1569 0.1947 0.0521 0.0497 
10 30 0.7 0.1 0.1596 0.1496 0.1564 0.1618 0.0468 0.0420 
20 30 0.2 0.1 0.1603 0.1572 0.1567 0.1593 0.0292 0.0345 
20 30 0.5 0.3 0.1500 0.1483 0.1471 0.1487 0.0188 0.0219 
20 30 0.7 0.1 0.1469 0.1451 0.1439 0.1577 0.0201 0.0211 
30 30 0.2 0.1 0.1549 0.1528 0.1524 0.1962 0.0152 0.0192 
30 30 0.5 0.3 0.1455 0.1440 0.1434 0.1611 0.0110 0.0137 
30 30 0.7 0.1 0.1433 0.1420 0.1408 0.1569 0.0115 0.0123 
40 30 0.2 0.1 0.1540 0.1524 0.1521 0.1592 0.0125 0.0149 
40 30 0.5 0.3 0.1433 0.1423 0.1417 0.1551 0.0094 0.0115 
40 30 0.7 0.1 0.1418 0.1404 0.1396 0.1488 0.0080 0.0089 
10 50 0.2 0.1 0.1691 0.1633 0.1632 0.1678 0.0354 0.0372 
10 50 0.5 0.3 0.1597 0.1499 0.1555 0.1568 0.0365 0.0358 
10 50 0.7 0.1 0.1560 0.1525 0.1528 0.1587 0.0254 0.0239 
20 50 0.2 0.1 0.1601 0.1569 0.1565 0.1610 0.0146 0.0183 
20 50 0.5 0.3 0.1491 0.1469 0.1462 0.1478 0.0129 0.0146 
20 50 0.7 0.1 0.1456 0.1387 0.1426 0.1457 0.0098 0.0105 
30 50 0.2 0.1 0.1552 0.1530 0.1527 0.1616 0.0097 0.0130 
30 50 0.5 0.3 0.1449 0.1437 0.1428 0.1592 0.0075 0.0090 
30 50 0.7 0.1 0.1420 0.1408 0.1396 0.1475 0.0065 0.0069 
40 50 0.2 0.1 0.1531 0.1514 0.1511 0.1572 0.0066 0.0087 
40 50 0.5 0.3 0.1434 0.1424 0.1418 0.1429 0.0057 0.0067 
40 50 0.7 0.1 0.1409 0.1399 0.1387 0.1597 0.0047 0.0052 
10 70 0.2 0.1 0.1691 0.1623 0.1633 0.1708 0.0252 0.0281 
10 70 0.5 0.3 0.1605 0.1548 0.1563 0.1576 0.0224 0.0227 
10 70 0.7 0.1 0.1539 0.1510 0.1503 0.1650 0.0186 0.0190 
20 70 0.2 0.1 0.1594 0.1562 0.1558 0.1589 0.0107 0.0140 
20 70 0.5 0.3 0.1494 0.1420 0.1464 0.1512 0.0081 0.0098 
20 70 0.7 0.1 0.1457 0.1378 0.1426 0.1489 0.0076 0.0086 
30 70 0.2 0.1 0.1557 0.1535 0.1532 0.1592 0.0061 0.0076 
30 70 0.5 0.3 0.1451 0.1437 0.1430 0.1601 0.0053 0.0067 
30 70 0.7 0.1 0.1426 0.1400 0.1403 0.1484 0.0044 0.0047 
40 70 0.2 0.1 0.1527 0.1510 0.1508 0.1570 0.0048 0.0063 
40 70 0.5 0.3 0.1425 0.1415 0.1408 0.1410 0.0037 0.0045 
40 70 0.7 0.1 0.1407 0.1397 0.1389 0.1421 0.0032 0.0035  
Notes: The DGP are generated according to the expressions (15)-(18) based on a Rook-type spatial weight matrix of order 1 
with ;1  ;65.0  ;5.0  ;45.0  ;25.0 6.0 ; );08.0,0(Ni   );05.0,0(Nvit   
).05.0,0();05.0,0( NeNu itit    
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Exogenous variable  : RMSE 
T N     SMLE SDMLE SDQMLE LSDV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
10 20 0.2 0.1 0.0061 0.0053 0.0051 0.0055 0.0131 0.0386 
10 20 0.5 0.3 0.0051 0.0047 0.0044 0.0049 0.0119 0.0169 
10 20 0.7 0.1 0.0046 0.0044 0.0042 0.0047 0.0355 0.0335 
20 20 0.2 0.1 0.0049 0.0041 0.0040 0.0028 0.0050 0.0120 
20 20 0.5 0.3 0.0031 0.0027 0.0025 0.0028 0.0050 0.0101 
20 20 0.7 0.1 0.0024 0.0021 0.0019 0.0018 0.0053 0.0095 
30 20 0.2 0.1 0.0044 0.0038 0.0037 0.0042 0.0034 0.0072 
30 20 0.5 0.3 0.0026 0.0023 0.0022 0.0030 0.0032 0.0066 
30 20 0.7 0.1 0.0021 0.0018 0.0017 0.0014 0.0027 0.0075 
40 20 0.2 0.1 0.0039 0.0034 0.0034 0.0036 0.0024 0.0055 
40 20 0.5 0.3 0.0023 0.0021 0.0020 0.0058 0.0024 0.0059 
40 20 0.7 0.1 0.0018 0.0016 0.0015 0.0010 0.0024 0.0054 
10 30 0.2 0.1 0.0056 0.0045 0.0043 0.0055 0.0080 0.0142 
10 30 0.5 0.3 0.0037 0.0031 0.0031 0.0050 0.0082 0.0177 
10 30 0.7 0.1 0.0029 0.0024 0.0025 0.0029 0.0088 0.0128 
20 30 0.2 0.1 0.0042 0.0035 0.0034 0.0041 0.0033 0.0080 
20 30 0.5 0.3 0.0022 0.0019 0.0017 0.0021 0.0034 0.0071 
20 30 0.7 0.1 0.0022 0.0019 0.0017 0.0016 0.0033 0.0076 
30 30 0.2 0.1 0.0039 0.0034 0.0033 0.0023 0.0021 0.0044 
30 30 0.5 0.3 0.0021 0.0019 0.0017 0.0017 0.0019 0.0059 
30 30 0.7 0.1 0.0018 0.0016 0.0014 0.0010 0.0020 0.0048 
40 30 0.2 0.1 0.0038 0.0034 0.0033 0.0028 0.0016 0.0027 
40 30 0.5 0.3 0.0020 0.0018 0.0016 0.0010 0.0015 0.0031 
40 30 0.7 0.1 0.0017 0.0015 0.0014 0.0008 0.0014 0.0044 
10 50 0.2 0.1 0.0043 0.0032 0.0032 0.0043 0.0042 0.0070 
10 50 0.5 0.3 0.0027 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019 0.0043 0.0097 
10 50 0.7 0.1 0.0021 0.0017 0.0017 0.0021 0.0047 0.0088 
20 50 0.2 0.1 0.0037 0.0030 0.0029 0.0033 0.0020 0.0051 
20 50 0.5 0.3 0.0020 0.0016 0.0015 0.0020 0.0018 0.0045 
20 50 0.7 0.1 0.0017 0.0013 0.0012 0.0016 0.0019 0.0050 
30 50 0.2 0.1 0.0036 0.0030 0.0030 0.0014 0.0012 0.0029 
30 50 0.5 0.3 0.0019 0.0016 0.0015 0.0014 0.0012 0.0032 
30 50 0.7 0.1 0.0015 0.0013 0.0011 0.0008 0.0011 0.0030 
40 50 0.2 0.1 0.0035 0.0030 0.0030 0.0018 0.0009 0.0023 
40 50 0.5 0.3 0.0019 0.0017 0.0016 0.0017 0.0008 0.0020 
40 50 0.7 0.1 0.0014 0.0012 0.0011 0.0025 0.0008 0.0027 
10 70 0.2 0.1 0.0037 0.0026 0.0025 0.0032 0.0030 0.0050 
10 70 0.5 0.3 0.0021 0.0016 0.0015 0.0020 0.0029 0.0071 
10 70 0.7 0.1 0.0016 0.0013 0.0012 0.0014 0.0036 0.0075 
20 70 0.2 0.1 0.0036 0.0029 0.0028 0.0036 0.0014 0.0035 
20 70 0.5 0.3 0.0019 0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 0.0012 0.0037 
20 70 0.7 0.1 0.0014 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012 0.0041 
30 70 0.2 0.1 0.0034 0.0029 0.0028 0.0025 0.0009 0.0018 
30 70 0.5 0.3 0.0018 0.0015 0.0013 0.0007 0.0009 0.0022 
30 70 0.7 0.1 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 0.0007 0.0008 0.0021 
40 70 0.2 0.1 0.0035 0.0030 0.0030 0.0019 0.0006 0.0017 
40 70 0.5 0.3 0.0017 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0006 0.0015 
40 70 0.7 0.1 0.0013 0.0012 0.0010 0.0011 0.0006 0.0020  
Notes: The DGP are generated according to the expressions (15)-(18) based on a Rook-type spatial weight matrix of order 1 
with ;1  ;65.0  ;5.0  ;45.0  ;25.0 6.0 ; );08.0,0(Ni   );05.0,0(Nvit   
).05.0,0();05.0,0( NeNu itit    
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Chapter 2  
Pollution Havens: a Spatial Vector Auto-Regression Approach 
1 Introduction 
There is an ongoing debate about the environmental impact of multinationals on host countries, 
in particular developing economies. On the one hand, the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) 
states that trade/capital liberalization will lead pollution-intensive industries to relocate to 
countries with less stringent environmental policies. Competition to attract FDI among 
economies might then lead to a reduction or status quo in environmental standards. On the 
other hand, according to the pollution halo hypothesis, relocating industries can improve 
environmental performance in the countries with laxer environmental standards through new 
and cleaner technology. Empirical studies designed to test these hypotheses have so far shown 
little and conflicting evidence. One of the crucial problems inherent in existing studies is that no 
specific causality analysis of the mutual relationship between FDI, environmental policy and 
capital/trade openness has been addressed. The most popular approaches consist of either 
assuming environmental regulation as a function of FDI/trade or vice-versa. Only recently, 
Ederington and Minier (2003), Cole et al. (2006, 2009), Levinson and Taylor (2008) and 
Kellenberg (2009) showed the theoretical and empirical importance of endogenizing 
environmental stringency with respect to FDI/Trade. 
 
Disentangling which relationship(s) is (are) more prevalent is essentially an empirical question. 
In order to do so, environmental stringency, inward FDI and openness are analyzed through a 
spatial panel vector autoregression (SpVAR) model for 124 host countries during the period 
1993 to 2000. The VAR framework provides a flexible statistical tool where dynamic relations 
can be determined and quantified based on a minimal theoretical structure. In addition, unlike 
traditional panel VAR, SpVAR allows to explicitly account for spatial cross-section dependence in 
the data. This is particularly important for two interrelated reasons. First, environmental 
policies, FDI allocation as well as trade openness have been shown to be spatially correlated 
(Eliste and Fredriksson, 2004; Blonigen et al., 2007; Egger and Larch, 2008). Second, taking into 
account spatial dependence and spillovers can potentially mitigate the variable omissions bias. 
To my knowledge, this study is the first to examine carefully the temporal and spatial dynamics 
through which these three variables interact at the world-wide level. 
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From a methodological perspective, this study presents several innovative features. First, the 
generalized empirical likelihood (GEL) estimator is applied to a spatial VAR model. Second, 
because ignoring the possibility of non-stationary parameters can lead to unreliable inference, 
second generation panel unit root tests, which explicitly account for heterogeneity and cross-
section dependence, are implemented. Last but not least, the role of spatial spillovers is 
highlighted through spatial complements to panel Granger causality and impulse-response 
functions. 
 
Results highlight the existence of a bidirectional causality between environmental regulation 
(proxied by SO2/GDP emissions) and inflows of FDI in the presence of spatial dependence. In 
addition, I am able to shed some light on the spatial relationships between the variables not 
found in the classical VAR. Spatial spillovers do play a key role in the relationship between FDI, 
environmental stringency and trade openness and confirm the presence of high globalization 
and strategic decisions. Overall, these findings suggest that the analysis of the linkages between 
FDI and the environment should explicitly account for the potential endogeneity and spatial 
nature of the variables in order to reduce variable omissions. Once that is done, the pollution 
have effect and the pollution halo hypothesis are both confirmed, in particular for low income 
countries. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 highlights the weaknesses found in the 
existing empirical literature about pollution havens. Section 3 presents the spatial VAR and the 
GEL estimator. Section 4 proceeds with the description of the data and the presentation of the 
panel unit root tests as well as the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Pollution Haven Survey 
The pollution haven hypothesis refers to the possibility that FDI could be sensitive to weaker 
environmental regulation, especially when polluting firms want to avoid the costs associated 
with environmental standards compliance. There is a growing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the linkages between environmental stringency, FDI/trade and globalization. 
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Initially, pollution havens were seen as the results of differences in the countries' comparative 
advantages in the production of pollution intensive goods. Copeland and Taylor (2003) go 
further and determine the strategic interaction between North and South countries from an 
autarky situation to free trade when environmental stringency is allowed to be income-induced, 
thus endogenous. They identify three types of impacts of FDI/trade on the environment. First, 
the scale (or volume) effect postulates that freer capital and trade flows lead to more 
production, which in turn means more pollution and harm for the environment. Second, the 
technique effect assumes that higher income leads to more stringent environmental policies 
which motivate the adoption of cleaner production technologies. Thus, this effect might 
mitigate the negative impact of globalization on the environment. Third, the composition effect 
presumes that some countries, based on their lower level of environmental stringency, are 
more likely to specialize in pollution-intensive activities than others. This last effect is the 
mechanism that is argued in the pollution haven hypothesis.  
 
In a theoretical article, Fredriksson (1999) demonstrates that in a perfect competitive market, 
trade liberalization increases (reduces) both firms and environmental lobby groups' incentive to 
influence the level of environmental stringency if the country displays a comparative advantage 
(disadvantage) in the pollution-intensive industry. Consequently, the effect of FDI/trade on the 
environmental policy-making will depend on the relative changes in political pressures. Cole et 
al. (2006) show that the effect of capital and trade flows on the environmental standards 
depends on the host country's level of corruption. In highly corrupted countries, environmental 
policy is partially determined by bribery and FDI can lead more easily to a reduction in the level 
of environmental standards or a lack of policies enforcement. In line with this mechanism, Cole 
and Fredriksson (2009) argue that the impact of FDI on environmental policy-making will be 
conditioned on the host country's political institutions. In the presence of few (many) legislative 
units and high (low) corruption, FDI will lead to less (more) stringent environmental policy and 
thus contribute to sustain (mitigate) the creation of a pollution haven. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the linkages between environmental policy and trade/FDI in an interdependent 
world. Growing international capital and trade flows have given rise to global interdependency 
of the economies and have strengthened the globalization process. In particular, government 
policies, including environmental and trade policies, are not only determined by the country's 
endowed characteristics but are also the product of strategic interactions among economies 
(Eliste and Fredriksson, 2004; Egger and Larch, 2008). The production costs are determined by
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the country's endowments and government policies, and determine themselves the level of 
domestic production/income which is created. Multinationals enterprises will also shape the 
domestic production through different channels including higher competition, technological 
diffusion and agglomeration externalities. In fact, one of the consequences of international 
capital mobility is that some types of FDI decisions to invest to different host countries are no 
longer independent of each other. Policy makers may also be tempted to integrate the effects 
on FDI/trade flows into their regulations, because production and trade, through national and 
multinational firms, impact the country's environment and endowment through scale, 
composition and technique effects. This can be further exacerbated by the spatial diffusion of 
regional/global pollutants emissions through wind and water. In particular, the level of SO2 and 
CO2 emissions in one given country is partially determined by the geographical location and 
wind patterns of emissions in the neighboring countries. 
 
Figure 1: FDI-Pollution Haven Linkages 
 
Source: Extended version of Kellenberg (2009) 
 
Even though the intuitive idea behind the PHH is rather simple, its empirical analysis has given 
rise to some difficulties. This is linked to the confusion between two types of empirical findings. 
On one hand, the pollution haven effect is empirical evidence showing that differences in the 
level of environmental stringency have an impact on the distribution of pollution industries 
among countries. In this perspective, the cost of environmental regulation compliance 
constitutes an additional location determinant. On the other hand, the pollution haven 
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hypothesis is empirical evidence attesting that a reduction in trade and capital restrictions leads 
to a relocation of dirty industries from countries with stringent environmental regulations to 
those with laxer standards. Therefore, the underlying assumption of the PHH is that the most 
important location determinant is environmental regulation and pollution intensity. Without 
necessarily explicitly stating it, most empirical studies actually measure the pollution haven 
effect, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the PHH to hold. The main reason 
is that the PHH is a second order effect, which is by definition more difficult to measure. 
 
Beside this terminology confusion, the controversy regarding the pollution haven effect is 
generated, in part, by a lack of convincing empirical evidence. Most studies, which analyze 
inflows of FDI to different countries originating from various home countries at the aggregated 
or industrial level, fail to disentangle any evidence of a pollution haven effect21. The traditional 
approach, corresponding to the solid arrows in Figure 1, considers the allocation of FDI as a 
function of environmental regulation (Spatareanu, 2007). The alternative approach considers 
the dashed arrows depicted in Figure 1 and estimate environmental regulation as a function of 
the level of FDI (Cole et al., 2006). More recently, a limited number of papers combine both 
approaches to address the potential endogenous nature of the pollution haven effect (Cole et 
al., 2007). Hoffmann et al. (2005) study whether FDI/pollution Granger causes pollution/FDI 
using a meta analysis of Granger causality tests with short time series and panel data. They 
observe that in low-income countries CO2 emissions Granger-cause net inflows of FDI, while for 
middle-income countries FDI Granger-causes the level of CO2. For high-income countries, there 
is no Granger causality. Based on these findings, the authors argue that the pollution haven 
effect is more likely to happen in low-income host countries.  
 
The main drawback of this study is to deliberately ignore the dashed-dotted arrows in Figure 1 
and assume no interdependence in economic and policy decisions as well as pollution 
emissions. As emphasized in the spatial econometrics literature, failure to account for spatial 
dependence may lead to biased inference. This may be particularly problematic for the 
empirical analysis of the PHH, because it is essential to identify the direction of causality 
between inflows of FDI, the level of environmental stringency and trade liberalization. 
 
 
                                                     
21
 Two other types of studies can be found in the empirical literature. The first strand considers inflows of FDI to a single country 
at the regional and/or industrial level. The second strand considers outflows of FDI from a single home country to one or more 
host countries at the aggregated or industrial level. 
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3 Spatial Panel Vector Autoregression 
The most popular method to examine the relationships of several variables with total flexibility 
is the vector autoregression analysis (VAR) (Sims, 1980). VAR is a generalized form of an 
autoregressive model in which the evolution of each variable is a function of its previous values 
and previous observations of all other series in the system. Theoretically (panel) VAR is able to 
potentially address the set of possible relationships between variables without relying on a prior 
theoretical structure beside the assumption of independence between cross-sections. A spatial 
vector autoregressive model (SpVAR) consists of an extended version of a VAR which includes 
spatial as well as temporal lags among a vector of stationary state variables. The spatial 
extension is justified by VAR's inability to explicitly consider the potential impacts of economic 
events in neighboring countries. In standard VAR, an economic shock that occurs in a given 
country only influences the economic conditions in that nation. All of the impacts prevail within 
its frontiers and thus automatically exclude spatial spillovers. In reality, a shock in a given 
country is likely to affect the economic conditions in the neighboring countries as well. That is, 
the economic conditions in the neighborhood countries are likely to exhibit co-movement over 
time. 
 
A limited number of studies have extended spatial econometrics to VAR analysis. LeSage and 
Pan (1995) apply spatial contiguity as an alternative prior in a Bayesian VAR model. They show 
that incorporating a spatial contiguity structure dramatically lowers forecast error. Chen and 
Conley (2001) propose to specify the spatial dependence of the endogenous dependent 
variables in a semi-parametric framework and estimate the parameters with a two-step sieve 
least-squares procedure. Di Giacinto (2003) derives a structural VAR model applying spatial 
relationships to follow prior theoretical beliefs. Recently, Beenstock and Felsenstein (2007) 
present a flexible SpVAR model that builds on the spatial autoregressive model with a spatial 
error process. They demonstrate that the inclusion of spatially and temporally correlated 
disturbances is problematic, because the structural parameters are not fully identified. To avoid 
this issue, Mutl (2009) extends Binder et al.'s (2005) framework to include a single spatial 
dependent error variable. Most of these spatial econometrics techniques, however, have been 
the object of limited applied works. 
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For simplicity, I restrict the presentation to a spatial panel VAR of order one, SpVAR(1), the 
extension to higher order being straightforward. Let ity  be a 1k  vector of dependent variables 
and i  a vector of individual effects of the i
th cross-sectional unit at time t . The SpVAR(1) is 
expressed in panel ( ;,...,2 Tt   Ni ,...,1  ) as follow: 
 
 tttt YWYY    11
~~~  (1)  
 ttt YY   1
~   
 
where   Ntittt yyyY ,,,,1  ,   NI
~ ,   NI
~ ,  kIWW 
~ , NI  is a NN  identity 
matrix and   is the Kronecker product. When the variables are grouped,  111 ~,   ttt YWYX  and 
  ~, . To simplify the notation, each element of the 1~ tYW  vector corresponds to 1tY . The 
lag coefficients are given by the kk  matrix  , while the lagged spatial coefficients are 
associated with the kk  matrix  . The individual effects are included in the matrix  . W  is a 
NN  spatial weight matrix, which defines the spatial arrangement of the observations. Its 
diagonal elements are set to zero, while its off-diagonal components are a spatial function 
between any two pair of locations. The theoretical foundation for W is quite general and the 
particular functional form of any single element in W is, therefore, not prescribed but has to be 
exogenous to the model. Although I experiment with alternative spatial weights (e.g. contiguity, 
inverse distance, ...), the main results are based on a negative exponential scheme: 
  jiifdw jiij    500exp , , where jid ,  represents the distance between locations i and j (in 
km). Each row of the spatial weight matrix is standardized so that all elements sum to one. 
Therefore, the lagged spatial lag parameters in   represent the averages values of the 
neighbor countries in the previous period, i.e. lagged "third-country" effects. The inclusion of 
these spatial variables accounts for the fact that a shock in a given country might need some 
time to extend over its neighborhood. This spatial process can play a key role in spatial VAR 
impulse response functions and Granger causality. Note that model (1) does not include a 
current spatial lag ( tYW
~ ), because it is not well suited for forecasting purposes. 
 
Unlike in standard panel VAR framework, the spatio-temporal stationarity of the SpVAR relies 
on stringer conditions. Assuming the spatial weight matrix is row-standardized, the stability of 
the system requires that the eigenvalues   of the matrix   are smaller than one, 
namely   0det  I  with 1 . A necessary but not sufficient condition for the spatio-
temporal stationarity to hold is that   1diag . Theoretically, the model would remain 
stationary if one or more autoregressive terms are explosive as long as they are compensated 
by their spatial extensions. Appendix 6.1 provides further insight on this issue. 
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3.1 Generalized Empirical Likelihood 
The estimation of a panel VAR similar to (1) without spatial features ( 0 ) is a well-studied 
problem. First, when T is small and fixed, it is necessary to impose some restrictions on the 
initial observations. Second, it is important to mitigate the homogeneity bias by specifying the 
unobserved individual effects. Beenstock and Felsenstein (2007) discuss the choice of fixed 
versus random effects in spatial panels. If the sample happens to be the population (e.g. 
countries), individual effects should be fixed because each panel cross-section represents 
unrandomly itself. Despite being subject to the classical incidental parameters problem, models 
with fixed effects are more likely to be robust to possible misspecification of the distribution of 
the specific individual effects. This explains why in practice, most empirical panel VAR 
applications are estimated in a fixed effects setting with a Generalized Method of Moments 
estimator (GMM) (Love and Zicchino, 2006). 
 
It is convenient to differentiate between the standard (difference) GMM estimators suggested 
by Arellano and Bond (1991), and their extended versions proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Difference GMM relies on orthogonality conditions 
between the disturbances in first-difference and the lagged values of the variables: 
 
       .12  ;,...,3,0, ,1,   tsTtYXYEYgE stitiitit  (2)  
       .11  ;,...,3,0, ,1,   tsTtYXYEYgE stitiitit   (3)  
 
Besides being asymptotically inefficient, standard GMM suffers from weak instrument problem 
when the data is persistent. It also breaks down, when the data is not stationary (Binder et al., 
2005). To overcome these drawbacks, several extended GMM estimators have been proposed. 
In particular, Blundell and Bond (1998) propose a system GMM estimator that relies on the 
following additional moment conditions: 
       TtYXYEYgE titiitit ,...,3,0, 1,1,    (4)  
       .,...,2,0, 1, TtYXYEYgE ittiitit     (5)  
 
This system of moment conditions makes extended GMM more efficient and less biased than 
standard GMM. In addition, it remains consistent in the presence of unit roots. However, one of 
the main drawbacks of system GMM, and GMM in general, is to be particularly sensitive to the 
set of moment conditions. In fact, a high degree of over-identification is problematic because 
GMM estimators assign the same weight to all moment conditions over the sample, although 
some moments conditions convey more information than others. 
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To address this issue, Newey and Smith (2004) propose a generalized empirical likelihood 
estimator (GEL) that assesses the orthogonality conditions by assigning a probability weight to 
each observation. More specifically, GEL generates a discrete multinomial distribution which 
yields the highest probability of the observed data subject to a set of moment restrictions:  
  
 
  
N
i ip
i pp
i
1,
logmax  argˆ,ˆ  (6)  
     
N
i ii
N
i iti
ppYgpts
11
0   , 1  , 0,    ..     
 
where ip  represents the individual probability associated with the individual observation iy  and 
   WYgYg itit ;,,   is the orthogonality conditions given in (2) and (3). Newey and Smith 
(2004) show that although GMM and GEL possess identical first-order asymptotic properties, 
the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator is able to remove several sources of GMM 
biases, including the correlation between the moment function and its derivative. These 
properties explain why GEL displays a higher order of efficiency than GMM. On a practical note, 
the underlying optimization process of GEL can sometimes fail to find a solution, which is not 
the case with the GMM estimators. In addition, traditional GMM estimators are less time 
consuming than GEL estimators. The drawbacks associated with GEL are, however, expected to 
be overweighted by its higher order of efficiency and flexibility. When there is no convergence 
or no possible solution with the GEL, I turn to the Continuously Updated GMM estimator (CUE), 
which is a special case of the GEL when each individual probability is given the same weight (
,1Nip   i = 1, …, N). 
 
4 Empirical Results 
Before displaying the main empirical findings, I implement different panel unit root tests to 
investigate the stationarity condition necessary to make any inference. But first, I briefly discuss 
the selection of the variables considered in this study which covers up to 124 countries between 
1993-2000. 
 
4.1 Variables Selection 
In its simplest form, the pollution haven effect is the result of changes in capital and trade flows 
due to modifications in environmental regulation. Therefore the focus on the empirical analysis 
should be on the difference between environment policy instruments across countries and how 
this alters capital and trade flows. Finding a dynamic measure of environmental stringency is a 
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difficult task. I restricted my search over environmental measures that have both within and 
between-country variation in order to control for important unobservable factors that may 
influence the level of stringency. The choices are severely limited, as most environmental 
regulatory indices at the country level consists of cross-sectional estimates based on one year of 
data. In the end, I consider sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions, whose reductions in emissions may 
be viewed as proxies for a host country's effective enforcement of environmental policies. Data 
on SO2 emissions are taken from Stern (2005) and expressed as (SO2/GDP) for ease of 
interpretation. As an output-oriented measure, SO2 emission should be a better measure of 
environmental regulation, because it does not only take into account the level of stringency but 
also its actual enforcement. This is important because the level of stringency is usually less time 
varying than its actual compliance. In fact, output-oriented measures should, theoretically, be 
able to account for the existence of subsidies or policy instruments that can offset the effect of 
stringer regulation. Note that for some countries, the SO2/GDP ratio is closely associated with 
the country's economic structure. In particular, Chile and Peru appear as the dirtiest countries, 
while Bolivia and Argentina are among the cleanest. To address this issue, I estimate the SpVAR 
without these outliers as a robustness check. In addition, I consider two other measures linked 
to environmental policies. The CO2/GDP ratio is taken from the World Development Indicators, 
while the number of ratified international environmental treaties is constructed based on the 
Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators database. 
 
Data on FDI, expressed as the ratio of FDI/GDP, is collected from the UNCTAD website. In order 
to maximize the number of covered countries with balanced observations, the analysis will 
focus on FDI flows rather than stock. Given that openness of an economy is difficult to quantify, 
I follow the literature and use the ratio of exports and imports over GDP given in the World 
Development Indicators website. Other proxies which measure the country's regulatory degree 
of capital account openness (de jure openness) are available. Unfortunately, for several 
countries the data is non-time varying enough which leads to multicollinearity issues affecting 
the estimation of the remaining coefficients. That is why these data are not considered in this 
study. 
 
4.2 Panel Unit Root Tests 
Stationarity in each variable leads to straightforward interpretation and inference of the VAR 
results. Thus, before estimating the model, careful analysis of the dynamic properties of the 
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variables is needed. It is a well established result that univariate tests such as the Dickey-Fuller 
(DF) and the Augmented DF (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) are not powerful enough to 
reject the null of a unit root given the short span of many time series. The applied literature has 
suggested to employ panel unit root tests in order to increase the power of the tests by 
exploiting a large number of cross-section units and overcome this issue. 
 
Although most panel unit root tests are based on different underlying specifications, the most 
general framework one can consider is given by: 
 itittiiit uxfyy   )(1,   
   itittiiit uxfyy   )(1 1,  (7)  
 
where i = 1, …, N, t = 1, …, Ti and f() is a (linear) function (constant and/or trend). The presence 
of a unit root in the panel can be tested in two ways. First, one can assume a homogenous 
alternative hypothesis, where all individual series are stationary: 1:0 iH    for all i versus 
1:1 iH  for all i . The second possibility is to consider a heterogeneous alternative, where 
some individual time-series are potentially non-stationary: 1:0 iH    for all i versus  1:1 iH   
for some i. 
 
Most of the first generation of panel unit root tests considers a heterogeneous alternative (Im 
et al., 2003; Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001; Hadri and Larsson, 2005; Moon et al., 2007), 
except Levin et al.'s (2002) and Breitung (2000) tests. Yet, the common point of all these tests is 
to assume cross-section independence, i.e. independent distribution for each individual time 
series in the panel. Although this admittedly very strong assumption simplifies the derivation of 
the asymptotic distributions of the panel unit root and stationarity tests, failing to account for 
cross-section dependence can seriously bias the test when the degree of dependence is 
sufficiently large. This is an issue, because a large amount of literature provides evidence of co-
movements between economic variables through common observed and unobserved factors, 
spatial spillovers effects, or general residual correlation that remains after controlling for 
common influences. 
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Table 1: Cross-section and Spatial Dependence Tests 
  FDI SO2 Openness 
Pesaran CD No Constant 1.286* 16.876*** 19.863*** 
 Constant 12.053*** -0.838 19.812*** 
 Trend 4.310*** 4.883*** 14.390** 
     
Moran I 1993 -0.090* 0.088* 0.168*** 
 1997 0.076* 0.047 0.175*** 
 2000 0.132*** 0.051 0.203*** 
     
Geary C 1993 - 0.869* 0.891* 
 1997 - 0.926 0.884*** 
 2000 - 0.863* 0.868** 
Note:  The Pesaran (2007) test checks cross-section independence, while the Moran I 
and Geary C check the absence of global spatial correlation. *** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 1 reports the results of testing for the absence of spatial and cross-sectional dependence. 
Independently of the specification, the Pesaran's CD test tends to reject the null of cross-
sectional independence. The Moran I and Geary's C statistics also reject the null hypothesis of 
no global spatial autocorrelation for standard level of confidence for almost each period for FDI 
and trade openness, but to a less extent for SO2. Note that Geary test cannot be implemented 
with FDI inflows because the test is only valid with positive values. Both spatial tests suggest 
that the variables are characterized by positive spatial correlation through agglomeration 
effects. In other words, the value taken on by the variables at each location tends to be similar 
to the values taken on by the variables at spatially close countries. The only exception is for the 
Moran test for FDI in 1993, where there seems to be negative spatial dependence. Overall, the 
tests tend to rule out the assumption of strong and weak (spatial) cross-section independence. 
The second generation of heterogeneous panel unit root tests relaxes the cross-sectional 
independence hypothesis (Hurlin and Venet, 2007). Within this new generation of tests, two 
general streams can be distinguished. The first approach relies on a factor structure 
specification, where the common and idiosyncratic components influence all the cross-section 
units in a linear dynamic factor model (Bai and Ng, 2004; Moon and Perron, 2004; Choi, 2006; 
Pesaran, 2007). The second approach relies on few or no restrictions on the residual covariance 
matrix (Chang, 2002, 2004; Breitung and Das, 2005; Demetrescu et al., 2006). The most popular 
second generation panel unit root tests are presented in the next sub-sections. Since most tests 
are still not available in econometric softwares, I implemented them in Matlab. Note that some 
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tests allow for the presence of a trend, others do not. The remaining tests, including the first 
generation of panel unit root tests, are reported in Appendices 6.6 and 6.7. The conclusions 
based on the second generation of panel unit root tests are not clear-cut and thus should be 
treated carefully. 
 
4.2.1 Bai and Ng (2004) 
Bai and Ng (2004) procedure is based on the decomposition of the process ity  into three 
components, a deterministic element, a common element captured by a factor structure and an 
idiosyncratic error term: 
 
ittiiit uFy 
  (8)  
 ittiiit euu  1,   
 
where i  and tF  represents a 1r  vector of factor loadings and common factors, respectively, 
and ite  is the i.i.d. idiosyncratic error terms. 
 
Rather than testing for a panel unit root directly in the process ity , the Panel Analysis of 
Nonstationary and Idiosyncratic Common Components method (PANIC) proposed by Bai and Ng 
consists of testing for the presence of a unit root in the common factors and the idiosyncratic 
error terms separately. The PANIC approach begins with formulating the model (8) in first-
difference with the assumption that   0 tFE . Once the r common factors and the 
corresponding loading factors are estimated by the principal component analysis (PCA) method, 
the unit root tests are performed on the following re-cumulated variables for rm ˆ,...,1  and 
Ni ,...,1  : 
  
t
s siti
t
s smtm
uuFF
2 ,,2 ,,
ˆˆˆˆ  
 
The unit root test on the defactored cumulated idiosyncratic error terms ( tiu ,ˆ ) is based on the 
average individual ADF t -statistics. Bai and Ng propose two Fisher's type statistics, cuPˆ  and 
c
uZ ˆ , 
as suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). Both pooled statistics converge to a 
standard normal distribution under the null. 
 
The unit root test on the defactored cumulated common factors ( tmF ,ˆ ) depends on the 
estimated number of common factors rˆ . If there is a single common factor ( rˆ = 1), the 
nonstationarity test is based on a standard ADF tests with a constant. When there are several 
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common factors ( rˆ >1), Bai and Ng suggest a sequential procedure to test the number of 
common independent stochastic trends in the common factors. The first test, MQf, analyzes the 
common factors assuming they can be represented by a finite order VAR. The second test, MQc, 
addresses serial correlation by non-parametrically estimating the nuisance parameters. Since 
the asymptotic distributions of both tests are non-standard, the authors provide 10%, 5% and 
1% critical values for different number of common factors. 
 
Table 2 displays the results of the PANIC analysis. The optimal number of the common factors is 
selected according to the robust procedure proposed by Alessi et al. (2008), who show that the 
standard procedure suggested by Bai and Ng usually leads to select the highest number of 
common factors available. There are between four and one common factors such that the 
idiosyncratic terms are independent across each cross-section. Most tests fail to reject the null 
of unit root tests. The only exception is the unit root test of the single common factor of FDI. 
Independently of the test considered, MQc or MQf, the number of common stochastic trends 
corresponds to the number of common factors. Overall, the Bai and Ng procedure tends to 
suggest that the non-stationary property of the three variables is mostly due to the idiosyncratic 
components rather than the common factors (growth trend). 
 
4.2.2 Moon and Perron (2004) 
The method proposed by Moon and Perron (2004) is different from Bai and Ng as it assumes a 
factor structure in the error term: 
 itiit xy    
 ittiiit uxx  1,   
 
ittiit eFu 
  (9)   
where i  and tF  represent a 1r  vector of factor loadings and common factors, respectively. 
The i.i.d. idiosyncratic component is represented by ite . 
 
Similar to Bai and Ng, the Moon and Perron approach consists of defactoring the data to 
eliminate the cross-sectional dependence represented by the common factors. The panel unit 
root is then performed on the defactored estimated idiosyncratic error terms. The authors 
derive two modified t-statistics, at  and bt , which are based on the cross-sectional average of 
the long-run variances of the idiosyncratic residuals. The authors demonstrate that, under the 
null hypothesis, both statistics converge to a standard normal distribution. 
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The results corresponding to the Moon and Perron test are reported in Table 3. Depending on 
the criteria considered, the number of common factors ranges from four to one. The null 
hypothesis of non-stationartiy of the idiosyncratic components is rejected for all variables when 
the model is specified with individual effects. However, this is no longer the case when a time 
trend is included in the model specification. Since, Moon and Perron show that their test has 
low power when the model includes a time trend, these last results should be taken cautiously. 
In any case, these results, ruling in favour of the absence of a unit root, are in contradiction with 
the conclusions based on the PANIC procedure.  
 
4.2.3 Chang (2002, 2004) 
Under few restrictions on the covariance matrix of residuals, the limit distribution of the 
standard (Wald-type) unit root test depends on nuisance parameters defining cross-section 
dependence. To overcome this issue, Chang develops a non-linear instrumental variables 
estimator of the autoregressive parameters in a standard ADF model (7). The instruments are 
generated according to a non-linear function of the lagged values: ).( 1, tiyF  The Instruments 
Generating Function (IGF) must meet the features of a regularly integrable function. In 
particular, it must satisfy  ,0)(  dxxxF   ensuring a correlation between the lagged values of the 
series and the non-linear instruments. Chang demonstrates that the t-ratio, denoted iZ , 
associated with the non-linear IV estimation of the individual ADF, is asymptotically normally 
distributed. In addition, the individual iZ  statistics are shown to be independent across cross-
section. This leads Chang to construct a pooled IV t-statistics, denoted NS , which converges to a 
standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 4 displays the nonlinear IV t-ratio statistics for four different instruments generating 
functions. The results are mixed depending on the model specification. In the model without 
constant, the unit root hypothesis is rejected for the three variables for most IGFs. The same 
findings hold for the individual constant specification. However, these conclusions are totally 
reversed when the model specification includes a time-trend variable. SO2 and trade openness 
reject the unit root hypothesis independently of the IGF considered. 
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Table 2: Bai & Ng (2004) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
Constant Optimal factors 4 1  4 1  4 1  
 êP  (idiosyncratic shocks) 16.271 3.997  -5.048 -0.038  3.532 3.672  
 
F
t ˆ  (common factors) - -3.83***  - -2.27  - -1.683  
 MQc (common factors) -11.317* -  -9.872 -  -12.239* -  
 MQf, (common factors) -0.423 -  -9.327 -  -4.224 -  
Constant and Trend Optimal factors 4 2 1 4 2 1 4 3 1 
 êP  (idiosyncratic shocks) 39.288 19.399 9.599 -0.758 4.761 14.464 2.124 13.279 7.315 
 
F
t ˆ  (common factors) - - -1.775 - - -0.716 - - -0.984 
 MQc (common factors) -11.858* -5.752 - -11.19* -0.13 - -11.812* -2.3 - 
 MQf, (common factors) -4.17 -6.022 - -9.884 -2.548 - -5.441 -5.437 - 
Notes:  P denotes the inverse chi-square (Fisher) test statistic based on the defactored idiosyncratic component of the variable. t corresponds to the standard ADF 
t-statistic  when there is a single optimal factor. When the number of optimal factor is higher, two other tests, MQc and MQf, are performed. *** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 3: Moon & Perron (2004) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
Constant Optimal factors 4 3 1 4 1 4 2 1 3 
 
BCNW
at
   -0.14 -0.133 -0.001 -7E+3*** -497*** -4E+5*** -9E+3*** -7E+3*** -0.133 
 
BCNW
bt
   -4.73*** -4.94*** -23.7*** -1.28 -7.48*** -5.70*** -14*** -20*** -4.94*** 
 
BINW
at
   -0.133 -0.131 -0.001 -8E+3*** -469*** -5E+5*** -9E+3*** -8E+2*** -0.131 
 
BINW
bt
   -4.60*** -4.78*** -22.3*** -1.17 -7.26*** -5.6*** -14.6*** -19*** -4.78*** 
 
QSA
at
   -0.134 -0.124 0 -7E+3*** -470*** -5E+5*** -9E+3*** -8E+0*** -0.124 
 
QSA
bt
   -4.85*** -5.02*** -24.4*** -1.33* -7*** -6*** -15*** -21*** -5.02*** 
Constant and Trend Optimal factors 4 3 1 4 1 4 3 1 3 
 
BCNW
at
   0 0 0 0.013 11.43 58.98 38.63 3.63 0 
 
BCNW
bt
   0.084 -0.301 -0.125 0.008 1.14 0.84 0.587 0.068 -0.301 
 
BINW
at
   0 0 0 0.013 12.18 64.62 41.14 3.83 0 
 
BINW
bt
   0.085 -0.31 -0.139 0.008 1.14 0.85 0.597 0.06 -0.31 
 
QSA
at
   0 0 0 0.003 5.08 21.12 14.72 1.80 0 
 
QSA
bt
   0.064 -0.256 -0.107 0.006 0.90 0.608 0.43 0.055 -0.256 
Notes: t denotes the t-statistic based on the defactored data. BCNW stands for the long-run variance computed according to Bartlett kernel function with common Newey 
and West truncation lag. BINW denotes the long-run variance computed according to Bartlett kernel function with individual Newey and West truncation lag. QSA  
stands for the long-run variance computed according to a Quadratic Spectral function and individual lag. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%. 
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Table 4: Chang (2002) Test 
  FDI SO2 Openness 
No Constant     KxxFNS 1   6.831 0.654 9.328 
       KxxsignxFNS  1   0.593 0.721 0.301 
     KxxxFNS  1   0.588 0.717 0.299 
       KxxxxFNS  1exp     6.327 -10.51*** 6.763 
Constant     KxxFNS 1   3.148 2.519 5.083 
       KxxsignxFNS  1   0.702 1.145 1.827 
     KxxxFNS  1   1.165 0.874 2.108 
       KxxxxFNS  1exp     22.102 -9.219*** -2.201** 
Constant and Trend     KxxFNS 1   -0.841 -4.282*** -7.245*** 
       KxxsignxFNS  1   0.105 -2.668*** -3.372*** 
     KxxxFNS  1   -0.785 -2.179** -3.642*** 
       KxxxxFNS  1exp     1.215 -12.09*** -13.163*** 
Notes: NS  denotes the average individual nonlinear IV t-ratio statistics based on a specific IGF. *** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
Overall, the different tests are not very conclusive about the stationarity properties of these 
variables. This comes partially from the fact that each test relies on specific assumptions and a 
different underlying specification. What seems to be clear is the presence of at least one 
common factor in the data. Since the GEL estimator based on the system of moments 
conditions does not break down in the presence of a unit root, the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable can ultimately be used to test for the homogenous non-stationarity of each 
variable. 
 
4.3 Estimation Results 
In order to investigate the pollution haven effect, I estimate two different panel VAR models: a 
non-spatial and spatial trivariate model with FDI, SO2 and trade openness. The main reason to 
proceed sequentially is to highlight potential collinearity problems after the introduction of 
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lagged spatial covariates. The order of the VAR is set to one in order to avoid dealing with a too 
small time period (T = 8) and severe multicollinearity. All specifications include individual time 
dummies to account for global time related shocks and reduce potential bias due to the 
presence of cross-section dependence in the error term. However, following Love and Zicchino 
(2006), these individual time effects are removed before estimation by demeaning the data, in 
order to mitigate potential additional collinearity. 
 
All estimations are performed with the panel fixed effect GEL estimator, unless specified 
otherwise. The different equations in the system are estimated at once based on the moment 
conditions suggested by the system GMM estimator (see equations (2)-(5)). More specifically, 
the instruments for the endogenous variables rely on the second and third lags of the 
dependent variables, while the lagged spatial lags are treated as exogenous. To reduce the 
number of moment conditions, the instruments are also collapsed (see Appendix 6.2, Roodman, 
2009). Note that GEL and more generally spatial VAR are not available in standard econometric 
software packages, that is why I implement the different estimators in Matlab22. Table 5 reports 
the results associated with the aspatial and spatial VAR for the full sample, while Table 6 
displays the results for low and high income subsamples but based on the whole sample spatial 
weight matrix23. Note that dealing with subsamples is problematic, because small sample size 
increases considerably the presence of collinearity and convergence issues. This is particularly 
the case of the high income sub-sample, that is why I turn to the continuously update GMM 
estimator, which, despite assigning the same probability weight to each cross-section, remains 
more efficient than System GMM and is less sensitive to convergence issues.  
 
The results confirm the dynamic nature of FDI inflows, pollution emissions and openness to 
trade with highly positive significant autoregressive parameters. The estimates suggest the 
presence of a simultaneous pollution haven and pollution halo effects. More pollution has a 
strong enhancing effect on inflows of FDI, while FDI seems to lead to lower pollution emissions. 
Taking together, both results are in line with the existence of potential endogeneity of the 
pollution haven/halo effect. However, these opposing effects are only significant for the low 
income sample. For high income countries, it seems that inflows of FDI do not have any 
significant impact on SO2 emissions. This can be explained by the higher prevalence of cleaner 
technologies in high income countries, which gives further insight on the smaller order of 
                                                     
22
 The optimization algorithms are based on John Zedlewski's matElike and Matlab's fmincon routines. 
23
 Appendix 6.3 reports the high and low income classification. 
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magnitude of the pollution haven effect in developed economies. In fact, it seems that FDI 
allocation to developing countries is slightly more sensitive to environmental stringency in low 
income countries. These findings remain valid when outlier countries in terms of SO2/GDP are 
dropped (e.g. Chile and Peru). The relationship between FDI inflows and trade-to-openness is 
also characterized by opposite effects. On the one hand, countries with large trade openness 
have lower FDI inflows, on the other hand, an increase in inflows of FDI increases the level of 
trade-openness. Yet, the sub-sample results suggest a single positive link between FDI and 
openness in developed economies, but a negative relationship between trade openness and FDI 
inflows in developing countries. 
 
 
Table 5: Full Sample Spatial VAR(1) Results 
 GEL Results GEL Results 
 FDI SO2 Openness FDI SO2 Openness 
FDI (t-1)  0.735 -0.026 0.378 0.637 -0.017 0.214 
 [0.042]*** [0.007]*** [0.079]*** [0.055]*** [0.008]** [0.079]*** 
SO2 (t-1) 0.355 0.739 0.546 0.205 0.670 0.016 
 [0.094]*** [0.042]*** [0.193]*** [0.039]*** [0.022]*** [0.109] 
Openness (t-1)  -0.065 -0.002 0.560 -0.159 -0.009 0.454 
 [0.022]*** [0.006] [0.050]*** [0.028]*** [0.007] [0.055]*** 
Spatial FDI (t-1)     -0.051 -0.021 -0.079 
    [0.058] [0.014] [0.109] 
Spatial SO2 (t-1)     -0.199 0.034 -0.194 
    [0.047]*** [0.019]* [0.134] 
Spatial Openness (t-1)     0.108 0.007 0.357 
    [0.020]*** [0.005] [0.047]*** 
Countries 124 124 124 124 124 124 
Time 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Notes:  The model includes time and country fixed effects, but time effects are removed prior to estimation. The estimation 
is performed using GEL with 2
nd
  and 3
rd
 lags as collapsed instruments. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** 
significant at 1%,** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
Taking into account spatial interactions leads to additional interesting findings. In particular, the 
negative impact of the lagged spatial lag of SO2 on the allocation of FDI confirms the evidence 
of the pollution haven effect. FDI flows in a given country tend to decrease if SO2 is higher in the 
neighbouring countries. This effect is quantitatively stronger for high income countries. More 
generally, most spatial covariates tend to be of a higher order of magnitude for developed 
countries, while temporal covariates are larger for developing countries. This confirms the view 
that high income countries are economically more integrated than developing economies. In 
fact, FDI inflows, pollution emission and trade openness in high income countries are 
characterized by a strong complementary strategic relationship in terms of spatial covariates. 
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Table 6: Sub-sample Spatial VAR(1) Results 
 Low Income GEL Results High Income CUE Results 
 FDI SO2 Openness FDI SO2 Openness 
FDI (t-1)  0.580 -0.045 0.010 0.217 -0.007 0.168 
 [0.053]*** [0.014]*** [0.113] [0.029]*** [0.008] [0.044]*** 
SO2 (t-1) 0.212 0.683 0.202 0.186 0.179 0.183 
 [0.052]*** [0.028]*** [0.145] [0.068]*** [0.063]*** [0.233] 
Openness (t-1)  -0.149 -0.026 0.417 1.78e-04 -0.012 0.103 
 [0.019]*** [0.008]*** [0.060]*** [0.024] [0.009] [0.057]* 
Spatial FDI (t-1)  -0.075 -0.002 -0.120 0.773 -0.019 0.133 
 [0.049] [0.018] [0.118] [0.123]*** [0.009]** [0.102] 
Spatial SO2 (t-1)  -0.207 0.002 -0.304 -0.218 0.811 -0.129 
 [0.036]*** [0.011] [0.095]*** [0.062]*** [0.167]*** [0.711] 
Spatial Openness (t-1)  0.093 0.007 0.354 0.019 0.001 0.887 
 [0.020]*** [0.005] [0.049]*** [0.029] [0.014] [0.077]*** 
Countries 83 83 83 41 41 41 
Time 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Notes:  The model includes time and country fixed effects, but time effects are removed prior to estimation. The 
estimation is performed using GEL with 2
nd
  and 3
rd
 lags as collapsed instruments. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. *** significant at 1%,** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
Putting together, these findings confirm the importance of potential endogeneity as well as the 
presence of dynamic interdependence in the analysis of the pollution haven effect. Failing to 
distinguish between high and low income countries might also lead to misleading results.  
 
Before investigating the spatial causality of these results, I re-estimate the SpVAR with the 
CO2/GDP ratio and the number of ratified international environmental treaties as alternative 
indirect measures of environmental policy. As highlighted by Table 7, the estimates associated 
with CO2 emissions support most of the earlier findings. Inflows of FDI to developing countries is 
larger when pollution intensity is higher, while now lagged FDI leads to higher CO2/GDP ratio in 
high income countries. However, according to Table 8, this is no longer the case with the 
number of signed international environmental treaties. The absence of significant relationship 
between inflows of FDI and environmental treaties could be explained by the fact that the 
ratification of an international environmental treaty does not necessarily translate into stringer 
environmental regulation. In some cases, countries with an incentive to ratify the treaty already 
comply with the environmental standards implied by the agreement. In other cases, sanctions 
against non-complying members are almost inexistent. In any case, the results with treaties 
should be treated very carefully, because the number of treaties is a count process and should, 
therefore, be estimated based on a count model specification. 
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Table 7: CO2 Spatial VAR(1) Robustness Check Results 
 Low Income GEL Results High Income CUE Results 
 FDI CO2 Openness FDI CO2 Openness 
FDI (t-1)  0.532 0.037 0.019 0.460 0.027 0.424 
 [0.048]*** [0.029] [0.121] [0.032]*** [0.014]* [0.031]*** 
CO2 (t-1) 0.083 0.831 -0.152 0.030 0.533 0.266 
 [0.026]*** [0.052]*** [0.069]** [0.052] [0.045]*** [0.072]*** 
Openness (t-1)  -0.112 0.083 0.604 -0.005 -0.031 0.544 
 [0.024]*** [0.027]*** [0.065]*** [0.012] [0.007]*** [0.019]*** 
Spatial FDI (t-1)  0.087 0.098 0.218 0.530 0.008 -0.155 
 [0.059] [0.053]* [0.126]* [0.105]*** [0.048] [0.052]*** 
Spatial CO2 (t-1)  -0.156 0.150 0.022 -0.069 0.457 -0.074 
 [0.033]*** [0.050]*** [0.075] [0.022]*** [0.108]*** [0.090] 
Spatial Openness (t-1)  0.048 -0.038 0.204 0.017 0.040 0.446 
 [0.014]*** [0.017]** [0.040]*** [0.011] [0.009]*** [0.044]*** 
Countries 91 91 91 42 42 42 
Time 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Notes:  The model includes time and country fixed effects, but time effects are removed prior to estimation. The estimation 
is performed using GEL with 2
nd
  and 3
rd
 lags as collapsed instruments. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** 
significant at 1%,** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
Table 8: Treaties Spatial VAR(1) Robustness Check Results 
 Low Income GEL Results High Income CUE Results 
 FDI Treaties Openness FDI Treaties Openness 
FDI (t-1)  0.559 0.018 -0.016 0.508 0.005 0.246 
 [0.051]*** [0.016] [0.109] [0.039]*** [0.023] [0.038]*** 
Treaties (t-1) 0.004 0.933 0.091 -0.056 0.501 -0.020 
 [0.034] [0.021]*** [0.099] [0.041] [0.094]*** [0.085] 
Openness (t-1)  0.010 -0.007 0.736 0.007 -0.003 0.533 
 [0.017] [0.008] [0.060]*** [0.029] [0.022] [0.036]*** 
Spatial FDI (t-1)  0.151 0.006 0.545 0.482 -0.179 -0.086 
 [0.067]** [0.021] [0.159]*** [0.125]*** [0.120] [0.127] 
Spatial Treaties (t-1)  0.034 0.059 0.035 0.110 0.489 0.056 
 [0.021] [0.014]*** [0.066] [0.041]*** [0.102]*** [0.132] 
Spatial Openness (t-1)  -0.004 0.007 0.065 0.024 0.014 0.457 
 [0.008] [0.004]* [0.027]** [0.041] [0.042] [0.072]*** 
Countries 95 95 95 40 40 40 
Time 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Notes:  The model includes time and country fixed effects, but time effects are removed prior to estimation. The 
estimation is performed using GEL with 2
nd
  and 3
rd
 lags as collapsed instruments. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. *** significant at 1%,** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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4.4 Spatial Granger Causality Test 
In order to check the relevance of the different variables in the system, it is useful to investigate 
whether each variable is determined, in part, by the remaining spatial and non-spatial variables. 
A variable x is said to Granger cause y, if the information embodied in previous values of x is 
useful for forecasting y. Yet, Granger causality does not imply in causality per se. One 
shortcoming of the standard panel VAR is its inability to distinguish between time and spatial 
causality. Spatial causality refers to the predictability associated with the previous spatial 
distribution of variable x to improve understanding the current spatial distribution of variable x 
or y. The (spatial) panel Granger test is implemented through a likelihood ratio test, where the 
null hypothesis assumes no (spatial) causality (Mur and Paelinck, 2009). The (spatial) test 
compares the log likelihood of the full model with the one associated with the system of 
equations subject to a zero restriction on a given parameter. Under the null hypothesis, the 
statistics follows a chi-square distribution of k degree(s) of freedom, k being the number of 
parameter constraints:     2 2
0
kLL
as
HHa
 . 
 
 
Table 9: Full Sample Panel Granger Causality Tests 
 Full Sample Low Income Sample 
Granger causes FDI SO2 Openness FDI SO2 Openness 
FDI - 2.35 4.52** - 7.41*** 0.15 
Spatial FDI -2.56 -1.99 -2.56 0.10 3.33* 0.09 
FDI + Spatial FDI - 13.85*** 4.61* - 8.07** 0.15 
SO2  16.56*** - 0.03 39.80*** - 0.43 
Spatial SO2  4.26** -2.80 4.26 29.71*** 6.92*** 2.97 
SO2 + Spatial SO2  16.52*** - 3.53 41.58***  0.67 
Openness 11.71*** 15.78*** - 16.37*** 0.35 - 
Spatial Openness 11.45*** 22.24*** 11.45** 13.17*** 4.00** 13.17** 
Openness + Spatial Openness 11.74*** 22.27*** - 24.16*** 5.99** - 
Notes:  Likelihood ratio test with no Granger causality as the null hypothesis. *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
   
 
 
4.5 Spatial Impulse Response Function 
Unlike in traditional VAR, the spatial IRF can decompose the response of a shock ( ) into a 
(direct) time  )(  and (indirect) spatial  )(  effect. Instead of analyzing how a specific shock in a 
given country propagates itself to the remaining countries, I consider a common global shock 
affecting initially the entire set of countries (e.g. global economic downturn). As shown in 
Appendix 6.1, the cumulative average effect of the shock   at time t + s is given by   m
s I . 
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Figure 2: FDI's Impulse-Response Functions 
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Figure 3: SO2's Impulse-Response Functions 
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Figure 4: Openness's Impulse-Response Functions 
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Figure 2 displays the impulse-response functions associated with inflows of FDI and the 5% error 
bands. Following Love and Zicchino (2006), the construction of the confidence intervals is done 
by randomly generating draws based on the estimated VAR coefficients and standard errors and 
re-computing the IRFs. This procedure is performed 1000 times in order to compute the 5th and 
95th percentile of the distribution. For each row, the first plot reports the IRF of the time effect 
of the shock, while the second one presents the spatial effect. The third plot considers the total 
effect as the sum of the direct and indirect effects. Figure 3 and 4 report the similar plots for a 
unitary shock in SO2 emission and trade openness, respectively. 
 
The previous findings are corroborated by the impulse response functions (IRFs). A shock in SO2 
emissions on the level of FDI inflows is globally positive but can be decomposed into a positive 
and negative impact through time and spatial dynamic, respectively. The opposite holds for a 
shock in FDI on the level of pollution, where the spatial dependence amplifies the impact of the 
shock. Both results support the potential existence of a bidirectional relation between FDI and 
environmental regulation and highlight the potential endogeneity of the pollution haven/halo 
effect. For the remaining IRFs, most of the spatial spillovers exacerbate the initial shock through 
a complementary relationship. One of the exceptions is the response of FDI after a shock in 
trade openness, where spatial dependence mitigates the impact.  
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relationship between FDI, environmental stringency (proxied by 
SO2/GDP emissions) and trade openness of 124 countries during the nineties by taking explicitly 
into account spatial dependence. Prior to the estimation, I perform second generation panel 
unit root tests. Although the results of the tests are not clear-cut, they provide confirmation of 
the existence of at least a single common factor. Based on a spatial panel VAR framework, I find 
evidence of a pollution haven effect in particular in developing countries. Furthermore, the 
panel Granger causality tests suggest that there is a potential bidirectional causality between 
FDI and pollution emissions once spatial dependence is taking into account, confirming in this 
sense the pollution halo hypothesis. The potential endogeneity of the relationships is further 
illustrated by the spatial impulse response functions. In addition, the SpVAR is able to highlight 
the role of spatial interaction in the determination of the linkages between FDI, openness and 
environmental regulation through amplification or mitigation mechanisms. 
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The results of this paper complement recent theoretical and empirical works, which highlight 
the importance of accounting for the likely endogeneity of environmental stringency with 
respect to FDI. Another important methodological feature of this study is the importance of 
accounting for spatial dynamic interactions. Any empirical study that omits both econometric 
issues might face biased and unreliable results. In addition, the analysis should be performed by 
distinguishing between developed and developing countries in order to mitigate the 
homogenous bias. Ultimately, the assessment of the pollution haven effect should be done 
through a structural specification which is able to capture all the determinants of the 
relationship between environmental policy and economic integration through trade and 
investment. 
 
From a policy perspective, the results definitively rule in favour of coordination between 
trade/investment and environmental policies at the national level through multilateral 
cooperation. The presence of positive and negative spatial spillovers, which amplify or smooth 
shocks, could then be fully captured or mitigated. More generally, any international agreement 
with environmental provisions addressing the risk of pollution haven effect should include 
different dispositions between high and low income countries as their relationship with respect 
to economic activity and pollution is significantly different from each other. In particular, 
developing economies cannot be expected to make changes right away. In fact, any agreement 
should encourage the transition to stringer environmental policies without impeding 
productivity and growth. 
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6 Appendices 
6.1 Spatio-Temporal Stationarity in SpVAR 
To illustrate the spatio-temporal stationarity condition, I consider a SpVAR with N = 2 assuming 
W  is row-standardized such that 
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Then it follows that a common shock   associated with variable x, which occurs at time t-1, 
yields: 


































































































































2121
1111
2121
1111
212121
211111
122121
121111
21
21
12
12
2221
1211
2221
1211
2221
1211
2221
1211
2
2
1
1
0
0
000
000
000
000
00
00
00
00
0
0
00
00
00
00
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
z
x
z
x
t
t
t
t
 
 
Thus, the average effect of   on the variables x and y at time t is given by 
     ,, 21211111 

  and more generally at time st   by: 
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This result remains valid for N > 2, as long as the spatial matrix W is row standardized. This is 
also the approach used to construct the impulse response functions of the system. 
 
 
6.2 Extended GMM in SpVAR 
Let    iTiiii XY  ,,21,  , where it  is a 1k  vector. To simplify the notation, each 
element of the tYW
~  vector corresponds to tiY , . The moments conditions given in (2)-(5) can be 
stacked as   0 iiPE  , where ] ,[  ii DLi PPP . 
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In order to restrict the number of instruments and avoid over-fitting, the moments conditions 
are collapsed as follows (Roodman, 2009): 
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6.3 Country Lists 
Low Income Countries 
Albania; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Bangladesh; Belarus; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; 
Brazil; Bulgaria; Burundi; Cambodia; Cape Verde; Chile; China; Colombia; Congo, Rep.; Costa 
Rica; Croatia; Côte d'Ivoire; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El 
Salvador; Ethiopia; Fiji; Gabon; Ghana; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; Honduras; India; 
Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Jamaica; Jordan; Kenya; Kyrgyz Republic; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; 
Lithuania; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Mauritius; Mexico; Mongolia; 
Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Rwanda; Senegal; Seychelles; Solomon 
Islands; South Africa; Sri Lanka; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Syrian 
Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; 
Uganda; Uruguay; Venezuela, RB; Yemen, Rep. 
 
High Income Countries 
Antigua and Barbuda; Aruba; Australia; Austria; Bahamas, The; Bahrain; Barbados; Belgium-
Luxembourg; Canada; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; 
Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Korea, Rep.; Kuwait; Malta; Netherlands; 
Netherlands Antilles; New Zealand; Norway; Oman; Portugal; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Slovak 
Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Trinidad and Tobago; United Kingdom; United 
States. 
 
 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std-Error Min Max 
FDI 3.02 4.34 -19.11 43.53 
SO2  0.49 0.73 0.01 7.62 
Openness 42.28 23.181 0 167 
Spatial FDI 3.15 2.35 -3.70 16.20 
Spatial SO2  0.48 0.26 0.09 1.97 
Spatial Openness 43.32 14.79 14.05 133.23 
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6.5 Correlation Matrix 
 
    Spatial Spatial Spatial 
 FDI SO2 Openness FDI SO2 Openness 
FDI 1      
SO2 -0.04 1     
Openness 0.39*** 0.07** 1    
Spatial FDI 0.23*** -0.1*** 0.14** 1   
Spatial SO2  -0.14*** 0.18** -0.06* -0.29*** 1  
Spatial Openness 0.08*** -0.08*** 0.28*** 0.48*** -0.06* 1 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
6.6 First Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Levin, Lee & Chu (2002) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
No Constant BCNWt

 -1.352* -6.72*** 5.161 
 BINWt

 -1.352* -6.72*** 5.161 
 QSIAt

 -1.35* -6.72*** 5.162 
Constant BCNWt

 -1.355* -6.723*** 5.16 
 BINWt

 0.183 -19.763*** -16.964*** 
 QSIAt

 -1.793*** -20.666*** -16.896*** 
Constant and Trend BCNWt

 1.833*** -19.33*** -16.143*** 
 BINWt

 -34.986*** -35.586*** -10.678*** 
 QSIAt

 -36.458*** -34.839*** -15.704*** 
Notes: t* denotes the adjusted t-statistic. BCNW  stands for the long-run variance computed according 
to Bartlett kernel function with common Newey and West truncation lag.  BINW  denotes a 
long-run variance computed according to Bartlett kernel function with individual Newey and 
West truncation lag. QSA stands for a long-run variance computed according to a Quadratic 
Spectral function and individual lag. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%. 
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Maddala & Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) Tests 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
No Constant 
NFiniteP   169.732 385.347*** -130.284 
 
NFiniteZ   4.912 -4.61*** 7.8 
 
NFiniteL   99.955 -96.017 155.349 
 
NFiniteL   0.246 -0.236 0.382 
 
NInfinitePm   -3.514*** 6.167*** -5.286*** 
 
NInfiniteZ   4.912 -4.61*** 7.8 
 
NInfiniteL   0.245 -0.235 0.381 
Constant 
NFiniteP   191.51 390.015*** 295.239** 
 
NFiniteZ   4.909 -4.531*** 0.259 
 
NFiniteL   104.164 -93.616 5.880 
 
NFiniteL   0.256 -0.23 0.014 
 
NInfinitePm   -2.536*** 6.377*** 2.121** 
 
NInfiniteZ   4.909 -4.531*** 0.259 
 
NInfiniteL   0.255 -0.229 0.014 
Constant and Trend 
NFiniteP   275.561 389.488*** 272.808 
 
NFiniteZ   2.057 -2.364*** 1.451 
 
NFiniteL   40.789 -52.386 29.084 
 
NFiniteL   0.1 -0.129 0.072 
 
NInfinitePm   1.238 6.353*** 1.114 
 
NInfiniteZ   2.057 -2.364*** 1.451 
 
NInfiniteL   0.1 -0.128 0.071 
Notes: P denotes the inverse chi-square (Fisher) test statistic, while Z is the inverse normal (Choi) and 
L
*
 is the logit test. Following Choi, there are two cases considered: when N is assumed to be 
finite or not to avoid degenerate distribution in the limit. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
Breitung (2000) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
Constant  UBt   -1.785** -1.728*** 0.613 
Constant and Trend  UBt   0.577 0.564 2.612 
Notes: t denotes the robust t-statistics. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
Constant tZ
~  -0.123 -20.902*** -10.823*** 
 tW
~  4.72 -6.976*** -1.303* 
Constant and Trend tZ
~  -23.554*** -51.945*** -20.949*** 
 tW
~  -23.554*** -15.236*** 0.464 
Notes: Z~  and W~  denote the standardized t-statistic under the assumption of serially 
correlated errors. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at  10%. 
 
 
Hadri & Larsson (2005) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
Constant 
BCNW
TInfiniteZ   9.585*** 10.536*** 11.317*** 
 
BINW
TInfiniteZ   15.132*** 16.122*** 17.086*** 
 
QSA
TInfiniteZ   12.756*** 13.159*** 12.685*** 
 
BCNW
TFiniteZ   9.575*** 10.709*** 11.64*** 
 
BINW
TFiniteZ   16.19*** 17.37*** 18.499*** 
 
QSA
TFiniteZ   13.356*** 13.837*** 13.272*** 
Constant and Trend 
BCNW
TInfiniteZ   21.556*** 21.446*** 21.321*** 
 
BINW
TInfiniteZ   69.143*** 61.464*** 73.123*** 
 
QSA
TInfiniteZ   13.941*** 14.423*** 12.605*** 
 
BCNW
TFiniteZ   22.53*** 22.385*** 22.221*** 
 
BINW
TFiniteZ   85.173*** 75.064*** 90.412*** 
 
QSA
TFiniteZ   12.505*** 13.139*** 10.747*** 
Notes: Z reports the stationarity test assuming correlated errors and heterogeneous individuals. 
Two cases are considered: when T is infinite or not. BCNW stands for the long-run 
variance computed according to Bartlett kernel function with common Newey and West 
truncation lag. BINW denotes the long-run variance computed according to Bartlett 
kernel function with individual Newey and West truncation lag. QSA stands for the long-
run variance computed according to a Quadratic Spectral function and individual lag 
truncation parameters. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Moon, Perron & Phillips (2007) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
No Constant   1cCPO   0.097 -3.839 4.717 
   5.1cCPO   0.879 -6.44 11.476 
   2cCPO   2.223 -7.927 20.152 
Constant   1cCPO   -2.672 9.195 4.581 
   5.1cCPO   -4.972 19.917 9.999 
   2cCPO   -7.026 32.041 16.129 
Constant and Trend   1cCPO   0.746 1.812 0.834 
   5.1cCPO   -13.447 -9.184 -13.095 
   2cCPO   -24.202 -14.609 -23.411 
Notes: CPO denotes the common-point optimal statistics which depends on the exogenous 
parameter c, whose values between 1 and 2 seems to provide a good balance 
between N and T. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
6.7 Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Choi (2006) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
Constant  Pm   -0.926 0.491 1.849* 
  Z   1.465 -0.755 -1.572* 
  

L   0.78 -0.376 -0.848 
Constant and Trend  Pm   -0.889 -0.889 -0.889 
  Z   1.255 1.255 1.255 
  

L   0.652 0.652 0.652 
Notes: P denotes the inverse chi-square (Fisher) test statistic, while Z  is the inverse normal 
(Choi) and L
*
 is the logit test. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant 
at 10%. 
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Pesaran (2007) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
No Constant  CIPS   -16.787*** -3.351*** -4.431*** 
  

CIPS   -1.909*** -1.753*** -2.162*** 
Constant  CIPS   -8.7E+05*** -9.6E+05*** -14E+0.5*** 
  

CIPS   -1.451 -3.164*** -2.437*** 
Constant and Trend  CIPS   -0.46 3.394 0.115 
  

CIPS   -0.382 -0.094 -0.34 
Notes: CIPS (CIPS*) denotes the average of the (truncated) individual cross-sectionally 
augmented CADF statistics. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%. 
 
Breitung & Das (2005) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
Constant  robt   -1.451* 0.652 0.089 
Constant and Trend  robt   -0.476 -0.44 0.364 
Notes: trob  denotes robust ADF t-statistics. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
 
Demestru, Hassler & Tarcolea (2006) Test 
Model  FDI SO2 Openness 
No Constant   1
1
kt   2.773 -2.603*** 4.404 
   1
2
kt   3.891 -3.652*** 6.178 
   ikt 1   2.366 -2.389*** 4.01 
   ikt 2   3.261 -3.292*** 5.527 
Constant   1
1
kt   2.772 -2.558*** 0.146 
   1
2
kt   3.888 -3.589*** 0.205 
   ikt 1   2.272 -2.912*** 0.111 
   ikt 2   3.132 -4.013*** 0.153 
Constant and Trend   1
1
kt   1.161 -1.335* 0.819 
   1
2
kt   1.629 -1.872** 1.149 
   ikt 1   2.366 -2.389*** 4.01 
   ikt 2   3.261 -3.292*** 5.527 
Notes: t denotes the weighted linear combination of individual probits. *** significant at 
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Chapter 3  
Complex FDI and Environmental Regulation24 
 
1 Introduction 
The growing role of multinational enterprises associated with the progressive liberalization of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) regimes has brought attention toward the environmental impact 
on host countries. One of the most controversial debate today is whether pollution-intensive 
industries relocate to countries with less stringent environmental policies, turning these 
countries into pollution havens. 
  
In this context, the pollution haven effect (PHE) refers to the possibility that FDI could be 
sensitive to weaker environmental regulation, especially when polluting firms want to avoid the 
costs associated with environmental standards compliance. While the intuitive logic behind the 
PHE is straightforward, it is fair to say that empirical studies designed to test this hypothesis 
have so far shown little evidence and suffer potentially from omitted variable bias, specification 
and measurement errors. Most empirical studies rely on a two-country framework, which 
ignores spatial dependence in multilateral FDI decisions. In particular, one of the underlying 
assumption of the existence of a PHE lies in the vertical structure of FDI. In fact, the consensus is 
that vertical FDI results from difference in relative endowments, while horizontal FDI is 
determined by similarity in countries' size and relative factor endowments. Accordingly, MNEs, 
which locate their production plant in the country whose environmental regulation is laxer and 
import back the product to be serve in the domestic market, engage in vertical FDI. This explains 
why there is a large empirical literature that analyzes indirectly the PHE by using trade data 
(Levinson and Taylor, 2007). From this perspective, the lack of PHE evidence could be explained 
by a greater prevalence of horizontal FDI. MNEs mainly motivated by the local market access 
will only be interested in duplicating the production plant in another country and serve its 
market, where cost differences (including compliance costs of environmental regulation) 
between the home and host country are of second-order importance. 
 
 
                                                     
24
 Written in collaboration with Madina Kukenova, PhD Candidate, University of Lausanne. 
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Yet, the inclusion of third-country effects, which capture the effect of proximity of other 
neighborhood host countries to a particular host country, is necessary to explain the emergence 
of new types of integrated FDI. In particular, complex FDI emerges when multinationals engage 
FDI in several host countries simultaneously in order to exploit the comparative advantages of 
each country with respect to a given part of the production process. This hybrid form of FDI 
allows MNEs to allocate the most pollution part of the production process to a country with 
laxer environmental regulation and the remaining of the production chain to other countries. 
Once processed, the product can be shipped to the home country to be consummed. As 
emphasized in the spatial econometrics literature, failure to account for third-country effects 
may lead to biased inference. This may be particularly problematic in the context of empirical 
studies of the PHE for three interrelated reasons. First, the impact of environmental stringency 
is not homogenous across different types of FDI. Vertical and complex FDI are expected to be 
more sensitive to environmental stringency than other forms of FDI. Second, environmental 
policies have been shown to be spatially correlated. Finally, it has proven extremely difficult to 
find credible instrumental variables for environmental regulation. As a consequence, the 
conclusions drawn from studies which fail to address those issues, remain questionable. 
  
This paper investigates the pollution haven effect at the world-wide level taking into account 
the so-called third-country effects. Since the pollution haven effect is more likely to be the 
result of differences in environmental stringency between developed and developing countries, 
I examine bilateral FDI flows using an extended OECD investment database which covers a large 
number of developed and developing host countries for a long sample period (1981-2000). The 
conceptual framework and methodology applied in this study are intended to address a number 
of difficulties discussed above. First, I consider a framework that is able to distinguish between 
types of FDI by accounting for the presence of spatial dependence in FDI decisions. Second, I 
recognize the strategic nature of environmental stringency between countries in order to 
reduce potential variables omission in the model specification. Third, I use different 
complementary measures of environmental stringency, namely SO2 emission per capita, CO2 
emission per capita and international environmental treaties. Each proxy used in this study 
relies on different underlying assumptions, which allows to take into account the different 
facets of environmental stringency. Last but not least, I provide a thorough treatment to 
simultaneity, endogeneity bias and spatial characteristics of the data, by applying system GMM 
to the spatial dynamic gravity-like panel model. 
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To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyze the pollution haven effect with 
bilateral FDI at the worldwide level from a third-country perspective. This is also the first time 
that the most prevalent type of FDI inflows is being investigated for more than a single parent 
country (e.g. USA). The empirical findings confirm the existence of a robust negative 
relationship between FDI and environmental stringency (proxied by SO2), when endogeneity 
and spatial dependence are addressed properly. In particular, failing to account for spatial 
dependence of environmental stringency can mask the presence of a pollution haven effect. 
Furthermore, results suggest the prevalence of complex vertical integrated FDI from high 
income OECD countries to less developed countries which is in line with the existence of a 
pollution haven effect. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the different reasons 
that lie behind the inclusion of third-country effects and briefly presents an overview of the 
previous empirical literature on FDI-PHE linkages. Section 3 describes the model specification, 
the data selection and the econometric procedure. Section 4 and 5 report the empirical analysis 
of the model and robustness check, respectively. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Spatial Linkages between FDI and Environmental Stringency 
Until recently, most multinational enterprises' (MNE) motivations analyzed in the literature 
relied on a two-country framework, where FDI between home country i and host country j was 
only affected by both countries' characteristics. However, new types of FDI have emerged in the 
last twenty years. Multinationals can allocate FDI in a host country but can also engage 
simultaneously in trade or FDI in a third country. The location decision of these new type of FDI 
will not only depend on the home and host countries' determinants, but also on the factors of 
the host's neighborhood countries. These more complex, integrated FDI, are embedded in a 
multilateral decision-making process, which means that FDI decisions across various host 
countries are not spatially independent. Other elements may also lead to interdependent FDI 
decisions across host countries, including imperfect capital markets and agglomeration 
externalities (spillovers) which limit the necessary funds a multinational company has to commit 
abroad. 
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Based on the theoretical work by Markusen and Maskus (2002), Yeaple (2003) and Baltagi et al., 
(2007), Blonigen et al. (2007) propose a partial equilibrium model and an empirical framework 
to assess four different types of FDI: horizontal, vertical, export-platform and complex FDI. In 
order to distinguish which type of FDI is the most prevalent, they propose to estimate a spatial 
autoregressive model which includes two spatial variables: (1) a spatial lag dependent variable 
representing the spatially-weighted sum of bilateral FDI from a given host country to other host 
countries and (2) a market potential variable corresponding to the spatially-weighted sum of 
other host countries' market size (see the next section for further details). Table 1 summarizes 
the expected sign of both variables for the different categories of FDI at the firm level, under the 
assumption that the firm is already a MNE25. The distinction between types of FDI is also 
important in the analysis of the pollution haven effect, because these four forms of FDI respond 
differently to the host and neighboring countries' environmental stringency. I, therefore, extend 
Blonigen et al.'s analysis to account for the MNE's behavior in terms of spatial and 
environmental stringency responsiveness.  
 
 
Table 1: Spatial and Environmental Linkages in MNE Choices 
FDI Motivation 
Horizontal Vertical Export Complex 
FDI FDI Platform FDI FDI 
Spatial Lag 0 – – + 
Market Potential 0 0 + +/0 
Environmental Stringency –/0 – –/0 – 
Spatial Environmental Stringency 0 + +/0 + 
Source: Blonigen et al. (2007, p.1308), Baltagi et al. (2007, p. 263)  
 
Horizontal FDI relies on the search of opportunities to sell in foreign markets. A MNE in home 
country i, which wants to serve foreign markets j and k, can export the products or launch a 
production unit in both host countries. Horizontal FDI is more likely to happen with sufficiently 
high trade costs between the home country i and countries j and k. In terms of third-country 
effects, the decision to undertake FDI in country j is more likely to be independent to the 
decision regarding country k and its market potential. In terms of environmental stringency, 
horizontal FDI is a priori not especially sensitive to differences in environmental costs. This is 
because horizontal activities of MNEs are mainly motivated by market access rather than a 
reduction in production costs. In other words, multinationals engage in horizontal FDI when 
                                                     
25
 In other words, the trade-off between engaging in FDI and exporting is no longer relevant. 
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duplicating a production plant in a foreign country outweighs the loss of scale economies 
associated with a single plant. This would no longer be the case if the multinational has to meet 
some environmental/health standards to be authorized to sell the products on the host market.  
 
Vertical FDI aims at obtaining low price resources or access to critical resources not available in 
the home economy. Since resource-seeking FDI is driven by factor cost differences between the 
home and host countries and not by market potential considerations, vertical FDI from home 
country i to country j will be undertaken at the expense of vertical FDI from i to another host 
country k. High environmental standards in country j will affect negatively FDI from home 
country i to country j, while higher environmental stringency in neighboring country k will have 
a positive effect on FDI from i to host j, other things being equal. In the end, the MNE might 
choose location j over location k. 
 
Export platform FDI is used to serve regional export markets through a platform for production 
and sales (Yeaple, 2003; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). This type of FDI has elements of both 
vertical and horizontal FDI. The specific location within a region is defined by cost 
considerations, as in vertical investments, while the sales in an integrated market respond to 
horizontal FDI considerations. In terms of environmental stringency, export platform FDI can be 
affected in two different ways. On the one hand, if the purpose of FDI is to serve export markets 
in developed countries through a platform production in a developing country and the access to 
these markets depends on the environmental/health product standards of the developed 
countries, the host country j's environmental regulation is no longer important. In this case, FDI 
to country j is likely to be associated with new techniques, including the latest abatement 
technologies (California effect), making the environmental stringency in the host country j no 
longer relevant. On the other hand, if the multinational wants to serve neighboring developing 
countries, the environmental stringency in the host country still matters. The production-
location decision in host country j will be negatively affected by higher environmental stringency 
in host j, but environmental standards between close countries (j and k) should be relatively 
close so the MNE can serve both markets using the same production process. If the company 
expects in the future an increase in environmental stringency in the host country j and its 
neighboring countries, it may choose today a production process that will meet higher 
standards in the future. In this case, the environmental regulation in country j would no longer 
matter, since the MNE no longer experiences a comparative advantage when locating in country 
j with lower environmental regulation. 
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Complex (vertical) FDI is characterized by a multinational firm from home country i which owns 
not only a production plant in host country j but also one in third country k, in order to exploit 
the comparative advantages of various locations. This type of FDI is associated with exports of 
intermediate inputs from affiliates (j and k) to another third market for further (or final) 
processing, before being dispatched to its final destination. The search for (low cost) suppliers in 
multiple (close) countries leads to the slicing-up of the value-chain of the production process. If 
both adjacent host countries j and k present similar supply network characteristics, the MNE 
may find it advantageous to launch production in host k given that it already owns production 
plants in (contiguous) host country j. Thus, complex FDI are characterized by a complementary 
relationship: complex FDI from home country i to third country k constitutes a complement for 
FDI from home country i to host country j. This positive relationship is strengthened if j and k 
are neighboring countries. Market potential in this type of FDI should not matter, although the 
level of industrial production in neighborhood countries should be positively correlated with 
higher opportunities for vertical suppliers (e.g. agglomeration incentives). This last category of 
FDI is particularly sensitive to environmental stringency in a given host and its neighboring 
countries, because the most polluting stage of production is more likely to be located in the 
host country characterized by less environmental stringency. The intermediate input will then 
be exported to one or more third-country for further processing, in order for the final good to 
be shipped to its final destination (e.g. home market). 
 
This study is based on two different types of literature. The first one is related to the application 
of spatial econometrics in empirical studies of the determinants of FDI, while the second 
focuses on the linkages between FDI and the pollution haven effect. The next sections attempt 
to shed some light on both literatures, with an emphasis on the most recent works. 
 
2.1 FDI Literature Review 
Empirical FDI studies allowing for the impact of third-country effects and applying spatial 
econometrics are sparse. Despite mixed evidence, these studies highlight the importance of 
spatial interdependence. Coughlin and Segev (1999) are the first to apply spatial econometric 
techniques to study the geographic distribution of FDI. Their results indicate that FDI into one 
location within China is positively associated with FDI into other close Chinese locations. Baltagi 
et al. (2007) study the third-country effects associated with US outbound FDI for seven 
manufacturing industries across both developed and less-developed destinations. They find 
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substantial evidence of spatial interactions, though they cannot definitively conclude whether 
export-platform or complex vertical FDI is more prevalent. Blonigen, et al. (2007) focus on 
aggregate U.S. outward FDI to OECD countries at the country level. While the estimated 
relationships of traditional determinants of FDI are robust to the inclusion of spatial 
interdependence, export-platform FDI seems to have greater prevalence, although the results 
are quite sensitive to the sample of countries examined. Blonigen et al. (2008) consider also 
inbound FDI from OECD countries to the US. They find strong and robust evidence for parent 
market proximity effects but it mainly depends on the sample selection. More recently, 
following Blonigen et al. (2007), Garretsen and Peeters (2009) estimate a spatial lag model for 
Dutch FDI to 18 host countries. Based on maximum likelihood estimations, third-country effects 
do matter, but are also sensitive to sample and model selection. 
 
2.2 Pollution Haven Effect Literature Review 
The existing empirical research on environmental regulations and FDI linkages displays mixed 
results depending on the type of studies. The first type of papers, which focus on inflows of FDI 
to a single country at the regional and/or industrial level, find some evidence of pollution haven 
effect (see for instance List and Co, (2001) for the United States and Dean et al. (2008) for 
China). Drukker and Millimet (2007) assess the presence of third-country effects in the 
determination of inbound US FDI by estimating a spatial error model with spatially weighted 
covariates. The authors find that many neighboring states attributes, including environmental 
stringency, influence FDI location. 
 
The second strand of studies, which analyze outflows of FDI from a single home country to one 
or more host countries at the aggregated or industrial level, display mixed findings (Xing and 
Kolstad, 2002; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Cole and Elliot, 2005). More recently, Wagner and 
Timmins (2008) find that the German chemical industry is the only pollution-intensive sectors in 
Germany to have relocated to countries with less stringent regulation once agglomeration 
effects (through a lagged dependent variable) are taken into account. 
 
The third category of papers considers inflows of FDI to different countries originating from 
various home countries at the aggregated or industrial level. Most of these studies fail to find 
evidence of a negative pollution haven affect (Javorcik and Wei, 2001; Eskeland and Harrison, 
2003). Cole et al. (2009) argue that the lack of evidence might come from the fact that these 
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papers fail to treat environmental policy as endogenous with respect to FDI. In particular, the 
effects of FDI on the environmental policy might be conditional on the government's political 
institutions sensitivity to corruption and lobbies pressure. 
 
Overall, the existing FDI-pollution haven effect empirical literature faces a number of 
limitations, which may partially explain the ambiguity in the results obtained. These drawbacks 
include different conceptual frameworks, data sources and proxies as well as different 
econometric methodologies. They are addressed in the next section. 
 
3 Model Specification 
This section presents the spatial dynamic panel model in a gravity setting to account for third-
country effects. The selected variables and the different spatial weight matrices considered in 
this study are presented. Finally, the estimation procedure is discussed. 
 
3.1 Spatial Dynamic Gravity Model 
Given the relative success of the traditional gravity equation in explaining the trade flow 
between countries, recent theoretical models (Head and Ries, 2008) suggest that location and 
size of bilateral FDI flows depend on country characteristics such as country size, population and 
factor endowments. According to Evenett and Keller (2002), the gravity model can support both 
assumptions of product differentiation (increasing returns to scale) and homogenous good 
production. Since I am interested in the detection of a substitutive or complementary 
relationship in the allocation of FDI between host countries, I follow Blonigen et al. (2007) and 
model bilateral FDI flows in a spatial autoregressive gravity panel model26. In addition, I 
acknowledge the fact that FDI decisions are part of a dynamic process and extend the model to 
a dynamic panel framework: 
 
     ijttijjtttijtttijtjtitijtijt uHWYWXHPYY    1  (1) 
 
 
                                                     
26
 Another possibility would be to introduce spatial dependence in the error term and estimate a spatial error model. However, 
as mentioned by Blonigen et al. (2007), FDI theory provides no real guidance whether or not to expect positive or negative 
spatial autocorrelation in a spatial error model, while the inclusion of a spatial lag dependent variable has theoretical 
foundations. Moreover, from an econometric point of view, the omission of spatial error dependence does not affect the 
consistency of the results. 
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where ijtY  is FDI flow from home country i to host country j at period t. itP  is a vector including 
parent country variables, jtH  includes host variables and ijtX  represent bilateral control 
variables. tW  denotes the spatial weight matrix, which is assumed to be non-stochastic, row-
standardized and exogenous to the model27. The diagonal elements of tW  are set to zero so that 
no observation predicts itself. Thus,  
ijttt
YW  represents the spatially weighted average of FDI 
flow from home country i to the neighborhood countries of country j. The associated coefficient 
 , called the spatial lag, allows to determine if FDI flow from country i to country j is 
(positively/negatively) affected by FDI from country i to other neighboring host countries. The 
parameter   is assumed to lie between -1 and +1 to ensure spatial stationarity. The vector 
 
ijttt
YW  includes spatially weighted host variables to account for potential third-country effects 
(e.g. market potential). ij  is the individual effect, that captures unobserved characteristics 
related to country-pair, which do influence bilateral FDI but are fixed in the short and medium 
terms. The time fixed effect, t , captures the business cycle common to all countries. Finally, 
ijtu  is the error term. 
 
The spatial dynamic panel model is a flexible framework that allows to capture the complicated 
dependence structure between economies. However, the coefficients estimate represents the 
(unobservable) pre-interdependent dynamic impact of each explanatory variables. In order to 
measure the long-run, steady-state, equilibrium of the model, one can compute spatial 
multipliers. To see this point more formally and assuming the steady-state prevails ( 1 tt YY ), 
the reduced form of equation (1) can be rewritten in matrix notation as follows: 
 
    tttttttNtt uHWXHPIWIY 
  1  (2)  
 
where I is the NN  identity matrix.   1 Nt IWIS   represents the NN  spatial multipliers 
effects matrix through which I can analyze the impact of a shock of a given explanatory variable 
in a country on the FDI inflows to this country and other contiguous economies. Following 
Franzese and Hayes (2006), the standard errors of these spatial effects are computed using the 
delta method (i.e. a first-order Taylor linear approximation to the non-linear expression S 
around the estimated parameters). 
 
                                                     
27
 As distances are time-invariant, it will generally be the case that Wt = Wt-1. However, when dealing with unbalanced panel 
data, this is no longer true. Missing neighborhood observations are problematic because they are treated as zeros. This may 
likely induce bias in the estimation and interpretation of the results. According to Baltagi et al. (2005), this constitutes an 
important issue for future research. However this "border problem" should be smaller with a distance-based weighting 
scheme and large averages distances between locations than for contiguity-based weighting schemes. 
     
-98- 
3.2 Variables Selection 
The dependent variable of the model is bilateral flows of FDI from 26 OECD countries to 79 host 
countries for the period 1981 through 200028. The data, expressed in current US dollars, are 
taken from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics website. Working on flows 
rather than stocks provides several advantages including more available data and less error 
measurements, although stocks present less volatility than flows and constitute a better 
measure of capital ownership.  
 
I specify our model in log-linear form (except for the dummies variables), because such a model 
is more likely to lead to well-behaved residuals given the skewness of most FDI data samples. A 
problem that arises when using a log-linear specification is how to deal with observations with 
negative and zero values. This is the case for FDI inflows which are negative when the home 
country repatriates previous investments made in the host country. In order to handle the 
presence of zero/negative FDI flows I apply the following log transformation to variables with 
negative or zero values: )1ln( 2 2  xxz  (Busse et al., 2010). 
 
The variables selection of the determinants of FDI is mainly dictated by data availability. Among 
the control variables, I include GDP, GDP growth, the share of the dirty industries in total value-
added, a risk index, a measure of capital openness (Chinn and Ito, 2007), a natural resource 
endowment dummy as well as bilateral distance between capitals and a colonial links dummy. 
All monetary variables are expressed in US dollars. Appendix 7.2 lists the variables considered 
and their sources. 
 
In addition, I also include a lagged dependent variable to account for agglomeration effects29. 
More FDI in a host country seems to attract more FDI in this same host country. These 
persistence effects are partly due to the fact that FDI is often accompanied by physical 
investments that are irreversible in the short run. Furthermore, Wagner and Timmins (2008) 
demonstrate that failing to account for agglomeration effects can mask the evidence of a 
pollution haven effect. The lagged FDI can also partially capture infrastructure in the host 
                                                     
28
 Appendix 7.1 lists the host and source countries. Note that countries with a population lower than one million of inhabitants 
have been dropped in order to exclude tax haven countries (e.g. Bahamas). 
29
 Agglomeration effect is measured by lagged FDI inflows, because the inclusion of FDI stocks leads to multicollinearity 
problems. 
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country. High physical (e.g. roads and power) and social (e.g. health and education) 
infrastructure as well as urbanization influence positively FDI inflows. Therefore, I expect the 
autoregressive coefficient to be positive. However, its sign could be negative because of 
congestion, when firms compete with one another through price bidding to downstream 
industries in the region. 
 
3.3 Environmental Stringency 
Measuring environmental stringency is the key problem in the PHE literature, because 
environmental policy can take many forms: environmental fees or taxes, permitting costs, 
regulatory delays, emissions limits that require installation of costly technology, the threat of 
lawsuits, product or process redesign, forgone output, and so forth (Levinson and Taylor, 2008). 
Unfortunately, this type of information is not available for most countries. Reductions in 
emissions may be viewed as proxies for a host country's effective enforcement of 
environmental policies. Therefore, I rely on three complementary measures of the relative level 
of stringency based on the actual level of pollution emission and the number of international 
environmental treaties30. 
 
The level of sulphur dioxide SO2 emissions, taken from Stern (2005), constitutes a good measure 
of air pollution. First, SO2 per capita is one of the most significant pollutants worldwide. Milner 
et al. (2007) show that the reduction in SO2 emission is highly correlated with the level of 
environmental funds in former Soviet Union countries. Second, it is highly correlated with other 
pollutants (Xing and Kolstad, 2002). Third, to the extent that pollution reduction is a public 
good, it suffers less from a free-ride problem and is available for a large number of host 
countries. That is the reason why, environmental stringency is proxied by the level of SO2 per 
capita emissions multiplied by -1.  
 
Air pollution can also be measured by the level of carbon dioxide CO2 emissions, provided by the 
World Development Indicators (Hoffman et al., 2005). Just like SO2 emissions, CO2 series are 
constructed from fuel consumption data, rather than directly observed. The use of CO2 
emissions as a proxy relies on strong assumptions. Some critics argue that CO2 emissions do not 
                                                     
30
 Other environmental proxies can unfortunately not be considered because of their lack of availability in terms of time period 
or/and covered countries (e.g. lead-content per gallon gasoline, pollution intensities; water pollution; fertilizer; WEF's 
environmental sustainability index, index of environmental sensitivity performance; number of deaths related to pollution; 
number of environmental NGOs, number of ISO 14001 licenses). 
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reflect only environmental stringency, but also the energy intensity of production. Another 
problem is that the pollution consequences of CO2 emissions are subject to the free-ride 
problem because the damages caused by CO2 emissions are global. There are fewer incentives 
for a government to modify its environmental policy, which makes it difficult to use CO2 
emissions as a proxy for environmental stringency. Therefore, I expect to find less evidence of a 
PHE with CO2 per capita emissions.  
 
The number of participation in international environmental treaties, taken from the 
Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators website, can also constitute a cross-country 
proxy, although its use relies on several strong assumptions. First, one implicitly assumes that a 
ratified treaty will automatically translate into stringer environmental stringency. This would 
probably be true only if there were sanctions for the non-respect of the treaty. Second, each 
country which signs a treaty will implement the exact same instruments in terms of cost and 
mechanism to comply with the regulation, which is unrealistic. Therefore, I expect to find less 
evidence of a pollution haven effect when considering environmental treaties. Following Xing 
and Kolstad (1998) as well as Javorcik and Wei (2001) I construct a variable of environmental 
treaties that reports the number of signed treaties. 
 
Independently of the proxy used, I hypothesize a negative relationship between environmental 
stringency and FDI. Higher environmental standards (ambient quality standards, emission 
standards, production process standards and products standards) leading to higher 
environmental costs can deter inflows of FDI. However, it is also possible that environmental 
stringency can attract FDI in order to gain a competitive advantage through higher standards, 
which would validate the so-called pollution halo hypothesis. As mentioned in the literature 
review, previous studies (Ederington et al., 2005; Cole et al., 2009; Kellenberg, 2009) suggest 
that not only FDI is sensitive to environmental stringency, but also that environmental policy 
can be affected by FDI, when the level of corruption and lobby pressures are high or when 
environmental standards are used as a strategic trade policy. In both cases, this could lead the 
government to set higher or lower level of environmental policy than it is socially efficient. As a 
result, environmental stringency has to be treated as (potentially) endogenous. 
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3.4 Third-Country Effects 
In order to account for the role of spatial dependence and interaction in the data, I include 
spatially weighted variables. Each spatial variable is computed using the same spatial weight 
matrix, except the spatial lag variable because of the bilateral nature of the data. In the 
construction of the weights themselves, the theoretical foundation is quite general and the 
particular functional form of any single element in tW  is not prescribed. In fact, the 
determination of the proper specification of tW  is one of the most difficult and controversial 
methodological issues in spatial data analysis. Prior to discussing the weighting scheme used, it 
is important to note that a miss-specification of the weighting matrix can bias the results. In 
practice, different weight matrices should be compared to find the most proper one. 
 
A general spatial matrix tW  can be defined by a symmetric binary contiguity matrix. This 
weighting scheme assigns a weight of zero to non-contiguous countries and a weight of one to 
all contiguous countries. Since the contiguity matrix cannot differentiate the degree of spatial 
linkages between adjacent locations, some more complex spatial weighting matrix can be used. 
For example, one can choose a simple inverse distance function, where each pair of location j 
and k declines to kjd ,1  if kj  . However, the inverse distance matrix has the disadvantage of 
always giving some positive weight to very remote countries (with weaker cultural, political and 
economic ties). A compromise can be reached by allowing the third-country effects to decay at a 
faster rate by giving more weight to locations within the same region and almost zero to 
locations outside the region31. This is done by dividing the distance between locations j and k by 
the minimum distance within the region r (where location j lies within region r): 
 
  .exp)(
,
,
, kjifdw jr
kj
MIN
d
kjt 

 
 
Following Blonigen et al. (2007), the estimation of complex integration strategies of 
multinationals is done by including a spatial lag bilateral FDI,   iktjktjkijtitt YdwYW   )( , , and a 
variable capturing market potential in neighboring host countries. According to Head and Mayer 
(2004), which apply different measures of host country market proximity in their analysis of 
Japanese outbound FDI into Europe, a distance-weighted sum of close countries' GDPs yields 
the best fit for the data. Thus, for a given host country j in year t, the market potential variable 
is defined as the spatially weighted sum of GDPs of all other countries: 
  ktjktjkjttt GDPdwGDPW   )( , .  
                                                     
31
 Six geographical regions are considered in this study: (1) North America; (2) Latin America and Caribbean; (3) Europe and 
Central Asia; (4) East Asia, Pacific and South Asia; (5) Sub-Saharan Africa; (6) Middle East and North Africa. 
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To capture the fact that countries do not define environmental regulation independently (Eliste 
and Fredriksson, 2001), I also include a spatially weighted environmental stringency that 
captures the spatial interdependence of environmental stringency: 
  ktjktjkjtt StringencyEnvdwStringencyEnvW .)(. ,   . The inclusion of this additional spatial 
variable is particularly important when one considers SO2 per capita emission as a proxy. 
According to the geographical location and prevailing wind patterns, levels of acid deposition 
from SO2 in one country is partially determined by emissions in neighboring countries. As a 
consequence, any country will have an incentive to behave strategically with respect to 
emissions originating in neighboring countries. Empirical evidence suggests also that the 
propensity of a given host country to ratify treaties is positively correlated with the number of 
treaties signed in the neighborhood countries (Davies et al., 2006).  
 
Based on the prevailing type of FDI, the expected sign of the spatially weighted variables will be 
different (see Table 1). I estimate the model with contiguity, inverse distance and negative 
exponential distance spatial weight matrices. But, for the sake of brevity, I only present the 
results associated with negative exponential distance. Note that the use of data at the country 
level can only capture net effects. For instance, the spatial lag coefficient may, on average, be 
no different from zero but this could simply be the result of export-platform and complex 
vertical FDI effects cancelling out. 
 
3.5 Econometric Issues 
The spatial dynamic lag model (1) faces simultaneity and endogeneity problems, which makes 
OLS estimation biased and inconsistent. In fact, one can analytically demonstrate that the 
spatial lag term YW   is correlated with the disturbances, even if u are independently and 
identically distributed. Each element of the dependent variable depends on a linear 
combination of all of the error terms. Therefore, the spatial lag term must be treated as an 
endogenous variable and proper estimation methods must account for this endogeneity. The 
spatial dynamic panel model is usually estimated using spatial (dynamic) maximum likelihood 
(ML) or spatial two stage least squares (2SLS). However, the main drawback of applying those 
spatial estimators is that, while the spatial lagged variable is considered endogenous, other 
explanatory variables are not. If other FDI determinants are endogenous or potentially 
endogenous, which is likely the case in our study, no instrumental treatment is applied to 
control for this econometric problem. 
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Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) suggest to apply system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) in a 
spatial dynamic framework. System GMM corrects for the endogeneity of the time and spatial 
autoregressive variables and other potentially endogenous explanatory variables by using 
lagged values of the dependent, endogenous and exogenous variables. In addition, system 
GMM allows to address other econometrics problems such as measurement error and weak 
instruments. It controls for time-invariant country-specific fixed effects such as culture and 
political structure. On a practical ground, it also avoids the inversion of the high dimension 
spatial weights matrix W and the computation of its eigenvalues, which can be sometimes 
computationally unfeasible to estimate the model or involve accuracy problems (here the 
spatial weights matrix W is 10'657  10'657). Based on extensive Monte Carlo simulations, 
Kukenova and Monteiro demonstrate that system GMM estimates consistently the spatial lag 
variable when N is large and T is moderate, as it is the case here. 
 
The system GMM estimator consists of estimating equation (1) as a system of two equations, 
one in levels and the other one in first-differences. Lagged first-differences are treated as 
instruments for equations expressed in levels, while lagged levels are used as instruments for 
equations in first-differences. The consistency of system GMM relies on the validity of the 
moment conditions, which depends on the assumption of absence of serially correlation of the 
level residuals and the exogeneity of the explanatory variables. Therefore, it is necessary to 
apply specification tests to ensure that these assumptions are justified. Two specification tests 
are available to verify the consistency of the GMM estimator. First, the overall validity of the 
moment conditions is checked by the Sargan/Hansen test. The null hypothesis is that 
instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Aware that too many instrument variables 
(exceeding the number of cross-section units) tend to validate fallacious results through the 
Hansen J test for joint validity of those instruments, as well as the difference-in-Sargan/Hansen 
tests for subsets of instruments, I apply system GMM by collapsing the moments conditions, i.e. 
avoid separating the instruments for each period (Roodman, 2009). 
 
In this study, the system GMM estimation relies on the following instruments structure. The 
variables considered as endogenous (lagged FDI, spatial lagged FDI and environmental 
stringency) are instrumented by their second and third lag values. The variables potentially 
endogenous and predetermined (host GDP, growth of GDP, country's risk) receive the same 
treatment. To account for the fact that the capital openness index is relatively constant over 
time, I instrument it using its 5 first lags only for the equation expressed in first-difference. 
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The capital-labour ratio and manufacturing variables are used as additional external variables 
and treated as predetermined. GDP of the source country is treated as strictly exogenous. The 
time fixed effects, the natural resources dummy as well as the gravity variables (distance and 
colonial links) are also treated as strictly exogenous, but used only in the first-difference 
specification. Following Xing and Kolstad (2002), I also include population density as an external 
exogenous variable. The latter is an indicator of congestion and the ability of pollutants to 
naturally disperse away from population centers. This instrument is unlikely to be correlated 
with the error term, that is why it is used in level and first-difference. I also correct the standard 
errors for small sample bias by applying the robust Windmeijer correction to the two-step GMM 
estimates. 
 
4 Panel Estimation Results 
Before estimating the model, it is always interesting to proceed at a graphical exploratory 
analysis of the relationship between inflows FDI and environmental stringency. Figure 1 depicts 
the spatial location of OECD's FDI outflows to the different host countries and their level of 
environmental stringency proxied by the number of international environmental treaties. First, 
it is interesting to note that most OECD's FDI takes place among OECD countries. Only a small 
fraction of FDI is allocated to less developed countries. Among these countries, some countries 
like Brazil or China can be considered as potential pollution haven countries, since they display a 
relatively low environmental stringency but attract a large amount of FDI from OECD countries. 
 
Figure 1: Average FDI Inflows and Environmental Stringency (1981-2004) 
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As Figure 1 suggests it, FDI flows and environmental stringency seem to be spatially correlated. 
To check the presence of spatial correlation (i.e. coincidence of value similarity and locational 
similarity), I perform two of the most popular global spatial indicators: Moran I (1948) and 
Geary's C (1954) statistics32. Appendix 7.5. provides the results of the Moran and Geary tests for 
bilateral FDI, GDP and environmental stringency (proxied by SO2 per capita and international 
treaties). Using different spatial weight schemes, the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation is 
rejected by both tests for most years for each variable. In particular, the results suggest the 
presence of positive spatial autocorrelation for each variable. This definitively calls for a 
systematic treatment of spatial interdependencies through a spatial dynamic panel framework. 
 
I first present the results associated with the full sample to determine potential biases caused 
by omitting the spatial structure of the data and by not instrumenting for environmental 
stringency (proxied by SO2 per capita emissions) and other potential endogenous variables. 
Then, since the motivation behind investment to developed and developing countries may be 
quite different, I estimate models for OECD and non-OECD host countries samples. The baseline 
model deliberately includes a limited number of explanatory variables in order to avoid 
multicollinearity problems and a decrease in the number of countries covered. The robustness 
check in the next section investigates the inclusion of additional FDI determinants and the use 
of other proxies for environmental stringency. 
 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Table 6 reports the results for the full sample (OECD and non-OECD host countries). The first 
three columns display the results without any spatial features for fixed effects, random effects 
and system GMM respectively. The other four remaining columns present the system GMM 
estimations including third-country effects (based on a negative inverse exponential distance). 
More precisely, I first add the spatial lag dependent variable, I then include separately the 
spatially weighted environmental stringency and market potential variable, to finally consider 
the three spatially weighted variables together. This sequence of specifications allows us to 
study the sensitivity of the results to the assumption of exogenous environmental stringency 
and the inclusion of third-country effects. 
 
                                                     
32
 The Getis and Ord (1992) test cannot be computed for all variables of interest in our study, since it can only be applied to 
positive values (FDI inflows can be negative for instance). 
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Despite the fact that most variables are significant and display the expected sign in the random 
effect regression, the Hausman specification test suggests that the fixed effect model is 
preferred over the random effect specification. Overall, the estimates associated with fixed 
effect are relatively poor. Only a few variables are significant. This should not come as a surprise 
since the fixed effect estimator does not correct for the endogeneity of some explanatory 
variables, including the lagged dependent variable and environmental stringency. When this 
issue is taken into account, as system GMM allows it, the results clearly improve. The estimated 
coefficients usually lie between the random and fixed effects results. The autoregressive 
parameter becomes significant, while the coefficient of environmental stringency switches from 
positive to negative. This finding suggests a positive endogenous bias in the pollution haven 
effect, when endogeneity is not corrected. 
 
According to the Hansen test, the different specifications associated with system GMM are 
appropriately specified. As discussed in Roodman (2009), the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restriction is robust to heteroskedasticity but can suffer from instruments proliferation in the 
regression. Too many instruments can overfit the model and, at the same time, weaken the 
power of the Hansen test to detect overidentification. Since I deliberately limited the number of 
instruments to be always significantly smaller than the number of groups (general rule of 
thumb), I rely on the diagnostic of the Hansen test. Although the Sargan test of over-
identification tests is not weakened by too many instruments, it is inconsistent in the presence 
of heteroskedasticity. That is why I pay less attention to this test statistic. The Arellano-Bond 
test for second-order serial correlation in the residuals ( 2m ) cannot reject the null of no 
correlation by any standard levels of significance for all specifications, which is additional 
support of the correct instrument specification of the model. 
 
The results show that the most important classical determinants of FDI have the expected sign 
and are significantly different from zero. In particular, the measure of agglomeration effects 
(lagged bilateral FDI) is significant in all system GMM specifications and confirm a persistence 
effect in the FDI decision. The host and source countries' GDP are significant across all 
specifications which is fairly intuitive and in line with the claim that market size is the single 
most important factor in the investment location decision. In particular, large home countries 
are more likely to invest abroad, while large host countries are more likely to receive FDI. The 
standard gravity variables (bilateral distance and colonial links) are also significant across 
specifications, which confirms the positive impact of close cultural environment and proximity 
on the FDI allocation.   
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Table 2: Full Sample Results 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.012 0.198*** 0.062*** 0.056** 0.056** 0.054** 
 [0.012] [0.011] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
GDP Host 0.850* 0.557*** 0.684*** 0.649*** 0.576*** 0.599*** 
 [0.450] [0.033] [0.137] [0.126] [0.142] [0.144] 
GDP Source 4.637*** 0.802*** 0.987*** 0.602*** 0.568*** 0.593*** 
 [0.824] [0.033] [0.064] [0.120] [0.123] [0.129] 
GDP growth 0.05 0.089*** 0.071 0.012 0.019 0.003 
 [0.033] [0.031] [0.070] [0.072] [0.071] [0.070] 
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.172 -0.122 0.409 -0.14 -0.242 -0.084 
 [0.218] [0.135] [0.348] [0.365] [0.354] [0.369] 
Risk Index -2.110*** -0.999*** -2.135** -1.348 -0.735 -0.982 
 [0.546] [0.340] [0.849] [0.863] [0.789] [0.838] 
Capital Openness -0.018 0.152*** 0.122 0.043 0.076 0.112 
 [0.089] [0.048] [0.144] [0.144] [0.142] [0.143] 
Oil Resources  -0.119 -0.284 -0.434 -0.319 -0.288 
  [0.111] [0.290] [0.265] [0.290] [0.286] 
Colonial Links  0.872*** 1.027*** 0.980*** 0.917*** 0.872*** 
  [0.148] [0.259] [0.270] [0.272] [0.272] 
Distance  -0.577*** -0.649*** -0.497*** -0.476*** -0.561*** 
  [0.039] [0.070] [0.084] [0.085] [0.107] 
Environmental Stringency 0.348** -0.305*** -0.679*** -0.428** -0.466*** -0.500*** 
 [0.173] [0.044] [0.168] [0.175] [0.176] [0.178] 
Spatial Lag FDI    0.515*** 0.541*** 0.519*** 
    [0.145] [0.153] [0.157] 
Market Potential     0.128 0.063 
     [0.165] [0.175] 
Spatial Stringency      0.389 
      [0.294] 
Observations 8678 8678 8678 8678 8678 8678 
Groups 699 699 699 699 699 699 
R-squared 0.033 . . . . . 
Instruments . . 145 148 151 151 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) . . 0.779 0.715 0.708 0.739 
Sargan test . . 0.327 0.685 0.726 0.716 
Hansen Test . . 0.488 0.663 0.619 0.642 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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By explicitly accounting for spatial dependence, the last three specifications allow us to highlight 
the most prevailing type of FDI originating from OECD countries (see Table 1). The fact that the 
spatial lag coefficient is positive and significant and the market potential is not significant rule in 
favour of a higher prevalence of complex FDI. However, one should be careful with the 
interpretation of these results. As noted by Blonigen and Davies (2004) combining rich and poor 
countries in FDI data can mask evidence or, in the worst case scenario, lead to implausible 
coefficient estimates. The next section takes this issue into account. 
 
4.2 OECD vs. Non-OECD Host Countries 
Since the motivation behind investment to developed and developing countries may be quite 
different, especially in the case of the PHE (Hoffman et al., 2005), combining FDI allocated to 
developed and developing countries may introduce undesirable noise into the data. In line with 
this consideration, I reestimate separately the different model specifications for two 
subsamples. Table 3 and 4 display the results for FDI to high-income OECD and to non OECD 
countries33, respectively. Note that when I consider the restricted sample or OECD and non-
OECD host countries, the third country variables are based on all countries. 
 
Overall, the comments made in the previous section can be reiterated for both tables. Based on 
the Hausman test, the fixed effect model is preferred over the random effect model. The 
classical determinants of FDI are in most cases significant with the expected sign. Yet, failing to 
correct for potential endogeneity of environmental stringency yields a different conclusion in 
each sub-sample. In the OECD host sample, the environmental stringency has initially a positive 
effect, but after correction it is no longer significant. In the non-OECD host sample, the 
endogeneity problem tends to mask the presence of a negative and significative pollution haven 
effect. Note that the evidence of a pollution haven effect for less developed countries is in line 
with the theory. Following Edgerington et al. (2005), the non-significant coefficient of the value-
added share of dirty industries as a percentage of total GDP might be attributed to the fact that 
the most polluting intensive industries are not necessarily the most likely to react to stringer 
environmental regulation because of high sunk costs impending them to be geographically 
mobile.  
  
                                                     
33
 Only high income OECD countries are dropped. Mexico, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Czeck Republic and Slovak Republic remain 
in the sample, since they can be considered as potential pollution haven (Cole and Elliott, 2005). 
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Table 3: OECD Host Sample Results 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.01 0.186*** 0.063** 0.054** 0.058** 0.055** 
 [0.015] [0.014] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
GDP Host 1.189 0.562*** 0.599*** 0.655*** 0.622*** 0.616*** 
 [0.814] [0.046] [0.117] [0.103] [0.107] [0.107] 
GDP Source 5.905*** 0.813*** 0.947*** 0.626*** 0.631*** 0.639*** 
 [1.075] [0.042] [0.071] [0.141] [0.145] [0.143] 
GDP growth -0.052 0.009 -0.076 -0.094 -0.09 -0.089 
 [0.062] [0.061] [0.092] [0.094] [0.094] [0.094] 
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.385 0.053 0.025 -0.426 -0.449 -0.502 
 [0.334] [0.264] [0.463] [0.509] [0.506] [0.512] 
Risk Index -2.183 -1.709 -1.959 -1.52 -1.708 -0.822 
 [1.552] [1.175] [2.571] [2.661] [2.509] [2.437] 
Capital Openness -0.051 0.05 0.23 0.18 0.177 0.314 
 [0.143] [0.111] [0.228] [0.224] [0.217] [0.227] 
Oil Resources  -0.002 0.131 -0.389 -0.339 0.085 
  [0.172] [0.379] [0.392] [0.395] [0.394] 
Colonial Links  0.984*** 1.063** 0.890** 0.838* 1.019** 
  [0.211] [0.415] [0.445] [0.463] [0.438] 
Distance  -0.711*** -0.758*** -0.685*** -0.682*** -0.730*** 
  [0.051] [0.096] [0.095] [0.096] [0.096] 
Environmental Stringency 0.872*** -0.376*** -0.319 -0.420** -0.384* -0.181 
 [0.243] [0.076] [0.204] [0.196] [0.202] [0.202] 
Spatial Lag FDI    0.489** 0.459** 0.442** 
    [0.193] [0.199] [0.191] 
Market Potential     0.015 -0.085 
     [0.186] [0.192] 
Spatial Stringency      0.787** 
      [0.337] 
Observations 5178 5178 5178 5178 5178 5178 
Groups 341 341 341 341 341 341 
R-squared 0.032 . . . . . 
Instruments . . 144 147 150 153 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) . . 0.744 0.883 0.829 0.836 
Sargan test . . 0.016 0.0922 0.0771 0.105 
Hansen Test . . 0.444 0.49 0.462 0.423 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 4: Non-OECD Host Sample Results 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI -0.003 0.202*** 0.088** 0.074* 0.075** 0.078** 
 [0.019] [0.017] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.040] 
GDP Host -0.006 0.781*** 0.800*** 0.581*** 0.592*** 0.465** 
 [0.567] [0.063] [0.196] [0.190] [0.211] [0.228] 
GDP Source 2.085 0.806*** 0.860*** 0.448*** 0.435*** 0.387*** 
 [1.277] [0.054] [0.092] [0.130] [0.131] [0.145] 
GDP growth 0.117*** 0.056 0.098 0.059 0.057 0.06 
 [0.039] [0.037] [0.072] [0.071] [0.070] [0.070] 
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.371 -0.162 -0.115 -0.498 -0.558 -0.659 
 [0.300] [0.156] [0.348] [0.346] [0.383] [0.417] 
Risk Index -0.829 -1.681*** -0.351 -0.593 -0.744 -1.141 
 [0.648] [0.490] [1.005] [0.962] [0.883] [0.901] 
Capital Openness 0.153 0.261*** 0.236* 0.163 0.159 0.127 
 [0.117] [0.062] [0.127] [0.124] [0.131] [0.133] 
Oil Resources  -0.589*** -0.691* -0.549 -0.582 -0.379 
  [0.171] [0.416] [0.390] [0.430] [0.459] 
Colonial Links  0.792*** 1.013*** 0.701** 0.695** 0.710** 
  [0.202] [0.337] [0.294] [0.293] [0.301] 
Distance  -0.486*** -0.421*** -0.225* -0.230* -0.157 
  [0.079] [0.130] [0.129] [0.131] [0.178] 
Environmental Stringency -0.407 -0.342*** -0.734*** -0.559*** -0.536*** -0.455** 
 [0.302] [0.067] [0.188] [0.198] [0.198] [0.202] 
Spatial Lag FDI    0.549*** 0.561*** 0.608*** 
    [0.138] [0.135] [0.148] 
Market Potential     -0.021 0.023 
     [0.215] [0.230] 
Spatial Stringency      -0.187 
      [0.344] 
Observations 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 
Groups 358 358 358 358 358 358 
R-squared 0.062 . . . . . 
Instruments . . 145 148 151 154 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) . . 0.756 0.462 0.451 0.424 
Sargan test . . 0.283 0.292 0.338 0.355 
Hansen Test . . 0.544 0.746 0.767 0.753 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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A positive and significant spatial lag and an insignificant market potential lead us to conclude 
that complex FDI is the most prevailing type of FDI from OECD countries toward less developed 
host countries. The OECD sub-sample results indicate also a high vertical integrated 
complementary relationship in the allocation of FDI to other high income host countries. Note 
that these results differ from the findings of Blonigen et al. (2005). They found strong evidence 
of vertical FDI from the United States to non-OECD countries and export platform FDI to 
developed European countries. They also notice that the spatial lag is no longer significant once 
country-fixed effects are controlled, which is definitively not the case here. Our findings are in 
line with Garresten and Peeters (2009), who highlight the presence of complex FDI for Dutch 
outbound FDI to developed and developing host countries. In any case, one should be careful 
with comparisons, since I do not consider a single but several parent countries (i.e. OECD 
countries). 
 
The estimated coefficients given in the last three columns of Table 4 measure only the pre-
interdependent dynamic impact from changes in the explanatory variables. In particular, I am 
interested in investigating the long-run steady-state equilibrium effect of a counterfactual shock 
in environmental stringency in a given country on FDI inflows to this country and its neighbor 
economies. Table 5 illustrates the steady-state spatial effect of a permanent increase in the 
stringency of environmental regulation in China, Brazil and Hungary on FDI flows based on the 
system GMM estimates given in the last column from Table 4. 
 
Table 5: Steady-State Spatial Effects of Environmental  
Stringency Shock on US  bilateral FDI   
Counterfactual  
Shock in China 
 Counterfactual  
Shock in Brazil 
 Counterfactual  
Shock in Hungary 
China -.685***  Brazil -.674***  Hungary -.567*** 
South Korea -.358***  Argentina -.285***  Austria -.112*** 
Japan -.297***  Chile -.244***  Romania -.107*** 
Hong-Kong -.173***  South Africa -.155***  Poland -.102*** 
Philippines -.136***  Colombia -.052***  Turkey -.098*** 
Note: Standards errors based on the delta method. *** significant at 1%. 
 
To save space, I only present the results for US FDI flows as they represent the largest share 
among OECD's FDI. I also only display the results for the subset of countries that are the mostly 
affected (in absolute value) by the counterfactual shock. A permanent 1% increase in 
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environmental stringency in China, Brazil and Hungary leads to a permanent significant decrease 
in US FDI flows to these countries. However, because of the complementary relationship in FDI 
allocation, the countries within the same region are also negatively (but to a lesser extent) 
affected by a lasting and stringer environmental regulation. 
 
5 Robustness Check 
It is relevant to ask to what extent our results are sensitive to the use of SO2 per capita as a 
proxy for environmental stringency34. Therefore, I re-estimate the model using CO2 emission per 
capita and the number of international environmental treaties as complementary proxies for 
the environmental stringency. In addition, I consider the initial model specification and include 
additional FDI determinants to make sure that the level of SO2 per capita emission does not 
capture other factors. 
 
5.1 Alternative Environmental Stringency Proxies 
As previously mentioned, the use of CO2 per capita and international environmental treaties as 
a proxy relies on stronger assumptions than SO2 per capita. Therefore, I expect to find less 
evidence of a pollution haven effect when considering these two additional proxies. Table 6 and 
7 display the estimation results for the non-OECD host country sample35. Note that the same 
instruments and lags structure as in the main results are used to estimate the spatial dynamic 
panel model. 
 
Most results found previously are also confirmed in Table 6 and 7. One major difference in Table 
7 is the fact that the country risk index is now significant. In both tables, the results suggest the 
prevalence of complex FDI from OECD countries to less developed countries. As Table 6 
documents it, the environmental stringency is negative and significant, only when I take into 
account the spatial structure of FDI inflows. This important finding suggests that ignoring spatial 
dependence can mask the pollution haven effect. The reason why this happens for CO2 and not 
SO2 emissions is probably related to the fact that carbon dioxide emissions are a global air 
pollutant, while sulfur dioxide emissions are more local/regional. The same kind of pattern 
                                                     
34
 I also estimated the model using SO2 per GDP to account for the country's economic activity. The results were qualitatively 
similar (i.e. significant pollution haven effect), despite multicollinearity problems with host and source's GDP. 
35
 Appendix 7.6 and 7.7 report the results for OECD countries. 
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happens with international treaties. The PHE becomes significant only when the spatial model 
includes the spatially weighted environmental stringency variable. More precisely, the allocation 
of FDI to a given host country is not only determined by the environmental regulation in the 
host economy, but also by the environmental stringency in the neighborhood countries. This 
finding is in line with the results of Davies and Naughton (2006). They show that the 
participation to international environmental treaties for non-OECD countries depends, among 
other factors, on the participation of geographically close governments. These results confirm 
once again the prevalence of complex vertical FDI among OECD home countries. In order to 
integrate the different intermediate production processes, the MNE considers a system of close 
countries rather than a single host economy. 
 
The fact that there is less evidence of pollution haven effect using international environmental 
treaties should not come as a surprise. As mentioned previously, this last proxy relies on 
stronger assumptions, which are less likely to hold for less developed countries. In particular, 
the enforcement of the environmental treaties is weak because monitoring is lax or non-
existent. Recent empirical evidence suggests that MNEs are more sensitive to the enforcement 
of environmental policy than the level of stringency itself (Kellenberg, 2009). This finding might 
even be more relevant, if I take into account the fact that decentralized local governments tend 
to set or implement lower environmental standards in order to attract mobile capital. This could 
partially explain why the correlation between SO2 per capita emissions and the number of 
international treaties is not robust across the different subsamples. For instance, the correlation 
is positive for the OECD sample, but weakly negative for the non-OECD and full sample. The use 
of environmental treaties leads also to high collinearity with several variables (the capital 
openness index and country risk index among others), which could explain why environmental 
stringency is not significant. It is interesting to note that the capital openness and the number of 
ratified international environmental treaties are related, especially for small countries, in terms 
of diplomacy and willingness to comply with international standards. 
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Table 6: Non-OECD Host Sample Results with CO2 per capita 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.004 0.193*** 0.086** 0.071** 0.070** 0.071** 
 [0.017] [0.016] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
GDP Host 1.016* 0.718*** 0.810*** 0.514** 0.413* 0.342 
 [0.550] [0.059] [0.191] [0.200] [0.215] [0.232] 
GDP Source 1.222 0.789*** 0.838*** 0.361*** 0.385*** 0.434*** 
 [1.154] [0.050] [0.100] [0.138] [0.136] [0.139] 
GDP growth 0.126*** 0.083** 0.08 0.057 0.05 0.045 
 [0.037] [0.035] [0.075] [0.076] [0.074] [0.073] 
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.121 -0.04 0.003 -0.453 -0.199 -0.117 
 [0.279] [0.144] [0.351] [0.356] [0.392] [0.475] 
Risk Index -1.442** -2.013*** -2.026* -1.221 -1.065 -1.466 
 [0.613] [0.472] [1.053] [1.032] [0.976] [0.976] 
Capital Openness 0.209** 0.152*** 0.105 0.067 0.02 -0.023 
 [0.099] [0.058] [0.143] [0.131] [0.131] [0.138] 
Oil Resources  -0.514*** -0.697 -0.323 -0.14 -0.02 
  [0.161] [0.431] [0.425] [0.448] [0.479] 
Colonial Links  0.887*** 0.968*** 0.606** 0.616** 0.579* 
  [0.189] [0.287] [0.301] [0.300] [0.336] 
Distance  -0.492*** -0.544*** -0.215 -0.174 -0.148 
  [0.075] [0.134] [0.142] [0.139] [0.238] 
Environmental Stringency 0.038 -0.317*** -0.355 -0.417 -0.468* -0.454* 
 [0.390] [0.069] [0.242] [0.256] [0.253] [0.267] 
Spatial Lag FDI    0.636*** 0.612*** 0.560*** 
    [0.144] [0.140] [0.139] 
Market Potential     0.231 0.253 
     [0.223] [0.255] 
Spatial Stringency      -0.031 
      [0.386] 
Observations 4078 4078 4078 4078 4078 4078 
Groups 374 374 374 374 374 374 
R-squared 0.065 . . . . . 
Instruments . . 145 148 151 154 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) . . 0.994 0.759 0.778 0.783 
Sargan test . . 0.345 0.635 0.681 0.686 
Hansen Test . . 0.232 0.37 0.46 0.499 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 7: Non-OECD Host Sample Results with Environmental Treaties 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.015 0.185*** 0.078** 0.054* 0.051 0.054 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.031] [0.032] [0.033] [0.033] 
GDP Host 0.898* 0.732*** 0.842*** 0.567*** 0.648*** 0.678*** 
 [0.489] [0.058] [0.190] [0.193] [0.235] [0.227] 
GDP Source 1.992* 0.785*** 0.880*** 0.391*** 0.383*** 0.423*** 
 [1.057] [0.048] [0.094] [0.133] [0.133] [0.128] 
GDP growth 0.118*** 0.071** 0.1 0.057 0.055 0.03 
 [0.036] [0.034] [0.080] [0.084] [0.084] [0.081] 
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.069 -0.01 -0.269 -0.495 -0.524 -0.536 
 [0.258] [0.140] [0.352] [0.364] [0.394] [0.376] 
Risk Index -2.065*** -2.604*** -1.738** -1.340* -1.483** -1.488** 
 [0.430] [0.335] [0.835] [0.719] [0.702] [0.686] 
Capital Openness 0.133 0.222*** 0.123 0.058 0.099 0.18 
 [0.091] [0.059] [0.151] [0.138] [0.143] [0.138] 
Oil Resources  -0.529*** -0.668 -0.246 -0.362 -0.245 
  [0.159] [0.425] [0.405] [0.448] [0.456] 
Colonial Links  0.920*** 0.823*** 0.719*** 0.744*** 0.714*** 
  [0.185] [0.298] [0.266] [0.258] [0.247] 
Distance  -0.530*** -0.672*** -0.308** -0.352** -0.314** 
  [0.070] [0.130] [0.140] [0.158] [0.155] 
Environmental Stringency -0.392 0.064 -0.201 -0.2 -0.232 -0.332* 
 [0.684] [0.070] [0.179] [0.153] [0.177] [0.175] 
Spatial Lag FDI    0.648*** 0.658*** 0.613*** 
    [0.138] [0.140] [0.132] 
Market Potential     -0.098 -0.086 
     [0.264] [0.249] 
Spatial Stringency      3.113** 
      [1.542] 
Observations 4576 4576 4576 4576 4576 4576 
Groups 374 374 374 374 374 374 
R-squared 0.061 . . . . . 
Instruments . . 157 160 163 166 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) . . 0.637 0.686 0.723 0.687 
Sargan test . . 0.116 0.389 0.439 0.514 
Hansen Test . . 0.217 0.251 0.225 0.3 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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5.2 Additional Control Variables 
Since uncovering evidence of a pollution haven effect is subject to potential variables omission if 
spatial dependence is not addressed properly, I have to make sure that the use of the level of 
SO2 per capita emission does not capture other FDI determinants. The next table reports the 
system-GMM estimations for the non-OECD sample by adding one by one additional control to 
the set of initial regressors36. This way I can detect any multicollinearity problem. Note that the 
inclusion of some explanatory variables decreases significantly the sample size of the panel. 
Therefore, one should be cautious when comparing the different results. Overall, the inclusion 
of the remaining additional FDI determinants leaves the results unchanged. Most of these 
additional explanatory variables have the expected sign but are not significantly different from 
zero. This is additional evidence that environmental stringency, proxied by SO2 per capita 
emission does not encompass any other determinants. 
 
More specifically, the first variable considered is GDP per capita to control for FDI allocation to 
higher income countries. However, the variable is not significant. I also include the number of 
telephone mainlines (per 1000 people) to measure the infrastructure level of the host economy. 
Its inclusion does not alter the results. In order to account for the importance of human capital, 
I include the proportion of secondary school enrollment. Since the measure is only available 
every 5 years, I interpolated it. Its estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
This might be related to the fact that I indirectly already account for the labour skill in the host 
economy by using the capital-labor ratio as a GMM instrument. In any case, the pollution haven 
effect remains negative and significant. This is also the case with the inclusion of a dummy 
variable for the presence of bilateral investment treaties and capital tax agreements between 
countries to account for the governments' marketing efforts to attract foreign investments. 
Openness to trade is considered in the literature as an important FDI determinant, that is why I 
consider several measures. The first proxy is a dummy variable for the existence of regional 
agreements trade which takes the value of 0 previous to the conclusion of the trade agreement 
and 1 afterwards. The ratio of exports to GDP as well as an index to assess the level of free trade 
of the economy and another one for the importance of trade tariff are also considered. In all 
these specifications, the associated coefficient is not significant. Although the
                                                     
36
 While Appendix 7.2 reports the sources of the additional control variables, Appendix 7.8 displays the results for OECD 
countries. 
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Table 8: Non-OECD Host Sample Results with Additional FDI Determinants 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.086** 0.083** 0.096** 0.064* 0.080** 0.072* 
 [0.038] [0.037] [0.043] [0.037] [0.039] [0.039] 
GDP Host 0.897*** 0.939*** 0.820*** 0.931*** 0.739*** 0.750*** 
 [0.209] [0.178] [0.214] [0.184] [0.188] [0.195] 
GDP Source 0.874*** 0.865*** 1.021*** 0.900*** 0.822*** 0.917*** 
 [0.092] [0.092] [0.105] [0.099] [0.096] [0.105] 
GDP growth 0.131* 0.129* -0.006 0.086 0.122* 0.128* 
 [0.070] [0.070] [0.103] [0.078] [0.074] [0.076] 
V.A. Dirty Shares 0.101 0.048 0.217 -0.142 -0.331 -0.258 
 [0.334] [0.337] [0.349] [0.309] [0.296] [0.355] 
Risk Index -1.355 -0.508 -1.21 -0.988 0.161 -0.457 
 [0.930] [0.977] [1.187] [1.039] [1.106] [1.044] 
Capital Openness 0.127 0.118 0.143 0.234* 0.185 0.291** 
 [0.152] [0.148] [0.142] [0.121] [0.138] [0.140] 
Oil Resources -0.883** -0.859** -0.421 -0.861** -0.562 -0.529 
 [0.438] [0.393] [0.465] [0.387] [0.393] [0.414] 
Colonial Links 1.007*** 1.106*** 1.211*** 1.042*** 0.946** 0.865** 
 [0.317] [0.310] [0.434] [0.378] [0.372] [0.365] 
Distance -0.463*** -0.446*** -0.526*** -0.435*** -0.463*** -0.525*** 
 [0.131] [0.123] [0.144] [0.145] [0.140] [0.166] 
Environmental Stringency -0.615*** -0.451** -0.767*** -0.563*** -0.657*** -0.708*** 
 [0.225] [0.217] [0.186] [0.183] [0.178] [0.209] 
GDP per capita Host 0.099      
 [0.239]      
Phone  0.291     
  [0.221]     
School Enrollment   -0.068    
   [0.657]    
Bilateral Invest. Treaties    -0.07   
    [0.278]   
Capital Tax Agreements     -0.582*  
     [0.301]  
Regional Trade Agreement      -0.243 
      [0.519] 
Observations 3500 3500 2631 3500 3500 3500 
Groups 358 358 347 358 358 358 
R-squared 148 148 121 233 227 199 
Instruments 0.796 0.795 0.251 0.973 0.827 0.904 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) 0.162 0.41 7.03E-05 0.125 0.055 0.0861 
Sargan test 0.437 0.496 0.336 0.708 0.614 0.767 
Hansen Test 0.086** 0.083** 0.096** 0.064* 0.080** 0.072* 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 8: Non-OECD Host Sample Results (continued) 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.107*** 0.081** 0.090** 0.034 0.090** 0.087** 
 [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] [0.051] [0.037] [0.037] 
GDP Host 0.772*** 0.817*** 0.809*** 0.544** 0.791*** 0.782*** 
 [0.193] [0.185] [0.194] [0.222] [0.198] [0.202] 
GDP Source 0.867*** 0.869*** 0.873*** 1.019*** 0.839*** 0.862*** 
 [0.099] [0.092] [0.089] [0.105] [0.093] [0.092] 
GDP growth 0.121* 0.086 0.081 0.094 0.1 0.096 
 [0.073] [0.073] [0.071] [0.107] [0.072] [0.072] 
V.A. Dirty Shares 0.263 0.164 0.045 0.095 -0.157 -0.157 
 [0.360] [0.371] [0.361] [0.373] [0.351] [0.352] 
Risk Index 0.072 0.053 -0.437 -0.498 -0.32 -0.35 
 [1.021] [1.005] [0.995] [1.493] [1.010] [1.006] 
Capital Openness 0.161 0.143 0.206 0.102 0.219* 0.242* 
 [0.130] [0.145] [0.145] [0.138] [0.128] [0.127] 
Oil Resources -0.59 -0.670* -0.717* -0.029 -0.744* -0.663 
 [0.390] [0.402] [0.430] [0.540] [0.423] [0.423] 
Colonial Links 1.040*** 1.044*** 1.022*** 1.022** 0.941*** 1.288*** 
 [0.349] [0.338] [0.329] [0.489] [0.335] [0.409] 
Distance -0.404*** -0.467*** -0.462*** -0.423*** -0.348** -0.409*** 
 [0.130] [0.132] [0.140] [0.141] [0.137] [0.130] 
Environmental Stringency -0.789*** -0.673*** -0.662*** -0.729*** -0.702*** -0.744*** 
 [0.188] [0.184] [0.211] [0.194] [0.186] [0.190] 
Openness 0.035      
 [0.235]      
Free Trade Index  1.051     
  [0.750]     
Tariff Index   0.349    
   [0.549]    
Corruption Index    -0.47   
    [0.295]   
Contiguity     1.190**  
     [0.541]  
Common Language      -0.396 
      [0.445] 
Observations 3312 3481 3480 2422 3500 3500 
Groups 343 357 357 349 358 358 
Instruments 148 148 148 97 146 146 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) 0.555 0.82 0.739 0.798 0.74 0.759 
Sargan test 0.0904 0.314 0.227 0.0217 0.274 0.284 
Hansen Test 0.478 0.5 0.529 0.607 0.549 0.551 
Lagged FDI 0.107*** 0.081** 0.090** 0.034 0.090** 0.087** 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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baseline model already accounts for the level of corruption, through a country's (financial, 
economic and political) risk index, I include an index of corruption to capture the level of 
enforcement of environmental stringency. Although the inclusion of this index decreases the 
sample size significantly, results are unchanged except for the lagged dependent variable, which 
is no longer significant. Finally, the inclusion of a contiguity and common language dummy 
further confirms that the evidence of a pollution haven effect is robust to the inclusion of 
additional control variables. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effect of environmental stringency on FDI inflows in a multi-country 
setting. In addition to traditional determinants of FDI, the model included spatially weighted 
variables in order to account for third-country effects. The estimations is carried out on a 
sample of bilateral FDI from OECD countries to a large number of host countries over the period 
1981-2000. 
 
I show the importance of distinguishing between inflows of FDI to high income versus low 
income countries and correcting for the endogeneity of the environmental regulation using 
system GMM. In fact, most specifications yield a significant negative relationship between 
environmental stringency and inflows of FDI, once endogeneity and spatial dependence are 
taken into account. This finding is robust across specifications but also using different 
environmental stringency proxies. In particular, depending on the global nature of the proxy, 
failing to account for spatial dependence can mask the pollution haven effect. Furthermore, I 
am able to highlight the prevalence of complex FDI between OECD countries and lower income 
countries. In other words, MNEs tend to allocate each main production step to different 
countries in order to minimize the production process costs. 
 
The policy implications are not necessarily straightforward. Environmental stringency can be 
used as an instrument to attract manufacturing multinationals. However, the host country 
should be aware that they will mainly attract intermediate goods production through vertical 
integrated complex FDI. In other words, they will only be part of a small part of the production 
process, the most polluting one. In terms of economic development, this is not necessarily the 
best way to ensure long term sustainable economic growth. 
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Although the findings are largely plausible and robust across specifications, they should be 
taken with cautious. The proxies for environmental stringency are unfortunately still imperfect 
and scarce. The use of a more reliable proxy would further reduce the bias associated with the 
potential omission of variables. Another interesting extension of this study would be to estimate 
the specification using bilateral data at the industry level in order to control more accurately for 
the polluting intensive composition effect. Unfortunately, disaggregated bilateral FDI data are 
scarce and only available for a limited number of countries and years. These are the main 
challenges the study of the linkages between FDI and pollution haven at the world-wide level 
faces. In any case, an inter-country analysis remains relevant to get the big picture in terms of 
the spatial allocation of FDI and can be of particular interest to policymakers in developing 
countries who compete to attract FDI. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Country Lists 
 
Host Countries: 
Algeria; Argentina; Bangladesh; Benin; Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Cameroon; Central African 
Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Czech Republic; Ecuador; 
Egypt; El Salvador; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; 
Honduras; Hong Kong; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran; Israel; Jordan; Kenya; Korea Rep.; Kuwait; 
Latvia; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Morocco; Nigeria; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; 
Philippines; Romania; Russian Federation; Senegal; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; South 
Africa; Sri Lanka; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Uruguay; Venezuela. 
 
Source/Host Countries (OECD countries): 
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; 
Japan; Korea, Rep.; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Spain; 
Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; United; Kingdom; United States. 
 
High Income OECD countries: 
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; 
Japan; Korea, Rep.; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; 
United Kingdom; United States. 
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7.2 Data Description 
 
 
FDI Determinant Theory/Hypothesis Proxy Variable (Source) Effect 
Market demand Market size GDP + 
 hypothesis (World Development Indicator)  
Growth rate Differential rates Real GDP Growth + 
 of return (World Development Indicator)  
Agglomeration effect Other Lagged FDI + 
  (OECD Database)  
Industrial Structure Other Share of Manufacturing in total GDP +/- 
  (World Development Indicator)  
Factor Endowments Factor endowments Capital/ Labour ratio + 
 hypothesis (World Penn Tables)  
Trade Barriers Tariff jumping Dummy for Regional Trade Agreement +/- 
 hypothesis (WorldTradeLaw.net )  
Capital Openness Other Ito-Chinn index + 
    
Investment Promotion Other Dummy for Bilateral Investment Treaties + 
  (UNCTAD)  
Country Risk Other ICRG index - 
  (World Development Indicator)  
Natural Resources Other Dummy for largest oil rich countries - 
  (www.eia.doe.gov)  
Proximity Gravity Capitals distance - 
 hypothesis Contiguity, Colonies, Common Language + 
  (CEPII)  
"Third-Country" Effect Spillovers Spatially weighted variables +/- 
 hypothesis (Negative exponential distance matrix)  
Environmental Stringency Pollution haven SO2 emission per capita (Stern (2005)) - 
 hypothesis International environmental treaties (ENTRI) - 
 
 
7.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
   Standard   
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FDI 13555 3.29 4.06 -10.97 12.75 
Lagged FDI 12211 3.39 4.02 -10.97 12.75 
Spatial Lag 13555 3.14 2.29 -7.93 11.4 
GDP 13415 26.41 1.47 21.16 30 
Market Potential 13415 25.22 0.9 21.94 27.79 
GDP Growth 13487 2.2 4.29 -50.49 89.83 
V.A. Dirty Shares 12074 -1.21 0.32 -5.59 -0.1 
Notes: All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the dummies variables. 
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   Standard   
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Manufacturing Share (%GDP) 10791 2.94 0.36 -0.54 3.77 
Risk Index 13386 -4.29 0.2 -4.62 -2.67 
Capital Openness 12723 0.64 1.13 -1.33 1.68 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 13555 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Regional Agreement Trades 13555 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Capital Tax Agreements 13555 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Oil Resources 13555 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Colonial Links 13555 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Distance 13555 8.17 1.11 4.09 9.88 
Environmental Stringency (SO 2  pc) 11299 11.36 1.03 5.68 15.53 
Spatial Stringency (SO 2  pc) 11299 11.53 0.58 9.55 14.18 
Environmental Stringency (Treaties) 13549 4.4 0.81 0 5.82 
Spatial Stringency (Treaties) 13549 4.04 0.48 2.16 4.88 
Phone 13474 5.26 1.32 -0.16 6.64 
School Enrolment 11168 4.4 0.42 1.61 5.18 
Openness 13106 3.36 0.6 1.19 5.26 
Exports 13050 24.65 1.53 18.22 27.77 
Free Trade Index 13182 1.96 0.2 0.43 2.28 
Tariff Index 13110 1.42 0.24 -2.07 1.63 
Corruption Index 9282 -2.07 0.19 -2.29 -1.13 
Notes: All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the dummies variables. 
 
 
7.4 Correlation Matrix 
 
  Lagged Spatial  Market GDP V.A. Manuf. Risk 
 FDI FDI Lag GDP Potential Growth Dirty Share Index 
FDI 1         
Lagged FDI 0.28 1        
Spatial Lag 0.25 0.23 1       
GDP 0.16 0.18 -0.02 1      
Market Potential 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.24 1     
GDP Growth 0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.1 0.11 1    
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 0 0.01 1   
Manuf. Share 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.33 0.16 0.05 1  
Risk Index -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.2 -0.43 -0.26 0 -0.1 1 
Capital Openness 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.27 0.3 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.64 
BIT -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.2 -0.09 0 -0.02 -0.01 0.42 
RAT 0.05 0.04 0 -0.13 0.18 0.04 -0.05 0.09 -0.29 
KTA 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.21 
Oil Resources 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.34 -0.09 -0.06 0.13 -0.2 0.01 
Colonial Links 0.1 0.09 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0 0.03 
Distance -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 0.12 -0.25 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.27 
Notes: All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the dummies variables. 
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  Lagged Spatial  Market GDP V.A. Manuf. Risk 
 FDI FDI Lag GDP Potential Growth Dirty Share Index 
-(SO2 pc) -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.1 0.12 -0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.07 
Spatial -(SO2 pc) -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.1 -0.18 0.08 -0.15 0.01 0.23 
Treaties 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.17 -0.01 0.03 0.17 -0.43 
Spatial Treaties 0.08 0.09 0.09 -0.08 0.19 0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.32 
Phone 0.1 0.11 0.08 0.3 0.4 0.01 -0.03 0 -0.71 
School Enrolment 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.25 0.36 0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.66 
Openness -0.03 -0.04 0.1 -0.57 0.21 0.16 0 0.08 -0.16 
Exports 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.85 0.46 -0.02 -0.06 0.17 -0.53 
Free Trade Index 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.28 0.12 0.01 0.06 -0.57 
Tariff Index 0.1 0.11 0.05 0.21 0.25 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.45 
Corruption Index -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 -0.35 -0.07 0.17 -0.01 0.67 
Notes: All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the dummies variables. 
 
 Capital    Oil Col.   Spatial 
 Open. BIT RAT KTA Ress. Links Distance -(SO2  pc) -(SO2  pc) 
Capital Openness 1         
BIT -0.36 1        
RAT 0.23 -0.12 1       
KTA 0.2 -0.02 0.5 1      
Oil Resources -0.02 -0.13 -0.24 -0.05 1     
Colonial Links -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 -0.08 0.03 1    
Distance -0.18 0.11 -0.83 -0.54 0.19 0.03 1   
-(SO2 pc) 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.18 -0.21 -0.04 -0.15 1 
 
Spatial -(SO2 pc) -0.31 0.18 -0.23 -0.17 -0.14 0.02 0.26 0.11 1 
Treaties 0.37 -0.35 0.44 0.3 0 -0.02 -0.39 -0.02 -0.37 
Spatial Treaties 0.25 -0.11 0.51 0.32 -0.17 -0.05 -0.47 -0.01 -0.18 
Phone 0.56 -0.33 0.38 0.21 -0.01 -0.06 -0.32 -0.24 -0.41 
School Enrolment 0.53 -0.28 0.37 0.21 -0.09 -0.06 -0.27 -0.2 -0.31 
Openness 0.1 0.09 0.33 0.17 -0.28 -0.04 -0.32 0.07 0.11 
Exports 0.54 -0.31 0.1 0.08 0.23 0 -0.1 -0.05 -0.16 
Free Trade Index 0.62 -0.21 0.42 0.23 -0.17 -0.04 -0.33 -0.13 -0.17 
Tariff Index 0.43 -0.24 0.34 0.15 -0.07 -0.08 -0.22 -0.13 -0.22 
Corruption Index -0.44 0.28 -0.25 -0.16 0.01 0.02 0.2 0.14 0.07 
Notes: All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the dummies variables. 
 
  Spatial  School   F. T, Tariff Corr. 
 Treaties Treaties Phone Enrol. Open. Exports Index Index Index 
Treaties 1         
Spatial Treaties 0.57 1        
Phone 0.49 0.47 1       
School Enrolment 0.54 0.48 0.83 1      
Openness -0.13 0.23 0.08 0.09 1     
Exports 0.37 0.12 0.59 0.5 -0.14 1    
Free Trade Index 0.3 0.45 0.65 0.6 0.52 0.45 1   
Tariff Index 0.35 0.37 0.71 0.62 0.09 0.44 0.64 1  
Corruption Index -0.33 -0.34 -0.62 -0.54 -0.14 -0.46 -0.54 -0.31 1 
Notes: All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the dummies variables. 
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7.5 Spatial Dependence Tests 
  
 Bilateral FDI GDP SO2 per capita Treaties 
Year Moran I Geary C Moran I Geary C Moran I Geary C Moran I Geary C 
1981 0.12*** 0.89*** 0.23*** 0.74*** 0.08* 0.91* 0.39*** 0*** 
1982 0.07*** 0.94** 0.12** 0.86** 0.14*** 0.84*** 0.36*** 0*** 
1983 0.11*** 0.89*** 0.1** 0.85** 0.11** 0.91* 0.33*** 0*** 
1984 0.1*** 0.93*** 0.2*** 0.77*** 0.21*** 0.79*** 0.34*** 0*** 
1985 0.19*** 0.81*** 0.25*** 0.72*** 0.26*** 0.73*** 0.33*** 0*** 
1986 0.11*** 0.91*** 0.31*** 0.67*** 0.24*** 0.74*** 0.31*** 0*** 
1987 0.13*** 0.88*** 0.16*** 0.78*** 0.22*** 0.75*** 0.33*** 0*** 
1988 0.15*** 0.86*** 0.26*** 0.71*** 0.23*** 0.77*** 0.29*** 0*** 
1989 0.2*** 0.8*** 0.32*** 0.67*** 0.31*** 0.7*** 0.32*** 0*** 
1990 0.19*** 0.84*** 0.31*** 0.67*** 0.29*** 0.72*** 0.31*** 0*** 
1991 0.14*** 0.87*** 0.35*** 0.63*** 0.25*** 0.76*** 0.18*** 0*** 
1992 0.14*** 0.89*** 0.34*** 0.65*** 0.27*** 0.75*** 0.07** 0.37 
1993 0.12*** 0.89*** 0.3*** 0.69*** 0.25*** 0.76*** 0.03 0.21 
1994 0.24*** 0.76*** 0.21*** 0.75*** 0.2*** 0.8*** 0.04* 0.15 
1995 0.15*** 0.84*** 0.25*** 0.71*** 0.21*** 0.79*** 0.09*** 0.2 
1996 0.17*** 0.84*** 0.28*** 0.68*** 0.27*** 0.73*** 0.13*** 0*** 
1997 0.18*** 0.82*** 0.31*** 0.66*** 0.16*** 0.84*** 0.15*** 0*** 
1998 0.09*** 0.91*** 0.28*** 0.68*** 0.18*** 0.82*** 0.16*** 0*** 
1999 0.12*** 0.89*** 0.26*** 0.69*** 0.18*** 0.81*** 0.18*** 0*** 
2000 0.15*** 0.86*** 0.26*** 0.69*** 0.16*** 0.84*** 0.17*** 0*** 
2001 0.14*** 0.86*** 0.28*** 0.68*** 0.33*** 0.66*** 0.18*** 0*** 
2002 0.14*** 0.86*** 0.33*** 0.65*** 0.2** 0.83* 0.22*** 0*** 
Notes: Both tests performed in logarithm with an inverse exponential distance matrix. significant at 10, ** significant at 5, *** 
significant at 1. 
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7.6 OECD Robustness Check with CO2 per capita 
 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.012 0.190*** 0.058** 0.051** 0.055** 0.063** 
 [0.015] [0.014] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
GDP Host 0.883 0.534*** 0.518*** 0.583*** 0.550*** 0.593*** 
 [0.851] [0.046] [0.113] [0.106] [0.117] [0.115] 
GDP Source 5.781*** 0.802*** 0.947*** 0.655*** 0.624*** 0.588*** 
 [1.071] [0.042] [0.077] [0.144] [0.146] [0.150] 
GDP growth -0.056 0.064 -0.047 -0.074 -0.053 -0.065 
 [0.062] [0.059] [0.087] [0.091] [0.092] [0.093] 
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.11 -0.053 -0.098 -0.524 -0.676 -0.495 
 [0.324] [0.263] [0.431] [0.490] [0.495] [0.493] 
Risk Index -2.433 1.261 -2.824 -1.701 -1.199 -1.325 
 [1.600] [1.063] [2.516] [2.648] [2.621] [2.594] 
Capital Openness -0.087 0.095 0.173 0.114 0.167 0.107 
 [0.143] [0.111] [0.213] [0.210] [0.210] [0.200] 
Oil Resources 0 0.028 0.007 -0.579 -0.611 -0.539 
 [0.000] [0.190] [0.450] [0.453] [0.463] [0.465] 
Colonial Links 0 1.035*** 1.120*** 0.937** 0.851* 0.878* 
 [0.000] [0.211] [0.416] [0.458] [0.477] [0.456] 
Distance 0 -0.700*** -0.733*** -0.687*** -0.686*** -0.682*** 
 [0.000] [0.051] [0.092] [0.094] [0.096] [0.103] 
Environmental Stringency 1.123 -0.602*** -0.558 -0.874* -0.914* -0.79 
 [0.722] [0.201] [0.520] [0.516] [0.538] [0.563] 
Spatial Lag FDI    0.444** 0.468** 0.493** 
    [0.190] [0.192] [0.196] 
Market Potential     0.055 -0.035 
     [0.192] [0.225] 
Spatial Stringency      0.062 
      [0.459] 
Observations 5194 5194 5194 5194 5194 5194 
Groups 341 341 341 341 341 341 
R-squared 0.03 . 144 147 150 153 
Instruments . . 144 147 150 153 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) . . 0.819 0.923 0.884 0.783 
Sargan test . . 0.0138 0.0862 0.0657 0.0239 
Hansen Test . . 0.409 0.467 0.455 0.356 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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7.7 OECD Robustness Check with Treaties  
 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.037*** 0.195*** 0.060** 0.060** 0.059** 0.056** 
 [0.014] [0.013] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] 
GDP Host -0.295 0.544*** 0.638*** 0.635*** 0.654*** 0.666*** 
 [0.740] [0.047] [0.124] [0.120] [0.122] [0.124] 
GDP Source 7.798*** 0.820*** 0.937*** 0.615*** 0.614*** 0.591*** 
 [0.996] [0.041] [0.084] [0.137] [0.136] [0.132] 
GDP growth -0.012 0.097 0.058 0.009 0.007 -0.021 
 [0.062] [0.060] [0.093] [0.096] [0.094] [0.093] 
V.A. Dirty Shares 0.135 -0.09 -0.454 -0.680* -0.535 -0.609 
 [0.312] [0.246] [0.380] [0.407] [0.410] [0.405] 
Risk Index -1.5 1.239 0.83 1.281 -0.147 -0.67 
 [1.534] [1.029] [2.727] [2.698] [2.614] [2.518] 
Capital Openness -0.048 0.184* 0.611*** 0.491** 0.369* 0.347 
 [0.143] [0.108] [0.219] [0.210] [0.217] [0.216] 
Oil Resources 0 0.373** 0.301 -0.092 -0.171 -0.01 
 [0.000] [0.155] [0.325] [0.319] [0.304] [0.325] 
Colonial Links 0 0.981*** 0.975** 0.992** 0.884* 0.968** 
 [0.000] [0.209] [0.447] [0.481] [0.489] [0.481] 
Distance 0 -0.622*** -0.887*** -0.742*** -0.749*** -0.675*** 
 [0.000] [0.057] [0.140] [0.146] [0.144] [0.145] 
Environmental Stringency 0.061 0.177 -1.191* -0.742 -0.764 -1.263 
 [1.921] [0.229] [0.712] [0.709] [0.713] [0.827] 
Spatial Lag FDI    0.450*** 0.449*** 0.488*** 
    [0.168] [0.165] [0.164] 
Market Potential     -0.101 -0.147 
     [0.186] [0.181] 
Spatial Stringency      3.66 
      [2.679] 
Observations 5728 5728 5728 5728 5728 5728 
Groups 341 341 341 341 341 341 
R-squared 0.033 . . . . . 
Instruments . . 155 158 161 164 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) . . 0.216 0.311 0.317 0.354 
Sargan test . . 0.225 0.36 0.403 0.467 
Hansen Test . . 0.311 0.39 0.376 0.424 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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7.8 OECD Robustness Check with Additional FDI Determinants 
 
 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.055** 0.062** 0.054* 0.057** 0.047* 0.055** 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.029] [0.025] [0.025] [0.028] 
GDP Host 0.679*** 0.607*** 0.718*** 0.566*** 0.541*** 0.530*** 
 [0.132] [0.122] [0.132] [0.115] [0.117] [0.142] 
GDP Source 0.951*** 0.950*** 1.045*** 0.958*** 0.985*** 0.924*** 
 [0.071] [0.072] [0.079] [0.073] [0.075] [0.109] 
GDP growth -0.093 -0.106 -0.151 -0.055 -0.107 -0.071 
 [0.092] [0.095] [0.110] [0.091] [0.082] [0.083] 
V.A. Dirty Shares 0.059 0.031 0.263 -0.201 0.469 0.609 
 [0.460] [0.462] [0.477] [0.449] [0.415] [0.457] 
Risk Index -2.974 -1.983 0.727 -2.051 -5.120** -3.848 
 [2.580] [2.519] [3.603] [2.413] [2.277] [2.363] 
Capital Openness 0.256 0.162 0.194 0.377 0.044 -0.088 
 [0.234] [0.235] [0.230] [0.238] [0.211] [0.217] 
Oil Resources 0.239 0.135 -0.136 0.214 0.138 -0.224 
 [0.404] [0.407] [0.423] [0.384] [0.398] [0.458] 
Colonial Links 1.093*** 1.128*** 0.842* 1.105*** 0.980** 1.050* 
 [0.424] [0.417] [0.472] [0.407] [0.443] [0.538] 
Distance -0.807*** -0.769*** -0.960*** -0.792*** -0.928*** -1.120** 
 [0.104] [0.101] [0.115] [0.101] [0.154] [0.446] 
Environmental Stringency -0.301 -0.325 -0.668*** -0.282 -0.388* -0.329 
 [0.205] [0.209] [0.227] [0.202] [0.198] [0.206] 
GDP per capita Host -0.468      
 [0.550]      
Phone  -0.199     
  [0.618]     
School Enrollment   -0.854    
   [0.905]    
Bilateral Investment 
Treaties 
   1.016   
    [1.282]   
Capital Tax Agreements     -0.74  
     [0.569]  
Regional Agreement Trades      -1.131 
      [1.321] 
Observations 5178 5178 4253 5178 5178 5178 
Groups 341 341 340 341 341 341 
Instruments 147 147 121 186 218 203 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) 0.837 0.753 0.979 0.813 0.97 0.841 
Sargan test 0.0212 0.0162 0.03 0.191 0.118 0.0856 
Hansen Test 0.369 0.383 0.163 0.91 0.428 0.0509 
Lagged FDI 0.055** 0.062** 0.054* 0.057** 0.047* 0.055** 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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 Fixed Random SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
Lagged FDI 0.064** 0.060** 0.057** 0.048* 0.064** 0.064** 
 [0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.027] [0.025] [0.025] 
GDP Host 0.811*** 0.677*** 0.663*** 0.587*** 0.591*** 0.619*** 
 [0.160] [0.132] [0.121] [0.140] [0.115] [0.116] 
GDP Source 0.934*** 0.933*** 0.963*** 0.971*** 0.936*** 0.937*** 
 [0.070] [0.072] [0.072] [0.077] [0.070] [0.071] 
GDP growth -0.08 -0.099 -0.037 -0.265** -0.066 -0.066 
 [0.088] [0.091] [0.091] [0.107] [0.092] [0.092] 
V.A. Dirty Shares -0.049 0.128 -0.212 0.032 0.056 0.041 
 [0.452] [0.461] [0.444] [0.468] [0.462] [0.452] 
Risk Index -0.128 1.497 -1.011 -1.242 -1.799 -1.743 
 [2.393] [2.350] [2.408] [4.020] [2.573] [2.579] 
Capital Openness 0.349 0.015 0.278 -0.583* 0.228 0.205 
 [0.220] [0.241] [0.213] [0.338] [0.227] [0.230] 
Oil Resources 0.144 0.125 0.005 0.165 0.117 0.057 
 [0.395] [0.387] [0.398] [0.421] [0.375] [0.385] 
Colonial Links 1.081** 1.100*** 1.114** 1.257*** 1.034** 0.653 
 [0.427] [0.399] [0.450] [0.471] [0.407] [0.464] 
Distance -0.658*** -0.734*** -0.861*** -0.950*** -0.687*** -0.731*** 
 [0.105] [0.104] [0.110] [0.120] [0.101] [0.096] 
Environmental Stringency -0.356* -0.385* -0.254 -0.430* -0.303 -0.295 
 [0.201] [0.215] [0.201] [0.238] [0.204] [0.203] 
Openness 1.019**      
 [0.489]      
Free Trade Index  4.881***     
  [1.894]     
Tariff Index   -3.685*    
   [2.045]    
Corruption Index    -0.488   
    [0.771]   
Contiguity     0.495  
     [0.327]  
Common Language      0.799** 
      [0.369] 
Observations 5178 5161 5161 3420 5178 5178 
Groups 341 341 341 339 341 341 
Instruments 147 147 147 97 145 145 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) 0.725 0.768 0.807 0.594 0.733 0.735 
Sargan test 0.0727 0.0753 0.0201 0.078 0.0202 0.0231 
Hansen Test 0.478 0.515 0.452 0.647 0.45 0.426 
Lagged FDI 0.064** 0.060** 0.057** 0.048* 0.064** 0.064** 
Notes: Exponential inverse distance as spatial weighting scheme. Two-Step System-GMM estimations. Time dummies and 
constant not reported. Standard errors incorporating the Windmeijer correction in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Chapter 4  
Unequal Spatial Diffusion of Eco-label Programs 
 
1 Introduction 
While most industrialized countries have adopted an eco-labelling scheme, African and Latin 
American countries have yet to decide to implement this type of market-based initiative. This 
asymmetry has led to trade tensions, as eco-labels are criticized for potentially imposing the 
environmental concerns of (high income) importing countries on the production methods of 
(low income) trading partners (Bonsi et al., 2008). This is particularly problematic for developing 
countries depending heavily on exports to sustain their growth. So far, in spite of these 
important concerns, most of the literature on eco-labels and its international trade linkages has 
taken a conceptual or descriptive approach due to lack of data. 
 
This study brings new empirical evidence on the determinants of multi-sector eco-labelling 
programs. It is based on a large sample, including 141 developing and developed economies and 
is the first one to examine the extent to which the eco-label decision is dependent upon the 
behavior adopted by nearby partner countries. A government, which faces pressure on its 
national and export markets, might consider introducing an eco-labelling scheme in order to 
restrict market access to foreign products, or to boost its exports earnings. Whatever the case, 
its decision will depend on how many and which countries have or are expected to adopt an 
eco-labelling program. Such interdependence may help explain the very unequal diffusion of 
eco-label programs among countries. As prior studies (Grolleau & El Harbi, 2008) have not 
controlled for the spatial dependence in the eco-label decision, their results may be biased or 
inconsistent. In short, the empirical approach in this paper aims at providing an answer to two 
main questions. First, why some governments have adopted eco-label programs and others did 
not. Second, do strategic interactions among partners matter in their decision to adopt an eco-
labelling scheme? 
 
To tackle the issue of cross-sectional interdependence, I estimate a Bayesian spatial 
autoregressive probit model by applying a new Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo algorithm. The 
standard iterative sampling method proposed by LeSage (2001) suffers from slow mixing and 
convergence when there is a strong posterior correlation between the parameters and the 
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latent variable. In order to avoid relying on a excessively large number of draws, which can be 
time consuming, I follow Holmes and Held (2006) and modify the algorithm to update jointly the 
non spatial regression parameters and the latent variable. To my knowledge, this is the first 
time that this type of joint sampling is done in a spatial Bayesian framework. A small simulation 
study confirms the superiority of this new algorithm over the standard one in terms of mixing 
and convergence. 
 
The empirical evidence confirms the role of the economy's stage of development and 
innovation capacity in the government's decision to introduce an eco-label. Moreover, results 
highlight the strategic nature of the eco-labelling decision. In particular, the probability for a 
country to introduce an eco-labelling scheme depends on the eco-label programs adopted by 
countries which are spatially close or sharing a strong trade intensity relationship with each 
other. These results explain why developing countries, which are standards takers, have 
naturally been put at a disadvantage in terms of eco-labelling adoption. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main determinants 
associated with the decision to introduce an eco-labelling scheme. Section 3 describes the 
spatial probit model. The joint sampling estimation method and its performance based on a 
small Monte-Carlo simulation study are also presented. The empirical results are discussed in 
section 4. Section 5 checks the robustness of the findings. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Determinants of Eco-Label Adoption 
"Eco-labels" is the short form for ecological labels. They contain information regarding potential 
impacts on the environment of the production, consumption and waste phases of the 
products/services consumed. However, eco-labelling schemes are not just messages about a 
product or a service but claims stating that it has particular properties or features (Mason, 
2006). In fact, even the instrument of labelling itself is a claim, as it refers to certain 
characteristics of the procedure under which the label is awarded. The very own existence of 
eco-labels arises when firms have information on the environmental impact of the product that 
consumers value but cannot check. Buyers are unable to verify the environmental consequence 
of the goods before the purchase or through frequent purchase. This type of information 
asymmetry, also known as credence feature, is due to the temporal, spatial and non-exclusion 
characteristics of most environmental impacts. In addition, the environmental degradation (or 
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improvement) generated by the environmental characteristics of the conventional (or eco-
friendly) product displays properties of public goods showing either non-excludability or non-
rivalry in consumption. This usually implies a free riding problem as well as an assurance 
problem. Moreover, no market prices prevail to really reflect the value of the production and 
consumption externalities of the product. These public good features lead to a misallocation of 
scarce resources because the decision-making process does not take into account all the costs. 
Therefore, most eco-label programs seek to fulfill two objectives:  
 provide consumers with more information about the environmental effects of their 
consumption, (i.e. transform the product's credence attribute into a search attribute), 
which should generate a move towards more environmentally friendly consumption 
patterns;  
 encourage economic agents (mainly firms and governments) to increase the environmental 
standards of products/services by benchmarking environmental performance (i.e. 
internalize the non-market benefits of the eco-labelled good). 
 
 
Figure 1: Eco-label Determinants 
  
 
Several authors have defined the potential determinants that could explain why countries and 
producers would adopt an eco-label (Grolleau & El Harbi, 2008). Among them, Basu et al. (2004) 
determine analytically and empirically the economic, trade and environmental variables under 
which governments and agricultural firms that apply green production methods are favorably 
selected in the set of countries that adopt an eco-label program. They also investigate the 
strategic interactions that prevail between trading partners in their decision to adopt the eco-
label in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a two stages multi-country setting. Based on 
their theoretical framework, which can be extended to manufacturing industries, Figure 1 
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depicts the main incentives behind the government's decision to introduce an eco-label. The 
perceived gains resulting from the adoption of an eco-label are simultaneously related to (1) the 
stage of development of the adopting country, (2) the fixed cost of the eco-labelling scheme, (3) 
the relative production cost advantage of the country in producing the type of products covered 
by the eco-label program and (4) the strategic interactions between trade competitors. 
 
2.1 Economy's Stage of Development 
The decision to adopt an eco-label is mainly determined by the stage of development of the 
economy. This is partially confirmed by Figure 2 which highlights the fact that most high income 
countries were among the first to introduce an eco-labelling scheme37. In particular, several 
governments decided to introduce an eco-label during the 1980s and early 1990s, coinciding 
with the trend of market governance and self-regulation in environmental policy instrument 
(away from command-and-control measures). In recent years, the need to address the issues 
related to global warming and biodiversity has led to a renewed interest in eco-labelling 
schemes. One explanation for this trend, which is related to the debate about the 
environmental Kuznets curve, is that, as the economy becomes richer, individuals are more 
aware of environmental issues and ask for stringer regulation in order to reduce and reverse the 
environmental pollution trend resulting from industrialization. 
 
Other features of the stage of development, which are linked with GDP per capita, but not 
necessarily perfectly correlated with it, are likely to enter the picture. Countries that face more 
social problems (e.g. high unemployment rate, child mortality rate, wage inequality, ...) are 
likely to assign a lower degree of concern for environmental issues, reducing the probability of 
introducing an eco-labelling scheme. Besides, market-based instruments like eco-labelling 
scheme are more likely to be implemented by efficient governments than command-and-
control standards. Thus, the probability to introduce an eco-label program will be lower in 
countries characterized by high inefficiency and/or corruption, which prevent the private sector 
from adopting voluntary environmental initiatives. Somehow related to the issue of corruption, 
democratic governments with high political freedom can support more easily environmental 
quality improvement measures through voters' preferences (Magnani, 2000) and thus increase 
                                                     
37
 The peak in 1992 and 2004 correspond to the introduction and extension of the European eco-label program, EU(15) and 
EU(25), respectively. Note that several European countries (e.g. Germany (Blue Angel), Netherlands (Stichting Mileukeur), ...) 
introduced an eco-label program before the UE Flower ecolabel. For those cases, only the first eco-label scheme introduced is 
considered (see Appendix 7.2). 
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the odds of introducing an eco-label program. Firms might also be interested in supporting the 
introduction of an eco-labelling scheme, when the threat of direct environmental policy 
regulation on the environmental quality of the product is high. Therefore, countries whose 
production structure is characterized by a high share of dirty products might be more 
favourable to eco-label programs. 
 
 
Figure 2: Time Pattern of Eco-label Adoption 
  
 
2.2 Cost of Eco-label 
Several reasons can lead a firm to opt to be a member of an eco-label program (e.g. improved 
corporate reputation, risks mitigation and management, competitive advantage, access to new 
markets, cost reductions in the long run, ). Ultimately, the producers' decision is based on 
evaluating two dimensions (Sedjo et al., 2002): 
 the extent to which the eco-label would increase the production costs (i.e. investment costs 
to comply with the eco-label's standards (indirect costs) and administrative costs associated 
with the eco-labelling procedure (direct costs)); 
 the extent to which consumers are willing to pay a price premium for eco-labelled products 
(i.e. predictability of the producers' future revenues). 
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Firms in large domestic markets will be able to dampen the fixed cost to be paid to be certified 
by a third party through economies of scale and improved learning curves. These elements play 
a key role in the development of differentiated goods (Bruce & Laroiya, 2007). As highlighted by 
Nadai (1999), the firms' eco-label adoption strategy is partially determined by the degree of 
heterogeneity between the sets of products sold. In addition, before the market phase, the 
government might face the opposition of some firms in the industry during the negotiation of 
the eco-label's criteria. These firms might want to try to block the agreement on the criteria or, 
if these criteria are nonetheless adopted by the authority, they can deliberately avoid the use of 
a label on their products. 
 
Consumer sensitivity to the environment, which is related to the country's stage of 
development, is also essential for eco-labelling programs to be effective. Greaker (2006) 
demonstrates that the introduction of an eco-labelling scheme becomes preferable than setting 
a minimum standard only when the willingness to pay for eco-labelled products is sufficient. In 
fact, the proportion of environmentally concerned consumers in the economy and their 
willingness to pay for public good characteristics increase the probability to adopt an eco-label. 
Results from a number of studies (Teisl et al., 1999; Sammer et al., 2006) suggest that two of the 
major reasons why consumers choose eco-labelled products are consideration for the 
environment and/or for their own health. Several demographic and economic characteristics 
play a role in determining eco-friendly behaviors. For instance, younger and more educated 
individuals usually display a lower information processing cost and thus are assumed to be more 
proactive in terms of environmental quality requests. In particular, the level of the green 
premium price is stimulated if consumers are already environmentally conscious and able to 
express their preferences through their environmentally friendly consumption choices. In 
addition, countries characterized by larger population densities are usually in need of a better 
environmental quality, because the lives of more people are affected by pollution. Yet, the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviors with respect to the environment is not simple and 
straightforward. The reason is that consumers are often dealing with mixed motives38. 
 
                                                     
38
 Several explanations have been provided, such as the "warm glow effect" (i.e. increased utility from the act of giving rather 
than receiving) or the "Veblen effect" (increase utility associated with the statue value given by the consumption) versus an 
excessive premium price charged or a lack of trust in the eco-labelled product (Peattie, 2001; Pedersen & Neergaard, 2006). 
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2.3 Relative Production Costs Advantage 
The export orientation of the economy's manufacturing industry can partially determine the 
decision to introduce an eco-label program, when the country, as a net exporter, is able to cover 
the eco-labelling fixed costs by capturing the green premium in larger export markets. In 
addition to this trade factor, the comparative cost advantage of an economy is related to the 
diffusion of innovations among private firms. In order to be awarded an eco-label on their 
products, firms have to invest more in environmentally sound technologies. This suggests that 
the criteria of the eco-labelling scheme will implicitly orient firms' R&D. Eco-label regulators 
usually expect that producers will achieve innovation during the market phase in order to 
respect the criteria. Therefore, the diffusion of eco-organizational innovations can ultimately 
improve the relative production cost advantage of an economy in producing different products 
(Porter & Van der Linde, 1995). One can expect this mechanism to be even stronger, if 
producers are already familiar with environmental innovations (e.g. standard-setting, 
certification and accreditation procedures), reducing the cost of the negotiation and market 
phases of the eco-label program. 
However, the introduction of an eco-labelling scheme might also lead to innovation distortions. 
In particular, during the eco-label criteria negotiation, producers may try to ensure that the 
standards will rely on the current technology they possess, ensuring the lowest environmental 
innovation costs as possible. Once the eco-labelling scheme is in place, producers might have no 
additional incentive to innovate beyond the eco-label's standards, even when they enjoy a 
larger profit margin in the market. Distortion might be further exacerbated by exporting firms 
afraid of the reaction of developing countries, which can file complaints over the non-respect of 
WTO's rules, and thus dissuading them from adopting higher environmental standards. 
 
2.4 Strategic Interactions with Trade Competitors 
Although countries are judicially independent, they are economically interdependent because of 
international trade and capital flows. Each government may face strategic interdependence on 
its national and export markets. Consequently, a country, which faces competitive challenges 
from a large number of countries whose level of environmental policy differs, will have some 
incentives to change its environmental regulation in response to other countries' policies. Since 
environmental attributes are unobservable, an eco-labelling scheme can serve as a screening 
mechanism or a signalling device. The governmental decision to introduce an eco-labelling 
program can thus be seen as a strategic environmental policy. A country's decision will depend 
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on the existence and future existence of eco-label programs in other countries as well as the 
existence of a green premium in those countries. Therefore, the eco-label adoption 
interdependence is expected to increase with high economic relationship intensity and 
decreases with large trade cost. Three mechanisms can explain the strategic environment in 
adopting an eco-label. 
 
First, a country, which faces competition from imports on its national market, might be willing 
to introduce an eco-labelling scheme whose criteria may be determined, intentionally or 
unintentionally, in favour of domestic firms. If domestic producers can adopt the eco-label more 
easily than foreign firms due to the criteria established, this may cause undesirable trade effects 
or trade frictions. Grolleau et al. (2007) investigate the implications of a possible strategic 
manipulation of eco-label programs that lead to raise the foreign rivals' production costs (Salop 
and Scheffman, 1983) through product categories definition, eco-labelling criteria and 
monitoring procedures. Beside modifying directly the foreign firms' production cost, the 
introduction of an eco-labelling program can increase the perceived quality of eligible domestic 
products and decrease that of noneligible imported product through market signalling39. 
Therefore, one of the "protectionist-like" effects could result from consumers valuing cleaner 
production, and hence, switching from the imported product to the domestically produced good 
once the standard becomes known. This change in consumption spending in favour of the eco-
label product can lead to a decrease in the price of the non eco-labelled product, which 
ultimately can reduce the trade volume and worsen the terms of trade of the developing 
exporters. 
 
Second, the emergence of environmental demands in export markets is more likely to be 
important in open economies. An exporting country, interested in extending its foreign market 
share (presumably to high income countries), may be interested in adopting an eco-label 
program. To promote the trade of the country's environmentally friendly products, the eco-
labelling will thus include products and follow the criteria adopted by other national eco-label 
programs (e.g. China eco-label with respect to EU). Since demand for environmental quality 
tends to be income elastic, differences in product categories and criteria are expected to be 
greatest between high and low income countries. In particular, foreign producers may be 
required to meet criteria that are not relevant in their own country. This is particularly 
                                                     
39
 For instance, the share of eco-labelled paper for notebooks in the swedish and danish market has increased over time to 
about 80%. 
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problematic for small and medium enterprises in small, resources-constrained developing 
countries, as certification procedures and eco-labelling compliance require important funding 
(Piotrowski & Kratz, 1999). Beside these costs, producers in many low income countries face 
asymmetric information. They do not necessarily possess information about some eco-label 
programs and all the certification requirements. These obstacles are further exacerbated by the 
fact that advanced technologies used to define the standards of the eco-label might be 
patented and thus difficult to access if not unaffordable. Just like in the first case, it is the 
determination of the standards associated with the eco-label, rather than the information 
embodied in it, that explains why eco-labelling can affect the market access to (developing) 
exporters (UNEP, 2005). This becomes even more problematic when each developed country 
supports different underlying eco-labelling criteria making it almost impossible for the 
producers to exploit economies of scales. 
 
Third, eco-labelling designed to reduce global environmental problems (e.g. CO2 emissions or 
biodiversity) might face free-riding that can alter a country's decision to implement an eco-
labelling scheme. Due to the transboundary nature of environmental degradation, consumers, 
whose country has implemented an eco-label program, can be tempted to free ride by reducing 
their own purchases of eco-labelled products. In fact, domestic buyers may expect foreigners 
customers to purchase eco-friendly products and thus choose to reduce their own purchases. 
This incentive will increase as the number of countries with an eco-labelling scheme is high, 
even if the potential green premium is large (Robertson, 2007). Domestic governments aware of 
this issue may decide to abandon the idea of an eco-label program as the number of countries 
with eco-labelling increases. 
 
3 Joint Sampling in a Bayesian Heteroskedastic Spatial Probit Model 
In this section, I present the limited dependent variable spatial model. The most popular 
method to estimate this type of interdependent binary models is the standard Metropolis-
Hastings-Gibbs sampling approach proposed by LeSage (2000). A potential problem of this 
standard iterative method is slow convergence. To address this issue, I extend the joint updating 
approach suggested by Holmes and Held (2006) in a spatial setting. To illustrate the relative 
efficiency of this new algorithm, I perform a small Monte Carlo study. Finally, I review the 
different types of spatial marginal effects associated with the spatial probit model. 
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3.1 Spatial Autoregressive Probit Model 
Assuming that each country assesses the costs and benefits of adopting an eco-label, a rational 
government will introduce an eco-labelling scheme only if it gains in welfare, expressed in 
monetary terms or net gain in utility40. Formally, iY  denotes country i's welfare associated with 
the adoption of the eco-label. Note that iY  is by definition a latent or auxiliary variable and thus 
cannot be observed directly. What is observable is the binary indicator variable Yi with entry 1 if 
the country has adopted an eco-label  0iY  and 0 otherwise  0iY . As explained in the 
previous section, a government's decision to introduce an eco-label may depend on the related 
decision of other close countries. Yet, assuming incorrectly that the decision of country i is 
independent of the decision of the N-1 remaining countries leads to biased as well as 
inconsistent and inefficient estimates which voids subsequent hypothesis testing (LeSage & 
Pace, 2009). That is why the latent variable is specified as a spatial autoregressive probit 
model41: 
 uXWYY     (1)  
        0Y1Y     
         Vu 2,0 N   
    Nvvvdiag ,...,, 21V   
 
where Y , Y  and u  are 1N  vectors. The parameter  , also known as the spatial lag, is 
associated with the non-negative row-standardized exogenous NN  matrix W . This spatial 
weight matrix, whose diagonal elements are zero, determines the form of the interdependence 
across country-pairs. This spatial autoregressive parameter can be seen as a reaction function 
which relates a country's choice about whether to introduce an eco-label to the existence of an 
eco-label in spatially close economies. Additional K explanatory variables are included in the 
KN  matrix X . To account for potential spatial heterogeneity and outliers, the variance of the 
error terms, V , is not constant. Following LeSage (1997, 2000), I introduce a set of variance 
scalars  Nvvv ,...,, 21  as unknown parameters to be estimated. This is important, because if a 
given country follows a different pattern than the majority of spatial observations, the errors 
                                                     
40
 Most theoretical papers focusing on the labelling procedure consider an authority that maximizes a social surplus which 
depends on the profits of the firms, the consumers' surplus, the environmental damage associated with the production of the 
good as well as other potential costs related to the introduction of the eco-label (Greaker, 2006). Alternatively, the objective 
function of the government may be represented by a weighted average of social welfare and political contributions, to include 
political economy considerations. 
41
 As highlighted by LeSage & Pace (2009), the cross-sectional spatially autocorrelated lag model, which is related to the 
spatiotemporal model, provides a long term perspective. 
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would no longer be normally distributed (i.e. fat-tailed errors associated with a Student-t 
distribution). The associated parameter estimates would thus be inconsistent if this was not 
accounted for. 
 
Methods for properly estimating and analyzing equation (1) have been the topic of a relative 
small body of research in the spatial econometrics literature. The issue is that the introduction 
of the spatial lag leads to simultaneity biases as well as additional heteroskedasticity in the error 
terms. The reduced form of expression (1) highlights this issue: 
 
    uXWY    1I  (2)  
 
The heteroskedasticity as well as the spatial dependence in the error term render standard 
probit approach inappropriate (        1121cov   WVWuW  III ). In fact, the 
presence of spatial autocorrelation makes the traditional maximum likelihood method less 
practical. The main reason is that the likelihood function requires to evaluate the joint 
distribution of the N interdependent outcomes, which is not the product of the N marginal 
distributions, but involves N-dimensional integration and the determinant of the NN matrix W. 
To see this point more formally, the likelihood function of equation (1) is expressed as follows: 
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where ui is the ith element of the error vector     XYWu  NI . Note that the determinant 
of the Jacobian WI  is approximated by  i
N
i   11  with i  representing the i
th eigenvalue 
of the matrix W. 
 
To avoid the direct calculation of multiple integrals in the likelihood function,which can be 
analytically intractable, several estimators have been proposed (Fleming, 2004; Franzese & 
Hays, 2008). McMillen (1992) is the first to suggest an Expectation-Maximization (EM) 
algorithm. His approach consists of replacing the discrete dependent variable with the 
expectation of the underlying continuous latent variable and maximizing its likelihood function 
until convergence is reached. Yet, this method faces several drawbacks (LeSage, 2000). First, the 
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EM algorithm does not provide standard-error for the spatial lag. Second, the method requires 
an arbitrary parameterization of the heteroskedasticity caused by the introduction of spatial 
dependence. Third, the approach is highly computation intensive when the number of cross-
sections is large. To address the issue of spatial heteroskedasticity, Case (1992) proposes an 
alternative estimator that groups each cross-section into regions whose errors are assumed to 
be strictly independent of each other. Instead of expressing the spatial discrete choice model as 
a maximum likelihood function, Pinkse & Slade (1998), among others, derive the necessary 
moments conditions and apply a two-step Generalized Method of Moments estimator. Both 
Case (1992) and Pinkse & Slade (1998) approaches ignore standard cross-section 
heteroskedasticity making them consistent but not necessarily efficient estimators. More 
recently, Beron et al. (2003) extend the Recursive-Importance-Sampling (RIS) method to 
estimate consistently the spatial probit and compute the associated standard-errors necessary 
for inference. The main disadvantage of this simulation method is its computational burden, 
which makes it less practical to account for heteroskedasticity in the error term42. To address all 
of these issues, LeSage (2000) extends the Bayesian Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) 
method to a spatial discrete choice model by using the Metropolis-Hastings-within-Gibbs 
sampling approach. The first advantage of the Bayesian strategy is to be able to derive the 
condition distribution of each parameter, and thus compute different moments of the 
distribution (e.g. mean, standard-error,...). The second advantage is its flexibility to account for 
the heteroskedasticity in the error terms (Smith and LeSage, 2004). That is why equation (1) will 
be estimated using the Bayesian MCMC approach. 
 
3.2 Standard Bayesian MCMC Approach 
According to the Bayesian approach, the product of the likelihood function and the prior 
density, which both depend on certain assumptions, determines the posterior distribution of 
the parameters that fits the data best43. Thus, in order to estimate the set of parameters  , V  
and   their associated priors (   ) have to be specified independently of each other. First, the 
explanatory variables are assigned a normal prior,   N(c,s). Second, in order to account for 
heteroskedastic variance iv
2 , the relative variance parameters,  Nvvvdiag ,...,, 21V  , are 
assumed to follow an independent   rr /2  distribution, which depends on the single 
                                                     
42
 In their empirical application, the estimation method proposed by Beron et al. (2003) does not rule out explosive spatial 
dependence  0ˆ    (see Table 4 p. 292), which can be problematic. 
43
 See Holloway et al. (2002), Thomas (2007) or LeSage & Pace (2009) for a more thorough introduction of Bayesian theory 
extended to the spatial probit. 
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parameter r,  ivr / iid  r
2 , Ni ,...,1 . The constant   is usually set to 1. Third, the spatial 
lag is assumed to be distributed according to a uniform distribution,     1max1min,  U  , where  
1
min
  and 1max
  represent, respectively,  the minimum and maximum eigenvalues of the matrix 
W . Another alternative is to assume a beta prior for the spatial autoregressive parameter  
    bb,  (LeSage & Parent, 2007). Based on these priors, LeSage (2000) extends the work 
of Albert & Chib (1993) and Geweke (1993) to derive the conditional posterior distributions of 
the set of parameters: 
    SCYYV  ,N,,,| p  (4)  
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        uVuWYYV 12½,,,|    eIp N  (6)  
 
where   means that the expression on the left-hand side is proportional up to a constant to 
the expression on the right-hand side. iV  denotes all the elements of matrix V  beside iv . Note 
that expression (6), the prior of the spatial lag, cannot be generated from a standard normal 
distribution, that is why the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, which is a standard accept-reject 
algorithm, has to be used. In the case of the alternative beta prior, a univariate numerical 
integration is applied to construct the conditional posterior distribution of the spatial 
autoregressive term and then sample it by inversion (LeSage & Pace, 2009). 
 
Finally, the posterior distribution of the latent/auxiliary variable, Y , conditional on the 
parameters is specified as a truncated multivariate normal distribution: 
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(7)  
 
where  YY,Ind  represents an indicator function which truncates from the left by zero if 1iY  
and from the right by zero if 0iY . Note that the marginal distribution of the individual 
elements of Y ,  iii vp YY ,,,,|  , does not correspond to an univariate truncated normal. 
LeSage's method relies on the Geweke (1991) approach to sample the conditional distribution 
for iY  from a truncated multivariate normal distribution subject to independent inequality 
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linear constraints (LeSage & Pace, 2009). Although there are other methods to simulate a 
truncated multivariate variables subject to inequality linear constraints, including Rodriguez-
Yam, Davis & Scharf (2004) efficient approach, the standard method in spatial probit is the 
Geweke method. 
 
Once the complete conditional distributions of all parameters in the model are specified, the 
MCMC sampling method can be implemented. While in standard Monte-Carlo simulation, the 
draws are generated independently based on a specified underlying distribution, in Gibbs 
sampler, each draw depends on the previous one in such a way that the produced samples 
display properties identical to those of the joint population. Thus, LeSage (2001) suggests taking 
iterative random draws from (4), followed by (5) and (6), and then (7). With a sufficient number 
of draws, the sample statistics can approximate the set of estimates that converges in the limit 
to the joint posterior distribution of the parameters. 
 
3.3 Joint Updating Bayesian MCMC Approach 
However, the main drawback of LeSage's iterative sampling method is the presence of strong 
posterior correlation between  , Y  and  . Although a correlated draws chain provides an 
unbiased picture of the distribution, the number of draws has to be sufficiently large. That is 
why, in order to tackle the issue of potential slow mixing in the Markov chain, I follow Holmes & 
Held (2006) and extend the joint updating of   and Y  to a spatial framework by using the 
product rule to decompose the joint probability of   and Y  as follows: 
     ??? ,,,|,,|,,|, YYVYVYYVY  ppp   
 
The auxiliary variable is now updated according to its marginal distribution once it has been 
integrated over   (see equation (4)): 
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(8)  
 
In other words, the proposed approach consists of sampling iY  according to its marginal 
multivariate truncated normal function   iiip YYVY ,,,|    and updating  's conditional means 
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(C) after each update to iY . Once all the individual elements of 
Y  have been sampled,   is 
generated based on its conditional normal distribution (4). More formally, the new procedure 
consists of iteratively44: 
1. updating  Y,  jointly according to (8), given   and V; 
2. updating V according to (5), given the remaining parameters; 
3. updating   according to (6), given the remaining parameters. 
 
Thanks to the joint updating approach, the mixing and sampling efficiency in the chain should be 
improved. In order to compare the performance between the standard iterative sampler and 
the joint updating sampler, I conduct a small Monte-Carlo simulation study. The latent variable 
Y  is generated according to equation (2) and used to determine the values of iY  as follows: 
1iY  if 0

iY  or 0iY  otherwise. The matrix of explanatory variables includes a constant and 
two standard random normal variables. The coefficient vector is set to the following values: 
  1,1,0 . The spatial weight matrix W  is a row-standardized rook-type matrix of order 10 
(i.e. the ten nearest neighbors). The spatial autoregressive parameter   is set to 0.75. For 
simplicity, the individual shocks are assumed to follow a standard Gaussian distribution, whose 
variance is homoskedastic   NIN ,0u . Four different sample sizes are considered: 
 1000,750,500,250N . 
 
For each of theses designs, 10 samples are generated and estimated according to 6 different 
samplers: 
1. iterative update with Geweke approach to simulate the latent variable and Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm to draw the spatial lag. 
2. iterative update with Geweke approach to simulate the latent variable and numerical 
integration to draw the spatial lag. 
3. iterative update with Rodriguez-Yam, Davis & Scharf approach to simulate the latent 
variable and Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw the spatial lag. 
4. iterative update with Rodriguez-Yam, Davis & Scharf approach to simulate the latent 
variable and numerical integration to draw the spatial lag. 
5. joint update with Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw the spatial lag. 
6. joint update with numerical integration to draw the spatial lag. 
 
                                                     
44
 The algorithms are written in Matlab and available upon request. 
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To my knowledge, this the first time that the approach suggested by Rodriguez-Yam, Davis & 
Scharf (2004) and the joint update have been applied to estimate a spatial probit. In order to 
measure efficiency, I compute, for each chain, the CPU computation time in seconds, the 
parameters' average Euclidean update distance between each iteration as well as the Raftery-
Lewis (1992, 1995) convergence statistic. A large value of Euclidean distance means good mixing 
while a high total number of draws necessary to ensure an i.i.d chain implies high 
autocorrelation in the chain and slow convergence. 
 
 
Table 1: MCMC Algorithms Performance 
 Iterative Update with  
Geweke and Metropolis-Hastings 
Iterative Update with  
Rodriguez-Yam et al. and 
Metropolis-Hastings 
Joint Update with  
Metropolis-Hastings 
N 
CPU  
Time 
Total  
Draws 
Param. 
Distance 
CPU  
Time 
Total  
Draws 
Param. 
Distance 
CPU  
Time 
Total  
Draws 
Param. 
Distance 
250 51 5268 0.145 37 4032 0.149 45 4164 0.192 
500 176 5130 0.103 135 4209 0.106 170 3844 0.137 
750 390 5172 0.083 313 4118 0.086 416 3947 0.111 
1000 725 5160 0.072 585 3863 0.075 841 3816 0.096 
          
 
Iterative Update with  
Geweke and Numerical Integration 
Iterative Update with  
Rodriguez-Yam et al. and  
Numerical Integration 
Joint Update with  
Numerical Integration 
N 
CPU  
Time 
Total  
Draws 
Param. 
Distance 
CPU  
Time 
Total  
Draws 
Param. 
Distance 
CPU  
Time 
Total  
Draws 
Param. 
Distance 
250 55 5580 0.158 41 4065 0.163 49 3911 0.204 
500 194 5164 0.112 153 3947 0.116 187 3916 0.145 
750 444 5251 0.092 368 3813 0.095 469 3811 0.118 
1000 839 5035 0.078 715 3770 0.081 956 3905 0.101 
Note: Performance measures based on the data generating process (2) with  75.0  and  .)1,1,0(    
 
 
Table 1 presents the results averaged over the four parameters (   and  ) and the 10 runs. 
First, the method proposed by Rodriguez-Yam et al. (2004) is more efficient than Geweke (1993) 
with higher mixing and faster convergence. Second, applying numerical integration to draw the 
spatial lag improves also the mixing and usually reduces autocorrelation in the chain. Third, 
although it is relatively more time consuming when the sample size is large, the joint updating 
sampler yields a larger average distance jumped between iterations and usually relies in smaller 
total draws. In fact, once the performances are standardized by their respective computation 
time, the joint sampling algorithm relies on a 45% smaller total number of draws to ensure 
convergence45. In addition, in comparison to Geweke method, the joint sampler yields 15 to 
                                                     
45
 Appendix 7.1 reports the relative performance of the iterative samplers with respect to the joint updating sampler. 
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50% more mixing in the chain. Interestingly, Rodriguez-Yam et al.'s approach can lead to the 
same level of mixing than the joint updating method when the number of cross-sections is 
particularly large. Overall, these findings suggest that the spatial probit model should be 
estimated by the joint update algorithm, especially when the sample size is relatively small (as it 
is the case in this study). 
 
3.4 Spatial Marginal Effects 
Once the model has been estimated, it is crucial to be able to interpret the coefficients (first and 
second moments of the conditional distribution). Yet, just like in standard discrete choice 
models, parameter estimates from a spatial probit cannot be interpreted directly. They must be 
transformed to yield estimates of the marginal effects, i.e. a change in the predicted probability 
associated with changes in the explanatory variables. However, unlike classical approaches, 
models including a spatial lag of the dependent variables have to be interpreted in a special way 
(Beron & Vijverberg, 2004). This comes from the fact that a change in a single country 
associated with a given explanatory variable will lead to a direct impact on the country itself, 
but can potentially affect all other countries indirectly. In fact, the spatial probit model allows 
for complex feedback loops that might take place when a shock in country i affects countries j 
and k to finally change back country i. The derivative of iY  with respect to a variable r in country 
j, (j = 1,…,N) takes the following form: 
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where   is the density function of a standard normal distribution and  ijiis  ˆˆˆ  with ij  
being the ijth elements of the matrix   uW 1I . 
 
Since it might be difficult to keep track of the KN 2  spatial effect estimates, when the spatial 
weight matrix size and the number of explanatory variables are large, LeSage & Pace (2009) 
suggest some useful summary measures of these effects for each explanatory variable r: 
-  Average Total Effect:    
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j ijr
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N 1 1
ˆ1ˆ . 
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Going back to the eco-label analysis, these impacts could be interpreted in the following way. 
The direct effect indicates how a rise in an explanatory variable across the sample of countries 
would affect the expected probability of the (average) country to adopt an eco-label scheme. 
The indirect effect measures how a shift in this explanatory variable would affect the (average) 
neighboring country's eco-label program adoption decision. Obviously, the size of these types of 
feedback will depend on the position and degree of connectivity of each country with each 
other (spatial weight matrix W ), the strength of spatial dependence (spatial lag  ) and the 
importance of the explanatory variables (parameters  ). 
 
4 Empirical Results 
The empirical analysis of the effect of eco-labels on trade flows suffers from fundamental data 
deficiencies (OECD, 2004). Because import and export statistics apply the same universal codes 
for tracking trade flows of eco-labelled and non-eco-labelled products, there is no information 
available on international trade in eco-labelled products. That is why in this paper the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a country has implemented a type I 
multi-sector eco-label program46. Type I eco-labelling is owned and operated by third parties, 
which may be governmental organizations or private non-commercial entities, and is awarded 
for products and manufacturing processes which meet certain environmental criteria. Unlike 
one single product category label (e.g. canned tuna caught in a dolphin safe way) or private eco-
label (e.g. certified wood), multiproduct eco-labelling covers a wide range of different 
manufactured products categories (e.g. Germany's Blue Angel). The firm's participation is 
completely voluntary. Indeed, manufacturers must pay for the right to display the label and 
demonstrate continued adherence to relevant product guidelines to maintain their 
certifications. Data on the adoption of a type I eco-label is taken from the Global Eco-labelling 
Network as well as the New Zealand's Ministry of Economic Development and the website 
ecolabelling.org. Appendix 7.2 reports the countries which have adopted a multi-sector eco-
label before 2009. Due to missing data, Liechtenstein, Malta, Singapore and Taiwan are not 
considered, although they have implemented an eco-labelling scheme. In addition, Costa Rica, 
South Africa, Turkey and Zimbabwe have introduced a tourism eco-label. But since this type of 
eco-labelling focuses on non-traded goods, they are deliberately omitted. 
 
                                                     
46
 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) distinguishes two additional categories of ecolabels. Type II is 
associated with informative environmental self-declaration claims which are not verified by any independent third party. Type 
III covers voluntary programs that provide quantified environmental data of a product, under pre-set categories of parameters 
set by a qualified third party and based on life cycle assessment, and checked by that or another qualified third party. 
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The selection of the explanatory variables is mainly dictated by their availability in order to 
maximize the number of countries in the sample ( 141N ). The table in Appendix 7.4 lists the 
countries considered in this paper. In order to reduce multicollinearity issues, I deliberately 
restrict the number of explanatory variables. Multicollinearity leads to technical issues and 
convergence problems. The table in Appendix 7.5 presents the different factors and proxies as 
well as their sources considered in this paper. Unless specified otherwise, the data are averaged 
over the 2003-2005 period. The tables in Appendix 7.6 and 7.7 report the descriptive statistics 
of the variables, Moran's spatial autocorrelation statistic as well as the correlation matrix. As 
suspected, the eco-label dummy variable displays significant positive spatial autocorrelation. 
The same is true for the remaining variables considered in this study, which definitively calls for 
a spatial framework. 
 
In order to avoid any endogeneity issue in the estimation process, the interdependence of the 
spatial autoregressive parameter (  ) is based on a geographical distance weighting scheme       
( W ), which is by definition strictly exogenous. The benchmark spatial weight matrix is based on 
a negative exponential distance measure: 
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where ijcetandis  is the bilateral geographical distance between the capital of country i and j (in 
kilometers). The advantage of this spatial scheme is to give a positive weight to countries which 
are close to each other (within a region) and almost zero weight to nations that are 
geographically remote from each other. Note that the spatial weight is row-standardized so that 
the sum of each row is equal to one. 
 
Before implementing the joint updating MCMC algorithm, several decisions have to be made. 
These include the values for the priors' parameters, the number of total iterations, the number 
of initial burn-in to be discarded and the spacing between iterations to be retained for the 
inference47. In fact, it is important to determine whether the sampling chain has converged to a 
stationarity distribution. So the question is what is the number of runs until the Markov chain 
approaches stationarity. According to Raftery and Lewis (1992, 1995) diagnostic statistics and 
autocorrelation measures, the estimation relies on a Monte Carlo chain which is based on at 
least 15,000 draws with 1,000 burn in draws and a thinning factor of at least 5. The main reason 
                                                     
47
 Unless specified otherwise, the priors' settings are set as follows:  ),1 ,0()(
12
eIN N   )( ,)01.1,01.1(  and 
)4()/4(
2
 iv , Ni ,...,1 . 
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to ignore 1,000 draws is to make sure that there is no systematic information left in the random 
numbers generation process for the remaining draws. In addition, only every 5th draw is saved 
for inference in order to reduce autocorrelation and avoid unjustified higher standard deviation 
in the parameters. If the chain for each parameter were to display high autocorrelation, further 
draws from the chain should be skipped in order to get proper inference on the standard 
deviation. 
 
Table 2 reports the main results. For each spatial specification, the average coefficients' 
posterior and its associated standard errors are reported in the first column. The estimated 
parameters' t-statistics are not computed. The main reason is that normalization by standard 
errors does no longer leads to a Student distribution, because the simulated draws are 
themselves approximation to Student distributions (Holloway et al., 2002). Here, a parameter is 
significant at the 5 percent significance level, if the quantiles at the 2.5 and 97.5 percent have 
the same sign, i.e. zero does not belong to the 95% interval. In addition, as suggested by LeSage 
& Pace (2009), the second to fourth columns report the average marginal direct, indirect and 
total effect, respectively. But first, I estimate the model assuming there is no spatial 
dependence in the eco-label decision in a homoskedastic framework. 
 
The traditional probit estimator performs relatively poorly. Most variables are not significant at 
the conventional level, except the number of international environmental treaties adopted, the 
share of high technology exports and the number of ISO14001 certificates. The presence of 
large standard errors might be due to the strong assumption of homoskedasticity in the error 
term and a potential variable omission when spatial dependence is not accounted for. These 
issues are addressed by estimating a heteroskedastic spatial probit model. According to 
different convergence checks instruments, the different Monte Carlo chains have reached 
stationarity48. In particular, the dependence statistic I, which reports the ratio of the total 
number of draws required to achieve a 5 percent test accuracy and the minimum number of 
draws needed to ensure an identically and independently distributed draws, is lower than 5 
 93.1I . Therefore additional draws are not required and proper inference can thus be 
performed. 
 
                                                     
48
 In order to check the convergence of the MCMC samplers, autocorrelation, Raftery-Lewis and Geweke diagnostics have been 
performed. To save space, they are not reported here but are available upon request. 
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Once interdependence in the eco-label adoption is taken into account, the results improve 
significantly. In fact, although not necessarily significant at the conventional level, most 
parameters display the expected sign. In particular, countries which have reached a high stage 
of development are more likely to adopt an eco-label. This is confirmed by the fact that GDP per 
capita affects positively the environmental label decision. As the economy growths, the 
government has the incentive and the means to introduce an eco-labelling scheme. 
Interestingly, the pollution pressure captured by emissions of SO2 decreases the probability of 
implementing an eco-label scheme. This counterintuitive result might be due to three reasons. 
First, although several high income countries are large SO2 emitters despite possessing an eco-
labelling scheme (e.g. Switzerland or Sweden), many low income countries without eco-label 
generate even higher levels of SO2 emissions (e.g. Mali or Nigeria). Second, most environmental 
labellings cover products in industries characterized with relatively low SO2 emissions (e.g. 
footwear or textile)49. Third, since the SO2 emissions' impact on the environment and health is 
relatively local, the need of direct regulation can be higher and the government might prefer 
command-and-control measures instead of self-enforcement instruments. This finding is robust 
to potential outliers characterized by a large mining sector (e.g. Chile and Peru). However it is 
no longer significant when other proxies for pollution pressure like urban particles, indoor air 
pollution and regional ozone are considered. 
 
Going back to the estimation results, the existence of scale effects captured by the manufacture 
value added share, increases the probability of eco-labelling implementation. In other words, if 
the costs associated with the eco-label procedure can be compensated by economies of scales, 
the probability to introduce an eco-label is positively significant. The same does not hold for the 
presence of a green price premium proxied by the population share below 45 years old. This 
probably comes from the fact that it is an imperfect proxy, since most high income countries 
with an eco-label in place have fewer young adult people relative to developing countries. 
Results show that economies displaying a relative production cost advantage through previous 
environmental preferences experience, innovation and a high share in high-technology exports 
are more inclined towards adopting a voluntary environmental program. This result is in line 
with Grolleau & El Harbi (2008), who find that economies characterized by higher technological 
innovation capacities use the eco-labelling scheme as a tool to enhance and reinforce their 
innovation potential. In fact, the diffusion of environment friendly organizational innovations 
                                                     
49
 Non-ferrous metals, petroleum, non-metallic mineral and chemical products are associated with large level of SO2 emissions 
(see Emission Data Base for Global Atmospheric Research). 
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through ISO14001 certificates seems to lead more easily to the adoption of an eco-label 
program. Although there seems to be a substituability relationship between the adoption of an 
eco-label and the average manufacturing tariff, it is not statistically significant. Finally, the 
results confirm the interdependent nature of eco-labelling decisions, because nations which are 
closer to each other in geographical terms display a higher probability of adopting an eco-label 
program. 
 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results 
 Standard Probit Spatial Probit with Exponential Distance 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Constant -0.043  2.662    
 [4.104]  [7.29]    
Real GDP per Capita 0.099 0.025 0.195*** 0.007*** 0.001** 0.009*** 
 [0.06] [0.014] [0.087] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] 
SO2  -0.026 -0.007 -0.087* -0.003* -0.001* -0.004* 
 [0.026] [0.008] [0.055] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
Political and Civil Rights -0.157 -0.04 -0.216 -0.009 -0.001 -0.01 
 [0.219] [0.048] [0.336] [0.014] [0.003] [0.016] 
Population Below 45 -0.087 -0.022 -0.17 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008 
 [0.081] [0.015] [0.123] [0.005] [0.001] [0.006] 
Environmental Treaties 0.067*** 0.017*** 0.111*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 
 [0.024] [0.01] [0.039] [0.001] [0] [0.002] 
Manufacture Value Added 0.065 0.017 0.194*** 0.007*** 0.001** 0.009*** 
 [0.044] [0.015] [0.074] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] 
High Technology Exports 0.043* 0.011* 0.094*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.004*** 
 [0.023] [0.008] [0.04] [0.002] [0] [0.002] 
ISO14001 0.289*** 0.074*** 0.399*** 0.016*** 0.003** 0.018*** 
 [0.094] [0.03] [0.138] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] 
Manufacturing Tariff -0.104 -0.026 -0.09 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
 [0.075] [0.022] [0.105] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] 
Spatial Lag   0.155**    
   [0.06]    
Observations (with eco-label) 141 (47)  141 (47)    
Total Draws / Omitted Draws -  15000 /1000    
Thinning Factor -  5    
I-statistic -  1.927    
Log-likelihood -17.568  -18.712    
Pseudo R
2
  0.804  0.792    
Note:  The mean of the posterior distribution is reported as coefficient while the standard deviation is reported in the 
brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 3: Model's Predictive Power 
 Standard Probit Model Spatial Probit Model  
 
Predicted 
Eco-label 
Predicted 
No Eco-label 
Predicted 
Eco-label 
Predicted 
No Eco-label 
Total 
Observed Eco—label 37 10 40 7 47 
Observed No Eco-label 3 91 1 93 94 
Total 40 101 41 100 141 
 
 
In comparison with the classical probit model, there are major differences in terms of average 
coefficients and marginal effects, the spatial direct marginal effects being theoretically 
equivalent to the standard marginal effects. Beside the fact that the number of explanatory 
variables significantly different from zero is higher in the spatial probit estimation, accounting 
for spatial dependence usually yields higher average estimates but lower average direct 
marginal effects in absolute value. This is mainly due to a large average coefficient of the 
constant in the spatial probit and a rate of decay relatively faster of the spatial dependence. 
This also explains why the indirect effects, which can be interpreted as the probabilistic impact 
of a rise in the neighborhood of a given explanatory variable on the eco-label decision, are 
always smaller than the direct effects. The largest average total effects are associated with a 
high number of ISO14001 certificates, a strong level of economic development and potentially 
large scale effects. These empirical findings can explain why the pattern of eco-labelling 
adoption between developed and developing countries has been unequal. Low income 
countries do not possess the economic structure that would allow them to bear the fixed costs 
of eco-labelling through a large green premium and a high innovation level. These obstacles 
might be further exacerbated by the lack of perceived or actual credibility of the eco-labelling 
scheme in those countries. This can explain why the few developing economies with an eco-
label program in place are operated by governmental entities. 
 
In order to further investigate the impact of interdependence, it can be of interest to compare 
the predictive power of the spatial probit model with respect to the standard probit model, 
because the McFadden pseudo R2 can be misleading. As in most empirical studies considering a 
probit framework, I assume that the model is able to predict the eco-label adoption (i.e. 1iY ) 
when the predicted probability is equal to or larger than 50 percent. In the benchmark sample, 
the proportion of countries having introduced an eco-label program is about 33.33 percent. The 
fact that the sample is unbalanced makes any prediction more difficult. Yet, Table 3 suggests 
that accounting for spatial dependence definitively increases the explanatory power of the 
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model. The standard probit model predicts 90.78 percent of the cases correctly, while its spatial 
extension displays a higher predictive power with 94.33 percent. Among the eco-label adopters, 
85.11 percent are also predicted correctly by the spatial model and only 78.72 percent by the 
simple probit model. Once again, this highlights the importance of accounting for 
interdependence in the eco-label adoption. Interestingly, according to the spatial probit model, 
some less developed countries should not have implemented an eco-label (e.g. Indonesia, 
Russia, Ukraine,... ), while Chile should have adopted one. Actually at the end of 2009 the 
Chilean government proposed a bill that required producers, distributors and importers to label 
goods with information on the environmental impacts posed by their products. 
 
5 Robustness Check 
In order to investigate the robustness of the previous findings, several sensitivity analysis are 
performed. First, I check if the estimates are sensitive to a modification of the Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo settings. Second, different expressions of the spatial weight matrix are considered. 
Finally, I estimate several econometric specifications, including the spatial error and Durbin 
version of the benchmark model in order to account for some potential omission variables. 
Overall, the conclusions based on the benchmark model prevail and confirm the existence of 
spatial dependence in the eco-labelling decision. 
 
5.1 MCMC's setting 
Several Monte Carlo studies showed that the estimation of non-linear probability models can be 
sensitive to the degree of heteroskedasticity of the disturbances. The benchmark results were 
obtained under the following variance's prior    44 2 iv . Therefore, in order to check the 
robustness of the main results, I re-estimate the model by setting a different value for the 
hyperparameter r, either assuming the prior distribution is more asymmetric and skewed (r = 3) 
or the prior distribution is symmetric (r = 10). I also estimate the model under the assumption of 
no heteroskedasticity in the residuals' variance, i.e. 1iv , Ni ,...,1 . 
 
To save space, I only report in Table 4 the results of the heteroskedastic and asymmetric versus 
the symmetric and homoskedastic case. Overall, the results remain qualitatively similar. Higher 
or lower skewness parameter of the variance 2  distribution does not alter the findings. The 
decision to introduce  an ecological label is still spatially  dependent.  However  when  k = 3,  the 
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Table 4: MCMC Robustness Check Results 
 Spatial Probit with Exponential Distance  
 
Heteroskedastic andAsymmetric Case (k = 3) 
Spatial Probit With Exponential Distance  
 
Symmetric and Homoskedastic Case 
Variable Coefficient Direct 
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect 
Total  
Effect 
Coefficient Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect 
Total  
Effect 
Constant 3.59    1.948    
 [9.174]    [4.858]    
Real GDP per Capita 0.198** 0.007** 0.001** 0.008** 0.15** 0.007** 0.001** 0.009** 
 [0.104] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.069] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] 
SO2  -0.116** -0.004** -0.001* -0.005** -0.059** -0.003** -0.00001* -0.003** 
 [0.075] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.031] [0.001] [0.00001] [0.002] 
Political and Civil Rights -0.219 -0.008 -0.001 -0.009 -0.267 -0.013 -0.002 -0.015 
 [0.38] [0.014] [0.003] [0.016] [0.234] [0.012] [0.002] [0.014] 
Population Below 45 -0.174 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.144 -0.007 -0.001 -0.008 
 [0.161] [0.006] [0.001] [0.007] [0.099] [0.005] [0.001] [0.006] 
Environmental Treaties 0.131*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 0.085*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 
 [0.052] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.028] [0.001] [0.0001] [0.001] 
Manufacture Value Added 0.234*** 0.008*** 0.002** 0.009*** 0.126*** 0.006*** 0.001** 0.007*** 
 [0.098] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] [0.051] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] 
High Technology Exports 0.111*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 0.073*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.004*** 
 [0.051] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.031] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] 
ISO14001 0.448*** 0.015*** 0.003** 0.018*** 0.387*** 0.019*** 0.003** 0.022*** 
 [0.173] [0.007] [0.001] [0.008] [0.106] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] 
Manufacturing Tariff -0.114 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.089 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
 [0.125] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.07] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] 
Spatial Lag 0.165**    0.133**    
 [0.073]    [0.044]    
Observations (with eco-label) 141 (47)    141 (47)    
Total Draws / Omitted Draws 15000 /1000    15000 /1000    
Thinning Factor 4    5    
I-statistic 2.403    1.786    
Log-likelihood -24.998    -14.188    
Pseudo R
2
  0.721    0.842    
Note:  The mean of the posterior distribution is reported as coefficient while the standard deviation is reported in the brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant 
at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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results are more sensitive, because the algorithm breaks down when a smaller value for the 
hyperparameter r is considered (r = 3). In any case, most of the marginal estimates remain in the 
same range as in the benchmark, suggesting that the results are robust to an alteration of the 
MCMC's algorithm. This might be surprising, since a simple t-test rejects the hypothesis that 
each average estimated individual variance term ( ivˆ ) is equal to 1. Although not reported, but 
available upon request, the results are also robust to a change in the initial value of the spatial 
autoregressive parameter and the covariance matrix of the prior distribution of  . 
 
5.2 Spatial Weight Matrices 
In order to shed light on the relative intensity of interdependence in the eco-label decision, I re-
estimate the model using six alternative spatial weighting matrix W . First, I consider the simple 
inverse bilateral distance which allocates a positive weight to all countries, including very 
remote ones. In fact, strategic dependence can be effective even beyond its own geographical 
region. The corresponding spatial weight matrix is defined as follows: 
 

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i f tan
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A second spatial weight matrix is constructed based on the minimum political distance database 
built by Gleditsch & Ward (2001). The main reason to consider this measure is that the type of 
eco-labels considered in this study are in most cases the result of a political decision. In 
addition, empirical evidence suggests that political interests are a major determinant in the 
attitude towards preventing environmental damage. This political distance measure is build on 
the minimum geographical distances for all governments within 950 kilometers of each other. 
However, this measure is not simply geographical as it account for political ties and influences 
between governments in the year 2000. For instance, according to Gleditsch & Ward, there is no 
political influence between Canada and USA: 
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Third, I consider a spatial weight matrix based on the average bilateral trade between 1995-
2000 to explicitly account for trade intensity between countries. Accordingly, strategic 
dependence should be higher among countries characterized by high trade intensity 
standardized by distance: 
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However, trade intensity might be too broad as a measure of strategic interdependence, 
because despite important trade flows, countries can in reality share small strategic 
interdependence if each one is specialized in different type of products. That is why, following 
Cao & Prakash (2009), the last spatial weight matrices are constructed based on countries' 
export and import structural equivalence. The export (import) profile corresponds to the 
correlation between manufacturing exports (imports) of country i and j to the remaining 
economic partners at both bilateral and sector levels50. An export (import) structural 
equivalenceij close to 1 implies that country i and j export (import) the same type of goods to 
(from) the same partner countries. In other words, economy i and j are competitors (partners) 
since they export (import) similar products to (from) the same foreign markets. Therefore, one 
can expect strategic interactions to be stronger between countries in competition in export and 
import markets. I construct three spatial weight matrices based on exports and/or imports 
structural equivalence, respectively: 
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Results given in Table 5 are qualitatively similar in terms of direct effect independently of the 
spatial weight considered. This is additional evidence of the robustness of the benchmark 
results. The differences in the marginal indirect effects (and thus total effects) are mainly due to 
the average value taken by the posterior distribution of the spatial autoregressive parameter. 
For instance, the spatial lag associated with the inverse geographical distance weight matrix is 
larger than any other spatial scheme. This suggests that spatial interactions in the eco-label 
decision are not bounded within their own geographical region. For instance, the Chinese 
government will not only consider the actions of its Asian neighbors, but also pay attention to 
European nations as well as the United States.  
 
 
                                                     
50
 Based on the United Nations' Standard International Trade Classification, four manufacturing sectors are considered: (1) 
chemical and related products; (2) manufactured goods; (3) machinery and transport equipment; (4) miscellaneous 
manufactured articles. 
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Table 5: Spatial Weight Robustness Check Results 
 Spatial Probit with Inverse Distance  Spatial Probit With Inverse Political Distance  
Variable Coefficient Direct 
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect 
Total  
Effect 
Coefficient Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect 
Total  
Effect 
Constant 12.81    1.809    
 [12.52]    [5.253]    
Real GDP per Capita 0.349*** 0.007*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.137** 0.006** 0.001** 0.007** 
 [0.132] [0.003] [0.023] [0.024] [0.073] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] 
SO2  -0.209*** -0.004*** -0.015*** -0.02*** -0.06** -0.003** -0.001** -0.003** 
 [0.096] [0.002] [0.02] [0.021] [0.031] [0.001] [0.0001] [0.002] 
Political and Civil Rights -0.491 -0.01 -0.014 -0.023 -0.357 -0.015 -0.003 -0.018 
 [0.662] [0.013] [0.046] [0.056] [0.249] [0.011] [0.003] [0.013] 
Population Below 45 -0.431** -0.008** -0.028** -0.036** -0.168* -0.007* -0.001* -0.009* 
 [0.246] [0.005] [0.039] [0.041] [0.103] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] 
Environmental Treaties 0.179*** 0.004*** 0.01*** 0.014*** 0.104*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 
 [0.072] [0.001] [0.009] [0.009] [0.029] [0.001] [0.0001] [0.001] 
Manufacture Value Added 0.3*** 0.006*** 0.02*** 0.026*** 0.086* 0.004* 0.001* 0.004* 
 [0.131] [0.003] [0.022] [0.023] [0.051] [0.002] [0.0001] [0.002] 
High Technology Exports 0.175*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.083*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 
 [0.078] [0.002] [0.014] [0.015] [0.031] [0.001] [0.0001] [0.002] 
ISO14001 1.035*** 0.02*** 0.061*** 0.081*** 0.437*** 0.018*** 0.004*** 0.022*** 
 [0.397] [0.007] [0.054] [0.054] [0.09] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] 
Manufacturing Tariff -0.135 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.062 -0.003 -0.0001 -0.003 
 [0.233] [0.005] [0.014] [0.017] [0.071] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] 
Spatial Lag 0.703***    0.18***    
 [0.129]    [0.057]    
Observations (with eco-label) 141 (47)    141 (47)    
Total Draws / Omitted Draws 15000 /1000    15000 /1000    
Thinning Factor 10    10    
I-statistic 1.991    1.991    
Log-likelihood -14.033    -14.109    
Pseudo R
2
  0.844    0.843    
Note:  The mean of the posterior distribution is reported as coefficient while the standard deviation is reported in the brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant 
at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 5: Spatial Weight Robustness Check Results (continued) 
 Spatial Probit with Trade Intensity Spatial Probit With Export Structural Equivalence 
Variable Coefficient Direct 
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect 
Total  
Effect 
Coefficient Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect 
Total  
Effect 
Constant -1.013    1.657    
 [4.406]    [7.402]    
Real GDP per Capita 0.097 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.23*** 0.008*** 0.004* 0.012*** 
 [0.066] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.095] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] 
SO2  -0.046* -0.002* -0.001* -0.003* -0.054 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 [0.029] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.044] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Political and Civil Rights -0.257 -0.012 -0.002 -0.014 -0.408 -0.014 -0.007 -0.021 
 [0.267] [0.013] [0.004] [0.015] [0.332] [0.012] [0.009] [0.019] 
Population Below 45 -0.128 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.246* -0.009* -0.004 -0.013* 
 [0.098] [0.005] [0.002] [0.006] [0.144] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009] 
Environmental Treaties 0.108*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.14*** 0.005*** 0.002* 0.007*** 
 [0.031] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.047] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] 
Manufacture Value Added 0.114** 0.005** 0.001** 0.007** 0.137* 0.005* 0.002 0.007* 
 [0.054] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.076] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] 
High Technology Exports 0.04 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.092** 0.003** 0.001* 0.005** 
 [0.029] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.048] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] 
ISO14001 0.253*** 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.014*** 0.418*** 0.014*** 0.006* 0.02*** 
 [0.108] [0.005] [0.001] [0.004] [0.135] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] 
Manufacturing Tariff -0.137** -0.006** -0.001** -0.008** -0.169 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 
 [0.07] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] [0.115] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] 
Spatial Lag 0.186***    0.281*    
 [0.114]    [0.155]    
Observations (with eco-label) 141 (47)    141 (47)    
Total Draws / Omitted Draws 15000 /1000    15000 /1000    
Thinning Factor 7    6    
I-statistic 1.787    1.628    
Log-likelihood -34.690    -28.111    
Pseudo R
2
  0.613    0.687    
Note:  The mean of the posterior distribution is reported as coefficient while the standard deviation is reported in the brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant 
at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 5: Spatial Weight Robustness Check Results (continued) 
 Spatial Probit with Import Structural Equivalence Spatial Probit With Export + Import Structural Equivalence 
Variable Coefficient Direct 
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect 
Total  
Effect 
Coefficient Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect 
Total  
Effect 
Constant 0.674    1.28    
 [7.072]    [5.556]    
Real GDP per Capita 0.208*** 0.007*** 0.016** 0.023*** 0.158*** 0.007*** 0.012** 0.019*** 
 [0.103] [0.003] [0.027] [0.028] [0.077] [0.003] [0.018] [0.019] 
SO2  -0.075* -0.003* -0.006 -0.009* -0.041 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
 [0.047] [0.002] [0.014] [0.015] [0.03] [0.001] [0.006] [0.007] 
Political and Civil Rights -0.898** -0.03** -0.072* -0.102** -0.416 -0.019 -0.029 -0.048 
 [0.488] [0.016] [0.114] [0.123] [0.294] [0.012] [0.046] [0.052] 
Population Below 45 -0.301* -0.01* -0.025* -0.036* -0.203** -0.009** -0.016* -0.025** 
 [0.172] [0.006] [0.051] [0.054] [0.123] [0.005] [0.029] [0.032] 
Environmental Treaties 0.149*** 0.005*** 0.011** 0.016*** 0.093*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 
 [0.048] [0.002] [0.017] [0.017] [0.033] [0.001] [0.009] [0.009] 
Manufacture Value Added 0.167** 0.006** 0.013** 0.019** 0.113** 0.005** 0.008* 0.014** 
 [0.082] [0.003] [0.022] [0.023] [0.063] [0.003] [0.014] [0.015] 
High Technology Exports 0.101*** 0.003*** 0.008** 0.012*** 0.065** 0.003** 0.005** 0.008** 
 [0.048] [0.002] [0.016] [0.017] [0.032] [0.001] [0.008] [0.009] 
ISO14001 0.563*** 0.019*** 0.04** 0.059*** 0.309*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.034*** 
 [0.163] [0.006] [0.057] [0.057] [0.11] [0.004] [0.023] [0.022] 
Manufacturing Tariff -0.13 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.096 -0.004 -0.005 -0.01 
 [0.154] [0.005] [0.017] [0.02] [0.078] [0.004] [0.009] [0.011] 
Spatial Lag 0.575**    0.514***    
 [0.219]    [0.188]    
Observations (with eco-label) 141 (47)    141 (47)    
Total Draws / Omitted Draws 15000 /1000    15000 /1000    
Thinning Factor 10    5    
I-statistic 1.669    1.481    
Log-likelihood -18.531    -14.743    
Pseudo R
2
  0.794    0.836    
Note:  The mean of the posterior distribution is reported as coefficient while the standard deviation is reported in the brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, * significant at 10%. 
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This is also confirmed when the spatial lag is based on export and/or import structural 
equivalence. In fact, strategic dependence goes beyond pure geographical and political 
distances and captures trade competition among structural equivalent economies. Two 
countries close geographically and trading intensively but whose manufacturing industries are 
structurally different will not necessarily share a strong strategic interaction in the decision to 
implement an eco-labelling scheme (e.g. one country trades food goods, while the other one 
trades manufacturing goods). This could partially explain why the spatial autoregressive 
associated with trade intensity is not large. The other reason might be due to the fact that the 
spatial weight matrix with bilateral trade is no longer strictly exogenous (but potentially 
predetermined). Yet the main findings remain almost unchanged, except that the substituability 
relationship between the average manufacturing tariff and the decision to introduce an eco-
label is now statistically significant. This is in line with the view that eco-label might work as a 
non-tariff barriers. But since this finding is not robust, this suggests that the underlying 
protectionist motivation behind the implementation of an eco-labelling scheme is not as strong 
as least developed countries might fear. 
 
5.3 Alternative Model Specifications 
Due to data availability, it is extremely difficult to consider a large number of different potential 
explanatory variables without reducing drastically the sample size. By reducing the number of 
countries, not only is the notion of interdependence altered, but the MCMC algorithm will yield 
less efficient estimates. That is why, I restrict myself to estimate different versions of the 
benchmark model, including the spatial error and Durbin models, to account for potential 
additional (spatial) variables omission. 
 
As suggested by Table 6, the results are robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables51. In particular, the level of the mortality rate, rule of law and corruption does not 
have a significant impact on the likelihood of eco-labelling. However, a high share of tertiary 
enrollment and population density, associated with a high stage of development and the 
existence of a potential green premium, increases the probability to implement an eco-label 
program. The same is true for the export orientation of the country proxied by manufacturing 
net trade. In other words, exporting economies are more likely to introduce an eco-labelling 
scheme. 
                                                     
51
 Several other specifications were estimated that included GDP per capita squared or a European Union dummy. Although 
those results lead to the same conclusion, they suffer from high collinearity and lack of convergence in the MCMC estimation. 
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Table 6: Additional Covariates Results 
 Spatial Probit with Exponential Distance 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 4.468 5.552 3.909 0.367 -2.102 4.404 
 [5.613] [6.768] [5.442] [7.627] [7.587] [7.555] 
Real GDP per Capita 0.127* 0.29*** 0.21** 0.064 0.437*** 0.272*** 
 [0.074] [0.111] [0.093] [0.072] [0.131] [0.131] 
SO2  -0.063** -0.116*** -0.078*** -0.131*** -0.135** -0.138*** 
 [0.032] [0.05] [0.036] [0.056] [0.056] [0.061] 
Political and Civil Rights -0.35 -0.303 -0.16 -0.385 -1.056*** -0.557 
 [0.252] [0.355] [0.282] [0.332] [0.354] [0.413] 
Population Below 45 -0.18* -0.242* -0.165* -0.067 -0.375*** -0.25 
 [0.107] [0.143] [0.106] [0.141] [0.147] [0.181] 
Environmental Treaties 0.082*** 0.138*** 0.086*** 0.087** 0.278*** 0.148*** 
 [0.028] [0.045] [0.029] [0.041] [0.064] [0.055] 
Manufacture Value Added 0.108* 0.198*** 0.143*** 0.118** 0.369*** 0.168*** 
 [0.055] [0.067] [0.057] [0.06] [0.095] [0.075] 
High Technology Exports 0.086*** 0.102*** 0.081*** 0.168*** 0.218*** 0.13*** 
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.031] [0.072] [0.061] [0.056] 
ISO14001 0.426*** 0.594*** 0.407*** 0.586*** 0.707*** 0.531*** 
 [0.095] [0.184] [0.108] [0.2] [0.141] [0.215] 
Manufacturing Tariff -0.072 -0.107 -0.08 -0.045 -0.269*** -0.117 
 [0.074] [0.089] [0.075] [0.105] [0.088] [0.09] 
Mortality Rate -0.025      
 [0.021]      
Rule of Law  -1.093     
  [0.755]     
Corruption Index   -0.576    
   [0.640]    
Tertiary Enrollment    0.069***   
    [0.029]   
Population Density     0.113***  
     [0.032]  
Manufacturing Net Trade      0.084*** 
      [0.03] 
Spatial Lag 0.122** 0.152*** 0.144*** 0.109** 0.192*** 0.148*** 
 [0.043] [0.032] [0.041] [0.038] [0.03] [0.041] 
Observations (with eco-label) 141 (47) 141 (47) 141 (47) 141 (47) 141 (47) 141 (47) 
Total Draws / Omitted Draws 15000/1000 15000/1000 15000/1000 15000/1000 15000/1000 15000/1000 
Thinning Factor 5 / 1.399 10 / 1.577 10 / 1.410 15 / 1.440 15 / 1.962 10 / 1.876 
I-statistic -13.930 -13.630 -13.859 -11.503 -9.851 -10.404 
Log-likelihood 0.845 0.848 0.846 0.872 0.890 0.884 
Pseudo R
2
  4.468 5.552 3.909 0.367 -2.102 4.404 
Note:  The mean of the posterior distribution is reported as coefficient while the standard deviation is reported in the 
brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Beside the spatial lag, spatial dependence can also be specified in the error term. The spatial 
error model whose errors are spatially correlated reads as: 
uWee
eXY




 
 
Estimation of the spatially autocorrelated error model through the MCMC method is very 
similar to the spatial lag model, because the prior of each parameter is defined independently of 
each other. The marginal effects in a spatial error model are computed as follows: 
  iriiijr ttX ˆˆˆ]ˆ[ˆ   
 
where 
22 ˆˆˆ
ijiit    with ij  being the ij
th elements of the matrix   uW 1I . 
 
Ignoring spatial error dependence yields an omitted variable bias, when the omitted variables 
are spatially dependent. The issue is that the spatial lag might capture uncorrected spatial 
dependence related to the error term. Despite its econometric foundation, there is no direct 
economic interpretation of the expected sign of the spatial error term. As highlighted by Pace 
and LeSage (2007), the spatial Durbin model has the advantage of reducing spatially dependent 
omitted variable bias and having a direct economic interpretation. The spatial Durbin model 
corresponds to the extension of the benchmark model which includes the spatially weighted 
average of the dependent variable (WY*) as well as the explanatory variables beside the 
constant term (WXnc): 
uXXWYY   ncW  
 
Note that in the spatial Durbin model, the spatial effects are modified to account for the 
presence of the spatial covariates: 
  irijNrijNiiNijr sIIsXI ˆˆ]W)Wˆ[(ˆ])Wˆ[(ˆ)]ˆWXˆ()Wˆ[(ˆ 11nc1     
 
One important drawback of the spatial Durbin model is the introduction of additional 
collinearity as it is the case here. As a consequence, there are some convergence issues. That is 
why, some of the MCMC settings are modified. In particular, the number of burn-in and draws 
are set to 20,000 and 100,000, respectively, because the posterior distribution of the spatial lag 
is not converging with a smaller number of draws. 
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Table 7: Spatial Error and Durbin Results 
 Spatial Error Probit Spatial Durbin Probit with Exponential Distance 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient 
Spatial 
Coefficient 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Constant 7.254  -0.477     
 [6.972]  [9.358]     
Real GDP per Capita 0.396*** 1.077*** 0.761*** -0.409 0.004*** -0.003 0.001 
 [0.16] [0.58] [0.295] [0.555] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
SO2  -0.159** -0.406** -0.449*** -1.326*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 [0.079] [0.205] [0.177] [0.328] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004] 
Political and Civil Rights 0.854 2.218 4.311*** -15.61*** 0.024*** -0.061*** -0.037*** 
 [0.592] [1.605] [1.713] [4.803] [0.018] [0.044] [0.03] 
Population Below 45 -0.333* -0.898* -0.245 -0.551 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
 [0.188] [0.617] [0.471] [1.019] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Environmental Treaties 0.236*** 0.622*** 0.515*** 1.434*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
 [0.072] [0.223] [0.182] [0.439] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] 
Manufacture Value Added 0.274*** 0.725*** 0.989*** 2.202** 0.004** 0.006** 0.011*** 
 [0.112] [0.332] [0.335] [0.824] [0.003] [0.005] [0.008] 
High Technology Exports 0.139** 0.359** 0.417*** 1.387** 0.002** 0.004* 0.006*** 
 [0.064] [0.173] [0.141] [0.629] [0.001] [0.004] [0.005] 
ISO14001 0.482*** 1.275*** 1.415*** 0.071 0.007*** -0.002*** 0.005*** 
 [0.136] [0.452] [0.265] [0.451] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] 
Manufacturing Tariff 0.091 0.249 1.269*** -2.431 0.007*** -0.01* -0.004 
 [0.126] [0.363] [0.338] [1.478] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] 
Spatial Error 0.958***       
 [0.023]       
Spatial Lag   -0.412**     
   [0.173]     
Observations (with eco-label) 141 (47)  141 (47)     
Total Draws / Omitted Draws   15000 /1000   100000 /20000    
Thinning Factor 5  5     
I-statistic 1.251  1.126     
Log-likelihood -22.571  -0.313     
Pseudo R
2
  0.749  0.997     
 Note:  The mean of the posterior distribution is reported as coefficient while the standard deviation is reported in the 
brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 7 reports the results of the spatial error and Durbin probit models with the negative 
exponential distance weighting scheme. In comparison with the spatial autoregressive model, 
the spatially autocorrelated error model yields higher posterior mean for each parameter, 
including the spatial error variable 95.0ˆ . As a consequence, the marginal effects are larger 
than the direct effects in the benchmark model. Since the errors seems to be spatially 
correlated, it might be justified to consider the spatial Durbin model to control for the potential 
omitted variable bias in the spatial error. As mentioned previously, the spatial Durbin model 
suffers from multicollinearity, which explains why the posterior mean of most variables is higher 
(in particular the political and civil liberties index). Therefore these results should be analyzed 
cautiously. Evidence suggests that the average government will not only look if its partners have 
implemented an eco-labelling scheme, but also consider their economic characteristics. That is 
why the indirect marginal effects are larger than direct ones in absolute value for most 
explanatory variables. Finally, accounting for spatial dependence in the error term yields a 
negative and significant spatial autoregressive coefficient. This surprising finding is in line with 
the view that eco-labelling might be subject to free-riding. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The decision of a government to introduce an eco-labelling scheme program depends on many 
factors. One potential determinant, usually omitted in empirical literature, is the existence of 
interdependence in the adoption's decision. To address this issue, a limited dependent variable 
spatial probit model is estimated through a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method using a new 
joint update sampler algorithm. In comparison with an aspatial specification, accounting for the 
spatial dependence leads to a higher explanatory power of the model, with type-I and type-II 
errors decreasing from 9.2% to 5.7% of sample observations. The main findings indicate that the 
probability for a government to introduce an eco-labelling scheme is positively related to the 
economy's stage of development decision, the existence of potential scale effects as well as a 
relative production cost advantage through innovation. In addition, there is robust evidence of 
positive strategic dependence in the eco-labelling decision. In other words, a country has a 
higher probability of adopting an eco-labelling scheme if its immediate neighbours do so. 
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These empirical findings help to understand the reasons behind the asymmetric diffusion of 
eco-labelling schemes between developed and developing economies. As the latter confront 
harsher socio-economic problems, they lack incentive to implement eco-label programs and 
tend to behave as "standard-taker" rather than "standard-setter". This is further exacerbated by 
the positive strategic interaction prevailing among partner countries. This leads to a world 
where eco-labels tend to cluster into high-income regions, distorting trade flows and reducing 
world welfare. 
 
In order to promote eco-labelling among low income countries, eco-label programs already in 
place should be revised to be as transparent and unbiased as possible and thus avoid any trade 
barrier effects. Harmonization in the standards, greater transparency in the certification 
awarding and mutual recognition in eco-labelling schemes are also necessary in order to reduce 
the fixed costs associated with eco-labelling adoption. Such changes will not be achieved easily, 
as they involve not only national governments but also the implicated firms and agencies in 
both developed and developing countries. 
 
Although the above-mentioned results have been proved to be reasonably robust, there is 
ample scope for further improvements. In particular, future research should account for the 
time dynamic in the eco-label program implementation and thus consider a dynamic extension 
of the spatial probit model for several reasons. First, the starting phase of most eco-labelling 
schemes is associated with procedural and methodological uncertainties that could be even 
more important and lasting in developing countries. Second, most current eco-labels in 
developed countries are able to exist because of subsidies. A slowed economy or a change in 
environmental policy could limit the sources of subsidies (e.g. individual supports, foundations, 
governments) affecting the functioning of eco-label programs. Third, the important 
consolidation and vertical integration within and between most segments of the market chains, 
that have been taken place during the past 30 years, can also alter the industry market structure 
and affect the eco-labelling schemes. Last but not least, the potential oversupply of eco-labels 
may prevent consumption of environmentally friendly products because of information 
congestion. This could ultimately lead to the elimination of some eco-label programs. Hopefully, 
with the development of better disaggregated data on eco-labelled trade flows, additional 
investigation will help to disentangle the different effects that are at play between eco-labelling 
and international trade.   
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Relative Algorithms Performance 
Performance relative to Joint Update with Metropolis-Hastings 
 Iterative Update with Geweke and 
Metropolis-Hastings 
Iterative Update with Rodriguez-Yam 
et al. and Metropolis-Hastings 
N 
Dependence 
Factor 
Parameter 
Distance 
Dependence 
Factor 
Parameter 
Distance 
250 1.102 0.659 1.102 0.659 
500 1.287 0.724 1.287 0.724 
750 1.397 0.797 1.397 0.797 
1000 1.569 0.869 1.569 0.869 
Note: Performance standardized with respect to CPU.  
Performance relative to Joint Update with Metropolis-Hastings 
 Iterative Update with Geweke and 
Numerical Integration 
Iterative Update with Rodriguez-Yam 
et al. and Numerical Integration 
N 
Dependence 
Factor 
Parameter 
Distance 
Dependence 
Factor 
Parameter 
Distance 
250 1.256 0.684 1.234 0.950 
500 1.274 0.745 1.233 0.976 
750 1.455 0.818 1.276 1.022 
1000 1.469 0.879 1.290 1.064 
Note: Performance standardized with respect to CPU. 
 
7.2 Manufactured Multi-products Eco-Label Map of the World 
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7.3 Manufactured Multi-products Eco-Label List 
Country 
National 
Eco-label 
Supranational 
Eco-label 
Country 
National 
Eco-label 
Supranationa
l 
Eco-label 
Australia 1991  Korea, Rep. 1992  
Austria 1990 1992 Latvia  2004 
Belgium  1992 Liechtenstein  1992 
Brazil 1992  Lithuania 2001 2004 
Bulgaria  2007 Luxembourg 1992 1992 
Canada 1988  Malaysia 1996  
China 1993  Malta  2004 
Croatia 1993  Netherlands 1992 1992 
Cyprus  2004 New Zealand 1990  
Czech Republic 1993 2004 Norway  1989, 1992 
Denmark  1989, 1992 Philippines 2001  
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1999  Poland 2004 2004 
Estonia  2004 Portugal  1992 
Finland  1989, 1992 Romania  2007 
France 1992 1992 Russian Federation 2007  
Germany 1977 1992 Singapore 1992  
Greece  1992 Slovak Republic 1996 1996 
Hong Kong, China 2000  Slovenia  2004 
Hungary 1994 1994 Spain 1994 1992 
Iceland  1989, 1992 Sweden 1989 1989, 1992 
India 1991  Switzerland 2000  
Indonesia 1994  Taiwan 1992  
Ireland  1992 Thailand 1994  
Israel 1993  Ukraine 2002  
Italy  1992 United Kingdom  1992 
Japan 1989  United States 1988  
Notes:  
 
Nordic Swan;  EU Eco-labelling. Sources: Global Eco-labelling Network, New Zealand's Ministry of Economic 
Development 
 
7.4 Country List 
Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; 
Belgium-Luxembourg; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina 
Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; 
Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Côte d'Ivoire; Denmark; 
Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; 
Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Honduras; Hong 
Kong, China; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; 
Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Rep.; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao PDR; Latvia; Lebanon; Lithuania; 
Macedonia, FYR; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; 
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Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; 
Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; 
Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Slovak Republic; 
Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; 
Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela, RB; 
Vietnam; Yemen, Rep.; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
 
7.5 Data Sources 
 
Factors Variable Expected sign Source 
Stage of development Real GDP Per Capita + WDI 2007 
Economic Efficiency Civil And Political Liberties Index + Freedom House 
Pollution Pressure SO2 Emission level + EDGAR 
Scale Effect Manufacture Value Added + WDI 2007 
Price Premium Population Below 45 Years Old + U.S. Census Bureau 
Environmental Experience International Environmental Treaties + ENTRI 
Innovation High Technology Exports + WDI 2007 
Innovation ISO14001 Certificates + ISO 
Non-Tariff Barriers Manufacturing Tariff -/+ WDI 2007 
Spatial Dependence Geographical Distance -/+ CEPII 
Spatial Dependence Political Distance -/+ Gleditsch Ward (2001) 
Spatial Dependence Bilateral Trade Flows/Structural Equivalence -/+ UN Comtrade 
Note: Non spatial data is averaged over 2003-2005, except SO2 emission data which is only available for 2000. 
 
7.6 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Moran I 
Eco-label 141 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.57*** 
Real GDP per capita 141 8967.93 13800.01 38.76 62812.54 0.54*** 
SO2 emissions 141 91.78 13.29 0 99.8 0.2*** 
Political and civil liberties 141 -3.37 1.85 -7 -1 0.48*** 
Population share below 45 years old 141 41.09 4.88 31.17 65.05 0.48*** 
Environmental treaties 141 41.35 20.45 4 104 0.68*** 
Manufacture value-added 141 15.19 7.57 2.3 42 0.34*** 
High-technology exports 141 0.09 0.12 0 0.71 0.16*** 
ISO14001 certificates 141 775.67 2565.73 0 21881 0.26*** 
Manufacturing tariff 141 8.63 5.57 0 31.85 0.44*** 
Notes: The Moran statistics tests the absence of spatial autocorrelation. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
  denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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7.7 Correlation Matrix 
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Eco-label 1          
Real GDP per capita 0.65*** 1         
SO2 emission -0.43*** -0.42*** 1        
Political and civil liberties 0.58*** 0.55*** -0.32*** 1       
Pop. below 45 0.42*** 0.4*** -0.46*** 0.27*** 1      
Environmental treaties 0.71*** 0.64*** -0.37*** 0.62*** 0.37*** 1     
Manufacture value-added 0.44*** 0.13 -0.16* 0.21** 0.39*** 0.35*** 1    
High-technology exports 0.48*** 0.33*** -0.22*** 0.31*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 1   
ISO14001 certificates 0.4*** 0.34*** -0.21** 0.19** 0.18** 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 1  
Manufacturing tariff -0.53*** -0.56*** 0.33*** -0.57*** -0.45*** -0.51*** -0.3*** -0.3*** -0.21** 1 
Note: *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Conclusion 
 
This final chapter brings the thesis to a conclusion by reporting the main econometric and 
empirical findings as well as policy implications from the previous chapters. In addition, 
potential extensions of this work for further research are discussed. 
 
Findings Overview 
This PhD dissertation, composed of four chapters, provides an attempt to investigate and 
disentangle the relationship between foreign direct investment and environmental regulation in 
an integrated world. From a methodological point of view, this work proposes several 
innovations as new and more efficient estimators are implemented in various spatial 
frameworks. The general conclusion drawn from this thesis lies in the importance of accounting 
and correcting for spatial dependence properly in order to assess the relationship between 
international trade, pollution and environmental policies. In particular, I found robust evidence 
of spatial dependence in the (strategic) allocation of FDI as well as environmental policies. 
Overall, these findings suggest to further enhance the collaboration between governments in 
order to mitigate negative and capture positive spatial spillovers. 
 
The first chapter, entitled "Spatial Dynamic Panel and System GMM: a Monte-Carlo 
Investigation", investigates the finite sample properties of estimators for spatial dynamic panel 
models in the presence of several endogenous variables. The simulation results suggest that in 
order to account for the endogeneity of several covariates, one should apply the system 
generalized moments method estimator instead of spatial MLE, spatial dynamic MLE or spatial 
dynamic QMLE. In addition, system GMM is computationally less demanding and more easier to 
adapt to unbalanced panel data. Yet, when the sample size is relatively small and the spatial lag 
is the main variable of interest, spatial dynamic models should be estimated with traditional 
spatial estimators. 
 
In the second chapter, "Pollution Havens: a Spatial Vector Autoregression Approach", I 
investigate the mutual relationship between FDI, pollution and trade openness for 124 countries 
during the nineties. After applying second generation panel unit root tests, I estimate a 
trivariate spatial VAR model where a shock occurring in a given country can potentially affect 
the economic conditions in the neighboring countries. Based on generalized empirical likelihood 
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estimations, the results highlight a reverse causality between FDI and pollution emission, 
suggesting the existence of pollution haven and pollution halo effects in low income countries in 
particular. In addition, spatial spillovers play a key role in the linkage between FDI, trade 
openness and SO2 emissions and highlight the strategic nature of these variables. 
 
In line with the previous chapter, the third study, entitled "Complex FDI and Environmental 
Regulation", investigates if differences in environmental regulations did influence OECD's FDI 
allocation during 1981-2000 taking into account third-country effects in a multi-country setting. 
The findings, based on system GMM estimates of a spatial dynamic gravity model, confirm the 
existence of a negative relationship between FDI and environmental stringency, once 
endogeneity and spatial dependence are corrected. In addition, the evidence of positive third-
country effects for FDI suggests the prevalence of highly complex vertically integrated FDI from 
OECD countries to developing economies. Multinationals tend to allocate each part of the 
production process, including the most polluting one, to host countries, which ensure cost 
minimization. 
 
In the last chapter called "Unequal Spatial Diffusion of Eco-labels", the decision to introduce an 
eco-labelling scheme is analyzed through a heteroskedastic Bayesian spatial probit. This 
framework allows the government's decision of introducing an eco-label program to be 
influenced by the decision of the neighbouring countries. I propose to estimate this model by 
extending the joint updating approach developed by Holmes & Held (2006) to a spatial 
framework. Based on a sample, including 141 developing and developed economies, I show that 
a country’s probability to introduce an eco-labelling scheme depends among other things on the 
eco-label programs adopted by countries which are spatially close or sharing a strong trade 
intensity relationship with each other. These findings explain why developing countries, usually 
standards takers, have been naturally put at a disadvantage in terms of eco-labelling adoption. 
 
Policy Implications 
This thesis offers a global framework supporting the view that pollution and environmental 
policies might be affected by strategic trade and investment considerations. However, simply 
stating that environmental policies have a negative impact on a country’s competitiveness 
would be an oversimplification. From a policy point of view, environmental regulation should be 
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designed with enough flexibility (e.g. market based instruments), whenever possible (e.g. local 
pollutant), to minimize compliance costs and enhance environmental preservation. In order to 
make the shift as smooth as possible, adjustment programs between high income, emerging 
and low income countries seem necessary. The global or regional dimension of some 
environmental issues (e.g. transboundary pollution) should also rely on the joint active 
cooperation between developed and developing economies. In particular, efforts should be 
made at harmonizing environmental policies among countries, not on a one-to-one mechanism, 
but by acknowledging any relevant differences among economies such as the level of 
development and the pollution absorption capacity. Overall, it is important to create conditions 
capable of generating additional resources targeted towards environmental quality. 
 
Further Research 
Although the different empirical findings of this thesis provide additional insights on the reasons 
behind inconclusive pollution haven effect evidence in the empirical literature, further analysis 
should be done in order to enhance the formulation of optimal policy and direct the priority of 
policy makers. 
 
Most of the empirical analysis in this thesis has been carried out using aggregate level data. 
Although panel data approach can account for cross-country heterogeneity, it might sometimes 
suffer from measurement errors. An analysis at a more disaggregated level would allow to 
elaborate more relevant policy recommendations, since some sectors are expected to be more 
sensitive to environmental regulation. Extending the period of analysis would also be important 
as the 2000's have seen the emergence of new poles of growth (e.g. Brazil, China, India,...). In 
particular, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship between environmental 
regulation and capital allocation among these emerging economies and developing countries 
(e.g. Africa). But most importantly, a better dynamic measure of environmental stringency at 
the cross-country level would be able to alleviate some of the ambiguity associated with the use 
of output pollution measures. Coupled with a more theoretical foundations of the spatial 
effects, this would allow for a better rationale to interpret the results from a political economy 
perspective for instance. 
 
Overall, additional theoretical and empirical research on the impact of trade and capital 
liberalization on the level of environmental stringency is required, before a satisfactory 
conclusion on this topic is reached. 
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